theAnalysis.news

A three-part interview of Michael Albert to Paul Jay and Greg Wilpert on his book, ‘No Bosses: A New Economy for a Better World’.

Part 1:

Long-time activist and author Michael Albert outlines his vision for a post-capitalist and classless economic system, known as participatory economics and based on his most recent book, No Bosses (Zer0 Books, 2021). In this first part, Paul Jay and Michael Albert talk about the importance of economic vision and the rationale behind re-organizing the workplace on the basis of self-management and a non-corporate division of labor.

Part 2:

How would remuneration and the allocation of goods and services look like in a post-capitalist participatory economic system? In this second part of our discussion with Michael Albert, the author of the book, No Bosses (Zer0 Books, 2021), he talks to Greg Wilpert about the contours of an economic vision that fulfills the values of self-management, solidarity, diversity, equity, sustainability, and participation.

Part 3:

Michael Albert responds to some common objections and concerns that Greg Wilpert raises about his vision for a participatory economy, such as how to avoid the spontaneous formation of black markets, whether his proposal should be considered socialist or anarchist, and whether his proposal can be a considered a blueprint.

TRANSCRIPT / Part 1:

Paul Jay

Hi, welcome to theAnalysis.news. I’m Paul Jay, and we’ll be back in a few seconds to talk about what a new, a different, a better society actually look like. I’m certainly one that’s convinced that to fight against the sort of distortion or depravity, as our next guest calls our current system, you also have to have a vision to fight for. So we’re going to be doing that discussion soon with Michael Albert and talk about his new book, No Bosses: A New Economy for a Better World.

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In the preface to the book No Bosses by Michael Albert, Noam Chomsky writes the following.

Excerpt

“The chapters do not provide a complete blueprint, but rather the essentials, or what Albert calls a “scaffold,” for future experience to fill out. The scaffold describes and advocates a natural and built Commons, workers’ and consumers’ self-managing councils, a division of labor that balances empowering tasks among all workers, a norm that apportions income for duration, intensity, and onerousness of socially valued labor, and finally, not markets or essential planning, but instead participatory planning by workers and consumers of what is produced, by what means, to what ends. It makes a compelling case that these features can be brought together in a spirit of solidarity to establish a self-managing, equitable, sustainable, participatory, new economy, with a rich artistic and intellectual culture as well.”

Paul Jay

Now join us to talk about this new book, No Bosses. Now joining us is Michael Albert. He’s a longtime activist, author of 20 books and hundreds of articles, and founder and staff at zcomm.org/znet. For our purposes today, most relevant, the co-author of a vision called Participatory Economics, sometimes Participatory Socialism, and as I said, his new book, No Bosses. Thanks for joining us, Michael.

Michael Albert

Thank you very much for having me. I really appreciate it.

Paul Jay

So, first of all, I have to admit something which most hosts, I don’t think, like to admit, but I’m going to admit it. I haven’t read the whole book yet. I’ve read, I think, significant pieces of it. I get a sense of the argument, but it’s really quite an in-depth analysis of what a new, different kind of society could look like. So we’re going to talk about some of the features of it.

Before I get you to lay out the very broad vision of what the scaffold is, why, at this point in history, did you decide this was the book you needed to write?

Michael Albert

I suppose the honest answer is I didn’t. This vision emerged at the end of the ’60s during that period of upheaval. So the impetus to talk about vision came then. I guess the easiest way to describe how that happened was that myself and Robin Hahnel, who was my partner in developing this vision, constantly ran into the question, sort of put this way, we get what you don’t like. We understand what you don’t like, but what are you for?

Oftentimes it felt like the person who was asking that, and sometimes it was true, was basically saying, if you don’t have an answer to that question, shut up. You have no right being so critical. It’s the kind of thing that a parent might say to you, but you could also run into it in organizing, and we did.

Our response was basically, you don’t have to have a full alternative to slavery in order to be an abolitionist. I don’t have to understand everything about what a new economy is going to look like to oppose capitalism. After a while, we began to feel like that was a justified answer. It was sort of an accurate, true answer, but it was strategically dumb because a lot of the people who were asking really meant it. They really meant, okay, yeah, this sucks. This is terrible, but is there anything better? What are you for? So that kicked off the experience of trying to come up with an economic vision that was viable and worthy. Then we come to the present, and it’s not the first offering on that, but it’s an attempt that I hope is more succinct, tightly argued, and maybe better over this period of time. So I wrote it now to do something better than in the past.

Paul Jay

Well, as I said in the intro, I’m a big believer that one needs a vision to fight for, not just against. In the 1930s, in the ’40s, even to some extent in the ’50s, but less so, the Soviet Union was that model for millions and millions of people. Rightly or wrongly, whether they really understood what was going on there, the state was at least a workers’ state. It certainly had full employment, health care and a very good educational system. It turned out that a lot of the accusations against it that it had become more or less a kind of centralized police state turned out to be true. A lot of people didn’t want to believe it.

That didn’t mean that one, that vision wasn’t something to fight for, at least in a broad sense. When that vision collapsed, it left a real gaping hole in the progressive movement around the world. Okay, now, sort of what you just said, we know what we don’t like, but what are we actually fighting for? I think this is a critical question in terms of organizing and the movement. The thing, too, is people wonder what’s going on with the support for [Donald] Trump and this kind of right-wing politics because, in some ways, it’s filling a void. The traditional American narrative is espoused either by corporate Democrats, or old-styled Republicans is quite discredited, and it’s not a vision that people will fight for.

So I think it’s very important to have this debate and discussion. It’s one of the things I’ve always wanted to do with theAnalysis.news. I’m glad we’re doing it, and I’m going to do a lot more of it, and of course, there isn’t one vision of what we’re going to fight for, but it’s sort of in the same ballpark. So give us a sense of what that scaffolding is.

Michael Albert

I’ll do that in a second. Let me just say that I agree with you completely about the importance of it, and I’d even like to add an element. If you’re fighting against something that’s good, if the thing you’re fighting against is horrible as it is, how do you fight? How do you know what to do? How do you know what to reveal and what to argue for? How do you plant the seeds of the future in the present? So that’s one reason why vision matters. It’s because strategy isn’t rooted only at one end in the present. It also has to lead to where you want to go.

The other reason is the reason I think you were driving at, which is you could almost say psychological, but I think it’s more than that, which is that absent the positive, we’re entirely negative. Negativity has a kind of a tone, dynamic and culture associated with it, which is very off-putting. So we don’t attract people because they feel like, well, I’m supposed to make sacrifices, struggle and reorient myself, and you won’t even tell me what for? They also feel like, well, I’m supposed to do all those things, and the sort of vibes that you give off is so negative, and I don’t want to do it. So we need vision in order to grow now, not just because it would be nice to have it down the road when there’s something to implement.

Okay, so what’s the scaffold, you asked? Well, first of all, what’s the logic of it? It’s those things which we can say confidently now are needed, are necessary, if the future— and this is an economy we’re talking about in the book, No Bosses. Other things are also important: kinship, the political system, community, and culture, but the book is about the economy mostly.

What things can we say are needed and essential if this future economy is going to have the attributes we want it to have? Not a full blueprint for the reasons Noam gives and one more. One, we don’t know enough to do a blueprint. We’re going to learn all sorts of new things as time passes. You can’t blueprint them in advance. That’s a point that Noam makes when he makes this argument.

But there’s another reason, I think that I feel, which is not our place. It’s not our place to tell future citizens the details of how they’re going to function. The only thing that is our place to do is to try to hand them a world in which they can function the way they want to, in which they can manage their own lives, in which they do have equity, in which they do have solidarity, and so on. So the scaffold is those components of a new society which are essential and without which you’re not going to have that. 

The most obvious one is the one that has been pronounced or argued for forever, for a long time, which is that you can’t have private ownership of the means of production. You can’t have capitalists. You can’t have 1% who own everything and who therefore administer everything and determine the outcomes for everything. In place of that, participatory economics says, let’s have a Commons of productive assets.

It really sets aside ownership completely. It’s not capitalists who own it. It’s not anybody who owns it. It’s this Commons of productive assets. The question then becomes, well, how do you get to use it? How does a workplace get to use the resources and the tools and so on? The idea is productive Commons.

Paul Jay

So what you’re about to describe, the scaffolding, is a building that’s going to get erected after there’s been a transition, we don’t know for how long, from existing capitalism to essentially the abolition of private ownership to ownership by the Commons. So there’s quite a transition that’s going to have to take place, but that’s not what the book is about. The book is about what this might look like once you have had this transition. Am I right in that?

Michael Albert

Basically, yes. Over on the side here, there’s a file called Transition. It’s the next project. Yes, we now have what we have. We now have what? Private ownership, the means of production; we have what we call a corporate division of labour. That’s a division of labour in which about 20% of the workforce does empowering tasks, and 80% does disempowering tasks. We have remuneration income for property, for bargaining power, and to an extent, for output, and we have markets and or central planning. We really do have both in the United States. Amazon is essentially planned, and Amazon is as big as many economies. So we do have central planning, and we do have markets and a combination. Each of those key components annihilate things that I feel— and this is a value question— things that I feel that Robin and I felt at the beginning characterize a good economy. We characterize a good economy as people controlling their own lives. We call it self-management, diversity rather than homogenization. Solidarity, people actually being concerned with one another’s wellbeing, instead of a rat race in which you get ahead at the expense of somebody else, and instead of remuneration for power and property, remuneration for how long you work, how hard you work, and the onerousness of the conditions under which you work during socially valued labour and then participatory planning.

Those are the scaffold things. So the scaffold isn’t the whole building. The whole building is even longer in the future. You describe transition and then a situation where you’re creating the new society or creating the new economy and other elements of the society. Okay, the scaffold is really the key component that you have to get so that that thing that you’re creating, that whole new society, is going to have the attributes you want it to have. In the case of the economy, it’s going to be classless, and it’s going to be self-managing, et cetera.

Paul Jay

Well, if it’s classless, then in terms of [Karl] Marx, Engelism, essentially what does communism look like? What Marx and [Friedrich] Engels envisioned after this period of socialism, where you still have classes, a state, and you still have laws and cops and armies, you’re envisioning, what does it look like after that?

Michael Albert

Well, yeah, but you just lined up a bunch of things, cops and state and so on, and those are additional discussions. I don’t think that a good society doesn’t have a political system. If you don’t want to call that a state because the word state implies fierce hierarchy, okay, but a political system I think it does have.

I even think it’s probably not something good to go off on, but in a good economy, planes would fly, let’s say, let’s assume that’s the case. You wouldn’t have random people as pilots. You would have the people who are piloting the plane have to be trained and able to pilot the plane. Well, now there’s more that you would have in a good economy. They would be remunerated like everybody else, and they would have a balanced job. They would do disempowering as well as empowering work. But part of what they would do is fly the plane. You wouldn’t say, well, the pilot has a lot of power while flying, which is true. The pilot has the lives of 500 people in his hands or her hands.

Paul Jay

Yeah, I hope they’re not going to have a big discussion about how to fly the plane while they’re 3,000 ft up in the air.

Michael Albert

No, so you want a good pilot who’s capable of—

Paul Jay

I don’t know about participatory—

Michael Albert

No, the participatory part will get to, but it’s not that, clearly, and it shouldn’t be that about policing either. That is to say, the idea that everybody is going to deal with the kinds of violations that occur. We don’t assume all of a sudden that everybody is Mother Teresa. People are still people. There will still be drunkenness. There will still be abuse. There will still be less of everything, but it doesn’t disappear. So, if it doesn’t disappear, the way that society deals with it has to be skilled, it has to be learned, it has to be capable, and it has to be under control.

So lots of things that exist now, for example, there are some people who would say, look, factories pollute. They are undignified in what they do, so let’s get rid of them. Okay, that’s just silly, I think. You’re going to have workplaces. You’re going to have places where people come together and do work. What you want to do is make it humane, self-managed and all the other things.

So back to the pilot. The pilot in a participatory economy pilots, does it well, is trained and is capable, but also does, at other points in time while not piloting other activities. Let’s say tending to the people on the plane, going up and down the aisles and helping people out or maybe tending to cleaning up the airport. I don’t know, but a mixed combination of tasks.

Why? Well, one of the key themes of participatory economics is that between labor and capital, there’s another class, a coordinator class. People who, by virtue of their circumstances in the economy— so in that sense, it’s a sort of a Marxist argument— by virtue of the circumstances in the economy have more empowering work. Their work gives them a degree of knowledge, awareness, confidence, connections to other people, and access to decision-making levers, and 80% are the opposite. Their work deadens, exhausts, reduces skills, and disconnects. So you get a situation where the 20% become a new ruling class over the 80%.

The solution to that in participatory economics, or part of the solution to that, is that you don’t give 20% of the workforce all the empowering work. You instead define jobs. This is the new division of labour. Define jobs in such a way that everybody has a mix of responsibilities and tasks which are comparably empowering. So everybody is prepared to participate in the workers’ Council and also in the consumers’ Council in a self-managing way, rather than 80% being so exhausted, deadened, devoid of information about what’s going on and lacking confidence that they don’t want to participate and after a while don’t. Twenty percent who set the agendas, do the debating, the arguing and make all the decisions and rules. That’s a piece of participatory economics which is connected to and motivated by the desire to get rid of not just an owning class on top but to get rid of a class of empowered employees on top by having that empowerment spread out. So that’s one of the key scaffolding features. 

The argument is if you don’t do that, if you keep the old corporate division of labor, no matter what people’s will is, no matter what people’s inclinations and their heartfelt desires are, that’s not the issue. The structure will impose a class division and class rule. So you need to change the corporate division of labour to balance job complexes.

Paul Jay

Well, they kind of route this in where we are and might be. The world you’re describing only comes into being if there’s, as I said before, a kind of transition from a primarily privately owned economy to a socially owned economy, whatever form that might take. To some extent, it’s a different discussion because you still have classes, and you still have probably a mix of public ownership and private ownership.

To get where you’re at, and I don’t know if, in the book, I’m not sure it goes there, but assuming humanity survives our current circumstances of the climate threat and nuclear threat and so on, you’re at a whole other stage of human society. At this point, aren’t you into artificial intelligence and robotics? The whole nature of work is going to have changed. I don’t know if there are any brain-dead menial jobs anymore.

Michael Albert

Yeah, I have to admit, I’m not too impressed with that kind of formulation. But let’s go 20 years into the past.

Paul Jay

No, what do you mean you’re not impressed with that? What aren’t you impressed by?

Michael Albert

I am not impressed with what’s attributed to artificial intelligence and what it’s going to be able to do. I’m not impressed with the notion that there’ll be no onerous work. There will be, and it will have to be shared. But if there isn’t, great. Let me go 20 years into the past because I think what we’re talking about here is relevant now.

In Argentina, when there was an economic crisis and tons of factories were taken over by the workforce, they actually weren’t taken over by the workforce in the way we think of it. What happened was the capitalist punted. The capitalist decided this thing was no longer working for me, and they left. The coordinator class inside those workplaces said to themselves it was already failing without the owner, it sure as hell going to fail, I’m going too. They left also.

So you had all these workplaces of diverse kinds that were void of their ownership sector and void of their coordinator class sector, but the workers couldn’t go anyplace, so they took over. That was a remarkable kind of situation. When the workers took over, interestingly, they formed workers assemblies or workers councils, I like to call them, and instituted a kind of democratic decision-making voting. Not exactly what we call self-management in participatory economics, but effectively a long ways toward it. They also pretty much levelled the wages. So they went a long ways toward equitable incomes. They even, in some cases, took into account people’s personal circumstances. So they did that, too.

I was in a room with about 50 representatives from around Argentina, from occupied workplaces, and I’ve told this story before because, to me, it’s so powerful. Before the sort of formal section, I was there to speak. Before the formal section, people are just chatting and talking with each other, and it was very light and upbeat. People from across the country are meeting other people, and they are all members of this small group of people who have taken over factories.

We start, and I say, let’s go around the room, and we start doing that with a little bit of reporting on their circumstances. By the time the 7th person, and it was literally the 7th person, they’re making this brief report, not only was the room no longer upbeat, but it was maudlin, and some people were crying. They literally have tears in their eyes. The 7th person said this, I would never have thought. I could never imagine that I would say maybe Margaret Thatcher was right. We took over the workplace, we instituted democracy, we made our wages fair, and we began to work and not only that, we made the workplace succeed. We got it back on track, but now all the old crap is coming back. And that’s what one through seven said, also in various ways.

At that point, I interrupted and said when you took over, what did you do about the various jobs? What did you do to deal with the fact that the engineers and the finance people had left? They said, well, obviously we had to do the jobs. So people took responsibility for doing the jobs. So I said, so you had a new person who was, for example, doing the accounting and the financial officer. They said yes. They didn’t really understand the question because it seemed like it was the only possible thing you could do. Then I argued, and I think it’s the case that what happened was not what they thought, and they admitted that what they thought was human nature was destroying their experiment, that human nature was at fault for bringing back all the alienation and bringing back the hierarchy against their desires.

I argued that, no, that’s not what happened. What happened was you maintained the old division of labor, and even though you populated those jobs with working people whose backgrounds were the same as everybody else’s backgrounds, nonetheless, over time and not very long, those people filling those jobs by virtue of what they were doing and the responsibility that they saw themselves as having begun to see themselves as more worthy, as deserving, more. They also came to the meetings with more information and knowledge, and confidence. They started doing the agendas, and they just kept nodding. Then they said, yeah, that’s exactly it. I don’t even go to the meeting anymore, one of them said, and that’s an institution at work.

That’s what it means to talk about an institution mattering. This institution, the corporate division of labor, was overthrowing the will of the workplace. They really wanted justice. They really wanted equity. They really wanted their experiment to be different, and all the old crap was coming back. So participatory economics mattered right then. In other words, what would they have done differently? Is that what you’re going to ask?

Paul Jay

Well, first of all, let’s parse this out for a second. This kind of worker’s ownership, worker’s collective in this day and age, it happens. You have an enormous one in Spain called Mondragon, and there are smaller experiments, but they’re still operating within essentially a capitalist world, and they don’t change the nature of that. Even though Mondragon in Spain is enormous, it’s one of the larger companies, I think, in Spain. It has not changed the fundamental character of Spanish capitalism. Although that being said, it’s far more democratic for the workers. They’re much more careful if they have layoffs. They keep paying people and so on. So it’s better, but it’s not where your book is at by any means.

Now, that being said, whether it’s now or later, how do you deal with the fact that someone’s going to have to keep the books and know something about bookkeeping? So what are you going to change about the division of labor?

Michael Albert

So it’s true that somebody has to know something about bookkeeping, but it’s not true that somebody has to do only bookkeeping and somebody else has to do only cleaning the floors. It could be the case that we essentially, it’s what we did at South End press years and years and years ago. It could be the case that the workforce says, here are our tasks. These tasks all have to get done, that’s true. Here’s how we’re going to divide them up. We’re going to divide them up in such a way that each person has a mix of tasks and responsibilities such that their work conveys to them comparable empowerment to the other workers. You can look at it in their case or in a hospital. It means, okay, the surgeon no longer does only surgery. I mean, it’s clear what it means. It’s sort of contrary to our expectations that people should do a mix of things, and some of them are empowering, and some of them are not. Some of them are disempowering even.

Paul Jay

Yeah, but hang on here. A surgeon can go clean floors. I don’t think it’s a particularly good use of all those years of training, but somebody who has been trained to clean floors can’t go do surgery.

Michael Albert

Correct, so that’s your transition. I want to address both of those things. Is it a good use of the surgeon’s time to do something other than surgery? If you look at just the surgeon and you look at just the patience of that one surgeon, the answer is no. It’s idiotic. I agree with you. But if you look at the whole economic system, no, it is a good use of time.

Why? Because the surgeon, and that is to say, everybody who does empowered work, also doing disempowering work means that the 80% of the population whose upbringing, circumstances, schooling and situation at work deny their capacity to do anything empowering and thus gets no empowering work out of them is undone, and we unleash the capabilities of those people.

Paul Jay

The society you’re talking about, anyone with the skill and inclination to go to medical school can go. You’re not going to have the barriers to medical school we have now.

Michael Albert

What you’re not going to have is, you go to medical school, and you become a doctor, but you’re not just a doctor. You’re also a nurse or custodian or whatever. You’re doing a mix of things. You say to yourself— I’ll let you off the hook for being the foil here. Margaret Thatcher would say, Michael, you’re crazy.

The doctor, let’s say the surgeon is doing 40 hours of surgery, and you’re telling me it makes sense to have a situation in which that talented individual, instead of doing 40 hours of surgery, does, let’s make it simple, 20 hours and does 20 hours of nursing, cleaning and whatever else. I say back, yes, and she says to me, but we lose half of our surgery, and I say back, yeah. You’d be right if the reason why the people who aren’t doing empowering work aren’t doing it is that they are genetically incapable of doing it, which is what you think, Margaret, but that’s not the case.

To make this argument in front of, say, an audience speaking or something, I say, think back 50 years and put all the surgeons in a stadium. It’s a big stadium. Put all the surgeons in the stadium and look around. What do you see? Right away, somebody says, well, they’re almost all white men. I say, yes, why do those surgeons say that they are in the stadium and the rest of us aren’t? The women aren’t in particular, and the Blacks aren’t, Latinos aren’t. What do they give as their answer? They say it’s because we’re good at it, and they’re not. We’re capable of it, and they’re not. Of course, that was nonsense. It’s nonsense now that the coordinator class is good at empowering tasks and capable of empowering tasks, and the working class isn’t. The working class is downtrodden and prevented in the same way that women and Blacks were, of different dynamics, but to the same degree as women and Blacks were before.

Let me just say one last story.

Paul Jay

I think you’re mixing up time periods here.

Michael Albert

Well, I certainly am. I’m comparing now and then.

Paul Jay

No, but in imagining this future, it would be more like if you’re talking would stay within hospitals and doctors, it’d be more like what the Cubans have done where you have way more doctors and way more accessibility to medical school. In fact, being a doctor is practically an ordinary job because it’s so easy to get a medical education. You don’t need to tell those doctors to go wash some floors. You open up the doors of the medical school, so anyone that has the inclination and ability becomes a doctor. It doesn’t have to be a special privilege job.

Michael Albert

That last step there was if everybody. Not everybody has the capacity. I couldn’t be a doctor. Not everybody can be a doctor.

Paul Jay

I don’t want to be a doctor. Nor could I. I’m terrible at math.

Michael Albert

But there’s 80% of the population that’s not doing empowering work, and there’s 20% that is. If it’s the case, as I think it is, that in the 80%, I don’t know what to call it, the spectrum, the spread, the distribution of capacities is marginally different from the distribution of capacities in the 20%. Then if you open the doors to them doing the empowering tasks they’re capable of, there is nobody available to do disempowering work.

Paul Jay

Well, we don’t have too much time in this segment. We are going to do more segments because we’re going to keep talking and even increasingly fighting, I hope. What do you mean by empowering work? What does that mean? Like I used to work on the railroad, I worked on the railroad for five years. I fixed freight cars. Is that empowering work? Fixing a freight car?

Michael Albert

I don’t know. Here’s the answer, though.

Paul Jay

Because I loved it. I loved doing it, but I don’t know what’s empowering about it.

Michael Albert

Well, here’s the answer.

Paul Jay

I’ll tell you one thing it was because we had a union and because we fought for our rights.

Michael Albert

It was better than if you didn’t.

Paul Jay

It was dignified because we made it so.

Michael Albert

If we have a workplace and we have a whole lot of tasks that have to get done, the empowering tasks are the ones that convey to the person doing it, attributes which contribute to being able to express their will and their desire, argue for it, participate and have the inclination to do so. The disempowered tasks have the opposite implications for the people doing them.

So in the Argentine example, I gave you, the subset of the workforce and the workers were from the same backgrounds. The subset of the workforce doing those empowering tasks became elevated. It began to dominate the meetings. It set the agendas. It was the one doing the talking, and the disempowered workers were the ones who basically had to choose among them who they would support or something. It sounds a little like U.S. elections. Then they would stop doing it, they would back off, and the empowered workers would start paying themselves more.

Coordinated class consciousness and working-class consciousness are maybe important to talk about. You brought up one other thing that I just want to address for a second because a lot of people might feel like, come on, Michael. You’re saying here that everybody can do a set of empowering tasks efficiently to have an overall balanced job. Isn’t that a big assumption?

Back to Argentina. I’m talking to a woman in a glass factory. Remember, they kept the old division of labour. She was now essentially the Chief Financial Officer. She was doing the accounting, and she was keeping the books. So I asked her what she had been doing before, and she had been functioning at this glass furnace, and she showed it to me. I would have lasted maybe one day, probably two hours. Incredible heat, just ridiculous. Doing the same motions over and over again. Then the owner left. The accountants left. The engineers left, and she became the accountant.

How did you do that? I asked, what was the hardest thing to learn? It was your question in a very narrow time frame and in a very precise case. I said, what was the hardest thing to learn? She didn’t want to tell me. She didn’t want to talk about that. So I said, well, was it learning accounting concepts? No. Was it learning how to use the computer? No. Was it learning how to use a spreadsheet? No. Well, was it learning how to present the case? No. So I said, well, please tell me. So she said, first, I had to learn to read.

So this person went from being a working-class person doing the same rote movements over and over in front of a furnace, which is probably taking years off her life, to being the person who was doing the accounting, the books and reporting on it in a period of a few months while having to learn to read on the way.

Now, I admit it was much for me to believe, but it was there. The capacity of people is a lot greater than we let on. You and I couldn’t be a doctor or surgeons for a lot of reasons. Not wanting to, probably not having the dexterity, not having the, whatever, but everybody can do empowering tasks. Everybody can do empowering tasks. The number of people who work on assembly lines—

Paul Jay

I think you’re putting too much onus, too much emphasis on the job as opposed to the relationship to power in the enterprise.

Michael Albert

That’s just because it’s what we’re talking about.

Paul Jay

Well, no, maybe you are, but I wasn’t. I’m saying that you could be the person in charge of picking up garbage cans, but you could also be a member of the management committee. At the same time, you could be a member of the HR committee.

Michael Albert

That’s a balanced job complex.

Paul Jay

That’s what?

Michael Albert

In other words, what participatory economics is saying is that—

Paul Jay

I don’t have to be a part-time accountant. I need to be on a decision-making body that has power, and I can still have my job picking up garbage cans.

Michael Albert

Fine, absolutely, just like the doctor can be a surgeon and pick up garbage cans, agreed?

Paul Jay

No, I’m not saying that. The surgeon should be a surgeon, but the cleaner should also be on the management committee, not just picking up garbage cans. I’d frankly be quite happy if the surgeon just kept doing surgery.

Michael Albert

Yeah, most of the nurses wouldn’t be happy. Did you notice the strikes that are going on right now in the hospitals? One of the most notable things is that doctors—

Paul Jay

It’s not collectively owned. The power starts from the ownership and then the structure of how that ownership is managed and that powers executed.

Michael Albert

This is our dispute.

Paul Jay

Not the nature of the job description.

Michael Albert

This is our dispute. Our dispute seems to be— correct me if I’m wrong. On the one hand, power flows from ownership, explicit control, et cetera, which is true in existing firms. It’s not true in, say, Soviet factories under the prior system; there was no owner. So it didn’t flow from ownership; it flowed from something else. I’m saying it flowed from the distribution of circumstances, and we’re talking about this entirely. There’s also the allocation system to talk about, and there’s also the fact that there is no ownership anymore. There are also self-managed decision-making procedures by the Council inside the workplace.

All I’m saying is that all that can be subverted by private ownership. You’re saying that, and I’m agreeing with you. I’m saying it can additionally be subverted by a distribution of tasks, a division of labour, which causes some people to be in a position to make decisions, inclined to make decisions and have the information to make decisions, and other people not. You’re saying back to me, okay, wait a second. If somebody is doing some rote task, a repetitive task and picking up garbage, whatever it is, they could be on the decision-making board or whatever. You had a name for it. I forget what you called it.

Paul Jay

A management committee, leadership committee, whatever you want to call it.

Michael Albert

So they could be on the leadership committee. Alright, so here’s the problem with that, I think. On the one hand, you’re saying the same thing as me. If the person has a mix of responsibilities that caused them to be prepared to participate and make good decisions and make them well, or at least to participate in making good decisions, they’re not [Joesph] Stalin, to participate in making good decisions well, then that’s a balanced job complex, but what you’re describing, I don’t think, does that.

First of all, it has this management committee, which apparently has a lot of power over everybody else but second of all, it has somebody who is doing this rote stuff all the time, then making decisions about the workplace. They have to have information about the whole workplace. They have to have the confidence to access that information, et cetera, et cetera. If you just take somebody and you invite them to a meeting at which there are 14 lawyers and 14 engineers and accountants and so on, and then there’s somebody sitting there who spends all day doing stuff that gives them no particular knowledge relevant to the decision making, and you say, okay, you can attend. It does nothing.

Paul Jay

Actually, I don’t agree with that. We’re getting long here now. You should watch these interviews I did with Jane McAlevey on how she does bargaining now, not in the future. Where when she meets with the employer, and she’s either advising or in the leadership of the negotiations on behalf of the union, she invites the entire workplace.

Michael Albert

Which is fine. I would, too.

Paul Jay

In the end, there are representatives to get elected, and they do choose who’s going to speak. There is going to be a certain level of practicality where you need some kind of decision-making that isn’t going to involve everybody.

Michael Albert

Well, wait a minute. What do you mean decision-making isn’t going to involve everybody?

Paul Jay

Well, let’s say should we hire so and so. You’re not going to have a factory of 5,000 people where 5,000 people meet to decide if you’re going to hire somebody.

Michael Albert

Exactly right, and who would hire? The people who are most affected would be the ones who would be most involved in that decision. For instance, we’re hiring to be on a team that you and I are on. Well, then you and I are going to have a lot of say because if we don’t like that guy, the team is going to pop.

Paul Jay

Of course, but you also have to have an overview of the entire enterprise. So you’re going to have to have an elected body that has an overview of the whole enterprise.

Michael Albert

Maybe everybody should have a significant overview of the whole enterprise. Let’s say we’re going to have a decision about the hours of work. What time work starts, what times it ends, how the workplace, et cetera, et cetera. Some decisions affect overwhelmingly just everybody. Those are the kinds of decisions that everybody is involved in. Those are big policies. Then there are decisions that affect a relatively small; this is self-management. There are decisions that affect overwhelmingly a smaller group subject to those prior decisions. So they’re working within those globally made decisions, and they’re making decisions that affect themselves much more. So they do that, that’s fine. The point is—

Paul Jay

Before we get more granular about this, because it’s a little bit of one foot in today and one foot in tomorrow, as part of the argument here, we’re going to do another segment about this because we are going to have a fight about how you have a modern economy without some kind of planning. I know you’re saying you don’t need—

Michael Albert

It’s called participatory planning. Absolutely you do need planning.

Paul Jay

Okay, well, let’s find out in the next segment what that’s going to look like.

Michael Albert

Okay.

Paul Jay

Anyway, write in, send us your questions and comments, and pick up Michael’s book. It’s called No Bosses. And where do they get your book?

Michael Albert

As far as I’m aware, I’m so isolated because of COVID. It’s in stores, and it’s online, on Amazon, all the various online purchase places. It’s available everywhere. I know what you’re pointing to. Let me point them to one thing. There’s a site called nobossesbook.com, and all the reviews are there that have come out so far. The book has only been out two months, basically, exactly. There are, I think, about 15-16 reviews there. There are a lot of interviews. There are all sorts of stuff there. So people could look there and get a feeling for, well, do I really want to read this book or not? Then if you do, you get it, and if you don’t, you don’t.

Paul Jay

Okay, cool. Alright, thanks, Michael. Thank you for joining us on theAnalysis.news.

Michael Albert

Thank you. 

TRANSCRIPT: Part 2

Greg Wilpert

Welcome to theAnalysis.news. I’m Greg Wilpert. Today we’re going to take a look at a vision of what a better society might look like. This is actually a continuation of a conversation that Paul Jay started with Michael Albert. So I’m going to urge our audience to take a look at that first segment with the two of them because this one will continue where that previous conversation left off.

The book we’re going to discuss today is called No Bosses: A New Economy for a Better World by Michael Albert and published by Zero Books at the end of last year in 2021. Again, I highly recommend that people check out our first interview with Michael. As a reminder, the book outlines what a post-capitalist and classless economy would look like, one that is based on worker and consumer councils, remuneration based on duration, intensity, and onerous of socially valued labor, balanced job complexes, and participatory economic planning.

Michael is a longtime activist, author of 20 books and hundreds of articles, cofounder of ZNet and Z magazine, and also of many other media projects. Also, he’s the co-author of a vision called Participatory Economics, or Parecon for short.

Thanks for joining me today, Michael.

Michael Albert

Thank you for having me, Greg.

Greg Wilpert

So in the previous segment, when you and Paul discussed your book, he went over the issue of balanced job complexes, which is a central feature of participatory economics. I’d like to move on from there to look at other aspects of the vision. Let’s take a closer look, first at remuneration and then at participatory planning. We’ll close off with a variety of miscellaneous questions that I have. So now, just to continue basically on this vision that you outlined in No Bosses, why is the issue of remuneration so central? That is, assuming we achieve a society in which no one is rewarded simply for owning productive property, and I think most people on the Left, at least, would agree with that idea that you shouldn’t be rewarded just for owning property. What’s wrong with rewarding people or remunerating people on the basis of supply and demand market forces? How do you propose to determine remuneration or income differently?

Michael Albert

It’s a big question, especially since it takes us into allocation, and I think maybe you wanted to save that for a little bit later. So let me start off with the sort of; I suppose you could almost call it a value question. If you get rid of income for property, isn’t it sort of simple? Don’t you have to come up with something in place of it? You do have to have something in place of it, clearly. I mean, you and I are working in the economy, and we go home, and we consume stuff. Our budget or our income is what governs how much we can consume. What determines how much we earn? How much do we get from the economy, assuming that we work? If we didn’t work, then that’s a whole different story. It’s going to be some kind of generalized income for everybody. We can get to that later. Okay, so we work. And if we’re not going to get paid for our property, and we’re not going to get paid the way a market pays us, which is really for bargaining power. The way a market system works is, and everybody has experienced it; if you have more bargaining power, you can take more. If you have less bargaining power, you wind up taking less. So that’s another thing we could reward.

It’s arguably a stance we could have. Let’s reward bargaining power. Most people on the Left, and actually, I think most people, period, are going to recognize that’s despicable. I mean, that’s basically saying that we should all be thugs, try and take as much as we can, and if we’re stronger, we get more, and if we’re weaker, we get less. If you’re not going to do that, then what?

Socialists, a lot of them have historically said, well, okay, there’s an obvious and simple answer to that question. The answer is let’s have people get back in proportion to what they put in. So, in other words, if I produce a certain amount, I should get back— I mean, maybe society puts a certain amount of the social output to investment, puts a certain amount to free goods, but whatever is the amount that’s going to go to personal consumption or collective consumption, group consumption, my income for that should be a function of how much I produce. On the face of it, that sounds perfectly reasonable because, after all, if I’m getting less than that, somebody else is getting some of what I did. If I get more than that, I’m getting some of what somebody else did. So it seems fair, but it’s not. Why isn’t it?

Well, it isn’t because what determines, let’s say, you and I are working in the economy, what determines how much we make? How much we add to the social product relative to one another? Well, it can depend on a lot of variables. It may be that you were born with certain genetic endowments, certain characteristics which are very productive. Or it may be that I am using some tools, some equipment that you don’t have access to that’s very productive. Or it may be that one of us has workmates who are more productive. It may be that just one of us is producing an item that’s more valuable. In any of these cases, you and I work, let’s say, the same number of hours. So we put in four hours of work. One of us is going to be producing a greater amount of output by value in that four hours. Okay, so the socialist who favors this might say, yeah, sure, that’s sort of warranted, and it’s not such a big deal anyway.

Well, so there are two questions. Is it warranted? Is it ethically fine? The second question is, is it a big deal? Does it make such big differences that those differences are going to matter throughout the whole society? The third question is, does it work well regarding allocation, which you want to get to eventually? So take the first two. I don’t think it’s ethically warranted. I don’t think it should be the case. These are values, so I can’t say this is the reality. I can only say this is a value that I favor. I don’t think that it ought to be the case that if I’m lucky in the genetic lottery, if I have LeBron James’s body or Adele’s voice or Chomsky’s brain, and I’m born with this stuff, I should then have, on top of that, great income. I should be showered with wealth on top of that. To me, that makes no ethical sense whatsoever. Similarly, I don’t think it makes ethical sense if I have better tools or if I have if I’m lucky. That’s basically what it is. Does it matter? Is the difference very much?

When some socialists would say that to me, I would say back, well, okay, do you think that it’s proper for, let’s say, LeBron James, Steph Curry, or whoever, the right to earn 40 or $50 million a year? They would say, no, of course not. I would say, why not? They would say, well, it’s too much, and they would have various reasons. I would say, yeah, but they’re underpaid. They’re not overpaid. They’re underpaid by your standard because your standard says, let’s remunerate, let’s provide income in proportion to the degree of the value of what they contribute to society. The public— you may not like it if you’re a socialist— the public likes watching LeBron James play basketball a whole lot, so much that he’s being underpaid because Nike is taking some of it, and the owner of his team is taking some of it.

I think that rules out that norm also. If that norm is ruled out, then we need a different one. What participatory economics proposes is that we should get income for how hard we work, for how long we work, and for the onerousness of the conditions under which we work. If the work we do is socially valuable, and that’s a norm, that applies to everybody. It applies to everybody in the same way. It doesn’t generate huge disparities, and it’s ethically sound. I also think it’s economically sound, but we can come to that when you ask about it.

Greg Wilpert

Yeah, I actually have a couple of follow-up questions on that, but I think maybe I should leave those until after we discuss the issue of allocation. Actually, I do want to have one follow-up question, which is, of course, the process by which, and this might lead to the question of allocation and planning, that is, how do you determine these kinds of very intangible factors of onerousness and intensity and things like that? Who gets to decide that? What’s the process?

Michael Albert

First off, the last phrase, who gets to decide that? The answer to that is always the same in participatory economics because participatory economics is an economy which purports to generate self-management. So if we work in the workplace, the workers’ council is the ultimate arbiter of everything. It’s the decision-making body. So the workers’ council inside of a workplace is doing that. How? That question remains, obviously. How is it doing it? Well, what did I say were the variables? How long do you work? That’s easy. I don’t think there’s a big issue with that. How hard do you work? Well, the answer to that is, (A), the people you work with know how hard you work, and (B), there is an indicator. So while you’re not remunerated for your output, that doesn’t mean your output has no bearing. Your output indicates whether or not you have worked long, hard, et cetera. As far as the onerousness of conditions, again, the workers’ council has to go along.

If you and I work in a workplace and we each put in, let’s say the work week is 30 hours, so we each put in 30 hours a week, and we’re working. I say to the group, I think I should be remunerated more, or you say you think I should be remunerated less. The workplace is responsible for how it does this. So that means that workplace one— maybe I would want to be in this workplace— says we’re going to be pretty lax about this. We’re going to have average remuneration one level above, maybe a second level above, one level below, maybe a second level below. Another workplace might decide, and it’s up to the workplace and the workers’ council that they’re going to operate somewhat differently. They’re going to operate with ten levels much more highly refined above, ten levels more highly refined below. So you can see the second one has a much more exacting task to determine where one is on that spectrum. The first workplace is pretty simple. The second workplace might favor that precision over the amount of time that is lost doing it. The first workplace prefers saving the time.

I don’t think honestly that— this is why I favored the first one, I guess. I don’t think that there’s a real problem here at this level. There’s a different question to ask, which then starts to be more difficult. At this level, I think we work on work teams, we have a plan for the workplace, and we’re trying to fulfill that plan. The workforce is basically dividing up the income that is allotted to the workplace. So the workplace is allotted an income, a total income, to apportion to its workers. The workforce now apportions that income. So if somebody is going to get more, somebody else is going to get less because the total is for the workplace, and the workers are then deciding whether or not somebody has worked less time or less effort. I like to sing while I work, I don’t know, something and so on.

Is it perfect? No. Of course, it’s not perfect. Nothing social is perfect. Can one do it acceptably to all the workers? Can one have a procedure that the workers agree on? Can one then enact that in a manner that the workers like, especially when the workers have chosen the procedure? I think the answer to that is yes. The question that arises, I mean if you want to ask something else first, the question that arises is, well, what determines that amount that goes to the workplace as a whole? What determines the total amount?

Greg Wilpert

Well, maybe that gets us to participatory planning, which is actually the largest chapter in your book. I think it actually opens up a whole bunch of related questions not only to the process of production of goods and services but also to the remuneration issue. So let’s focus on that, and then I have some follow-up questions on remuneration as well. How would you outline how participatory planning would work and what would make it better than markets or central planning? Now that’s a huge question and let’s see if we can—

Michael Albert

Let me start from where we were, and then maybe we can hone in on other parts if that’s okay. So we’ve got this workplace. You and I work there, and I don’t know, 100 or 1,000 other people work there. We now know, internally, we have workers’ self-management. We make decisions via the workers’ council. Sometimes it allots the decisions to a team because it mostly affects the team. Sometimes it’s the whole workplace. We have the balance jobs that we talked about earlier. That’s a big deal. That makes a difference in all of this, simplifying things. Then we’re apportioning that allotted income.

So what determines that allotted income? Why is that allotted income higher or lower? Well, participatory economics says that productive assets— that’s the thing that capitalists own, basically. Productive assets are not owned by individuals. They are part of a commons. Our workplace, let’s say we make bicycles, whatever, our workplace is basically saying to the society we would like to use a certain share, a certain part of the productive assets in the commons. That’s a part of our plan. We’re saying let us use those productive assets, and we will produce these bicycles. Let’s say that the plan is accepted. We haven’t talked about that at all but let’s say that it is. We have a socially accepted, a socially responsible amount of output to produce. That’s what we’ve agreed on. In terms of bicycles, given the equipment we have to make bicycles, the number of workers that we have who are working, and so on.

Let’s suppose, for a minute, what do we want our allocation system to do? Let’s suppose for a minute that our workforce, the 100 or 1,000 of us, or whatever it is, produces at a socially responsible average level, average duration, average intensity, average onerousness, because that’s the nature of our workplace, let’s say. So then our workplace would be allotted 100 or 1,000, the number of workers times what is allotted to be the average income. Let’s say that we don’t. Let’s say that, in fact, this is how it happens, in other words. A subset of us are working less hard. A subset of us are working less hard. So as a result, our workplace is not, in fact, producing commensurate to the productive assets that we’re utilizing. We’re producing less.

What does that mean when you look at people? It means somebody is exerting, but it’s not socially responsible, or they’re not exerting, and therefore it’s less work. So, in other words, the total duration, intensity, and onerousness that the workplace is generating, which is what’s remunerated, is less than the total number of workers times the average. Some of us are not working up to capacity. We’re not working well, or we’re literally not working for the duration, et cetera. Somehow the allocation system has to apportion the right total bundle of income to the workplace. It’s a two-step deal. The allocation system says to our workplace, here’s your income for your workforce. Then our workers’ council says, Greg, here’s your income. Michael, here’s your income to everybody in the place. The simplest solution, maybe we even decide that we all trust each other and everybody gets the same, but we don’t have to decide that. The total that’s allotted to the workplace should be the total that’s warranted. The total duration, intensity, and onerousness. That’s a high demand on the allocation system, only one of many high demands that are placed on a good allocation system as compared to markets or central planning, which just don’t— they generate results, but the results don’t correspond to any kind of positive, virtuous values that we might have. They just generate results that are distorted relative to equity and self-management.

So it’s not that it gets technical, but it gets detailed. So the allocation system has to sort of ascertain well, in the case of a workplace, is it living up to its proposal or is it falling short regarding the social responsibility aspect? Obviously, it pays attention to output to do that. You’re not remunerating for output, but that doesn’t mean output doesn’t matter. Output matters. It’s just that you don’t get income for it. You get income for this other thing, but output matters to determining whether or not you’re doing socially valued labor, whether or not you’re using the equipment and using your own talents and your capacities consistent with getting an average income or more than an average income.

Greg Wilpert

So how would the participatory planning aspect work? Who gets to decide whether or not how many assets are allocated or remunerated to the workplace?

Michael Albert

Participatory planning says something like this. It says the workplace has a workers’ council. The neighborhood has a consumer council. So the consumer council is basically all the people who consume in the neighborhood, and it does partly collective consumption and partly individual consumption.

What is allocation? Allocation is a process by which what people are consuming and what people are producing are brought into proximity of each other. If they’re not in proximity, if much more is being produced than consumed, you got all this waste. It’s not being done. If you are short, well, then the consumers are being inadequately fulfilled, I suppose you could say. So you want these things to be in proximity to each other. You don’t want waste, you don’t want surplus, and you don’t want shortage. So that’s part of what allocation does, and you can accomplish that.

One way to accomplish that is with central planning. Ostensibly very smart or well-equipped people decide the outcome and instruct people what to do. That’s the essence of it. So that’s one option.

Another option is markets in which this can have many sorts of wrinkles, but in which the consumers and the producers are competing and which they’re all trying to get the best that they can. They try to arrive at outcomes that they prefer by applying the power that they have at their disposal. So, that’s another option. 

So participatory economics says there is a third option. There’s a way to do this which is cooperative, not competitive, and which has no top and no bottom, no center, no elite imposing its will upon the process. So what’s the process? The process is the consumer councils are making proposals. What are they proposing? They’re proposing collective consumption and individual consumption, the sum of it. All told, they’re proposing what society wants to consume, but each individual is proposing for its constituency, and the producer councils are proposing what society wants to produce in light of the productive assets that are available. Each workplace is proposing that, and you sum it all up in an industry, and you get the proposal for all total bicycles, not just our workplaces bicycles, and then for the whole economy.

If you just did that, they wouldn’t match. So that’s the allocation problem. There’s no particular reason to think that the sum total of what everybody was proposing to produce and everybody’s proposing to consume would be in proximity of each other. Why should that be? It wouldn’t be. So what you have to have is a process that brings them into proximity.

The process is that there are what the economists call iterations. There are rounds of planning. So the workers’ councils make a proposal, and the consumers’ councils make a proposal. What are they making it based upon? Well, they’re making it based upon prices. If I’m a consumer, I know that ultimately I can consume consistent with my budget. In other words, my income in light of prices. If I was only consuming bicycles, I could consume 47 bicycles or $400— because it sums up to my income. I know what my income is. This is not unfamiliar. This is true in any economy. I know what my income is, or I know what it’s likely to be at the end of the planning process. I know what prices are or are likely to be at the end of the planning process. So we’ll come to how I know them in a minute. So I make a proposal based upon that. On the producers’ side, it’s rather similar. I know what my workplace is utilizing, I know again what the costs are, and I know what the price of my output is.

Now it’s a little different than being within my budget on the consumer side. On the producer side, I have to have the value of my product commensurate to the cost of everything that I’m putting into it. That’s what’s socially responsible. It’s not socially responsible for me as a workplace to be using lots of equipment and have lots of workers and produce nothing. That’s socially irresponsible in the same way as it would be socially irresponsible for me as a consumer to consume a ton and not have done anything to warrant it.

The planning process has a second component. It has workers councils and consumers councils, and now it has something that’s called an iteration facilitation board. What’s that? That’s a bunch of people, or it could be a bunch of equipment that looks at prior activity and proposes a guess; that’s what it is. It’s called indicative prices. It proposes a guess as to what prices are going to wind up. So when we make our first proposal, when I sit down to say, to make my first consumption proposal, I know what I did last year, I know what my expected income is, I know what my expected prices are, and I make a proposal. At the workers’ council side, it’s pretty much the same thing. I know what prices are, I know what costs are, I know what I did last year. I have all these sorts of— so I make a proposal for what to do this year. My workers’ council makes a proposal. They don’t match. 

In the first iteration, we don’t have a plan; we have some information. That’s what we have. I get some information that the thing I’m producing is in undersupply. People want more of it, let’s say. I get a new set of prices for the second iteration. For the second round of planning, I get updated prices and guesses at what the final price is going to be. Same thing on the consumer side. This goes on for a number of rounds, not 200, ballpark seven-six in about there, and we arrive at a plan.

Now, why is this any good? Well, if the prices are drastically weird and wrong then it’s not good. If the prices are a reflection of what we could call full social costs and benefits, personal, collective, and ecological, so it takes into account what are called externalities. If the prices do that and if the producers are arriving at a responsible proposal, they’re properly utilizing their assets to provide what’s socially desired, and the consumers are arriving at a socially responsible proposal, a proper level of consumption, then we have a good plan.

In fact, economists have various ways of figuring out whether something is desirable or not. Honestly, mostly I’m not particularly partisan to those things. If you use those approaches, then this does as well as the idealized market system, except much better because the prices are actually real. Now, this would introduce new problems. How do you get that ecological thing in there? We still have this question of where in this came the determination of the amount of income that each workplace gets.

Greg Wilpert

Well, I wanted to follow up on the question of how this is actually different from markets. Aren’t markets an iteration process between supply and demand? How is what you’re proposing actually different? Of course, you end up with a plan, but that’s kind of like you could say, well, the company that’s making the widgets has a plan for making x number of widgets based on the information they got from the market.

There’s a sense in which— one way to extrapolate from that question is to say what do we have to do to markets to make them an acceptable mechanism process, allocation mechanism for getting consumption and production to be in proximity to each other and to fulfill our values. Remember what our values were? Self-management, solidarity, diversity, equity, and so on.

Well, you’d have to do quite a lot to markets. In fact, I think you’d have to turn it into participatory planning. That’s what would wind up happening if God could come down and, step by step, tinker with markets and make them fairer and fairer and fairer. Why? Well, this gets us into markets, but I guess you want to do that. What’s wrong with markets is multiple things. So one thing that’s wrong with markets is that they are a system in which my benefit is your loss and vice versa. When I’m selling or buying, I’m trying to— what is it? Sell cheap and buy dear. In other words, each participant is trying to do the best they can for themselves in a manner, so it produces a kind of individuality. It’s producing a kind of competitiveness.

Now, that might sound abstract, and who cares? But look around, look at society and ask yourself, this is a big deal. This is a fundamentally important institution in society, causing people to be narrow, to be individualist, to not give a damn about the other person. Not because they’re evil, but because that’s the way the system works. That’s the way markets work. They don’t work if you behave otherwise. Nice guys finish last, basically. So that’s one feature.

Another feature in markets is that markets don’t— in markets, there’s a buyer and a seller. The buyer and the seller are entering into the transaction. The will of the buyer and the will of the seller are entering into the transaction. So one problem is that they’re out for themselves in a narrow, individualist way, but that’s not the only problem. Another problem is that it’s not the case that the buyer and the seller are the only people who are affected by a transaction. When we do a transaction, and I don’t know, you get a car, okay, so you’re affected, and you get the car. The producers are affected; they sell the car. Everybody who breathes the pollution that your car spits out is also affected. That is not the only way people are affected. They’re also affected because, for instance, the steel that went into the car didn’t go into something else. So now, let’s assume that we collectively consume guided missiles. The guided-missile steel didn’t go into building transit or whatever. It’s partly external, what are called externalities, implications for those beyond the immediate transaction. It’s partly that, even more than that, every transaction in some sense affects everyone. In any transaction, in any producing and then consuming stuff is being used. It’s put to a certain purpose, and it’s not put to another purpose. So everybody is sort of impacted by this choice. We want self-management. So we want people to have a say in decisions in proportion to the degree they’re affected. Again, an outrageously, seemingly too demanding demand to put on the institution. We believe in it.

So what we’re saying is that the process of these workers and consumers councils making proposals; you’re proposing your consumption, you’re proposing your production. I’m not dictating it. Nobody is. Then mediating that and refining that in light of information that returns is, in fact, taking into account other people’s inclinations and other people’s desires. It’s not arriving at it by the amount of power that you have. It’s not arriving at it by ignoring the environmental effects. It’s taking all this stuff into account, and it’s all sort of playing back into your choice as you modify your choice.

If you say a market is just people producing stuff and getting stuff with a budget and with attention to impact, then every allocation system is a market. That’s what people in society say to us. So it removes the issue of are markets good or bad. Can we do better than markets? Well, there’s no such thing. If that’s what a market is, then every economy is going to have that. A market is not that. A market is buyers and sellers competing, trying to get ahead at the expense of the other, all based on short-term valuations, all based on prices that are a product of bargaining power. As a result, it has various negative effects, which we can see all around us.

Does participatory planning do better? Well, that’s an open question, I suppose until maybe it exists. Its advocates argue that, yes, participatory planning manages to create an allocation process that’s consistent with the other institutions.

Let me just go on one second more to give an example of what it means for an allocation process to not be consistent. In the earlier session that was done, we talked about balanced jobs. The purpose of that was to get rid of a class division between those who monopolize empowering circumstances and those who are doing the opposite. They’re in work roles that are disempowering. The claim is that that’s not just any old class division, but it can become a fundamental class division, where one class, the empowered classes, is the ruling class, and the other class, disempowered classes, subordinate class, let’s say 20 over 80. Okay, so we don’t want that, so we have balanced job complexes so that our activity in the economy does not distinguish us into two groups, one that’s empowered and one that isn’t empowered. It instead leaves us all comparably empowered.

Let’s say on top of that we put central planning or we put markets. If we put these kinds of allocation on top of balanced job complexes, there’s a contradiction. This is not compatible. Why not? Well, with central planning, it’s sort of obvious. The central planners don’t want to negotiate with the workforce. They want to impose on the workforce. The whole logic of the thing is that the central planners are authorities and that they want authorities inside the workplace to negotiate with because they sure as hell don’t want to negotiate with a whole workers council. They’re sending instructions, and they want the instructions to be met.

So we know historically that’s sort of what happens. The more interesting one is the market. Why would markets be inconsistent with balanced job complexes? I think it goes something like this. If you have markets, then you have competition. If we produce bicycles and somebody else produces bicycles, we’re competing for market share. We’re competing to become the larger bicycle firm, the firm that can generate more income. Remember, income with markets is a function not of duration, intensity, and onerousness but basically of what you can take. If the bicycle firm can engineer its way into getting more gross revenues and essentially surplus, then it does better. So its workforce wants to do that.

How do you do that? Well, a workplace across town is producing bicycles, and your workplace is producing bicycles. You do things that let you get ahead. What kind of thing lets you get ahead? Dumping your waste on your neighborhood, speeding up, not having child care, not having air conditioning for anybody except maybe a few, and so on. I’m not sure everybody agrees with me about this, but I think that what happens in this kind of circumstance is that the workplace— let’s say we even have workers councils. So we have markets and workers councils and balanced job complexes. Still in all, my workplace has to compete because of its markets. So it has to make these sort of horrible decisions, decisions that hurt the workforce.

Well, who’s going to make those decisions? Who’s good at making those decisions, and who’s going to make them? If we don’t make them and somebody else does, we get screwed. If we do make them, we screw ourselves. I think what happens is we have to find people who are well adjusted and who are poorly adjusted, I suppose I should say, who are of a mindset and of a skill set to make those kinds of choices, to cut costs, to increase output regardless of the impact on the workforce.

So we hire people like that. So we go to the—nowadays, we would go to the Wharton School or the Harvard Business School or something, and we hire somebody who has been socialized into not caring about fucking other people over. We hire them, we put them in offices, and we say, okay, screw us because it’s in our interest. Screw us at work to get us more income and to keep us alive and competing with other firms, so we don’t go under. The logic of markets disrupts the equity of income, but it also disrupts the classlessness of self-management. That’s how an allocation system can screw up your aspirations.

Greg Wilpert

Let me get back to the question of how you incorporate values at this point because I could imagine a situation where, let’s say, you’re a bicycle factory or whatever. You mentioned earlier that you wouldn’t want them to dump their waste in the community. Obviously, the community has an interest in preventing that. In the process of coming up with a plan, presumably, they would take that into account. What if, let’s say, that factory just dumps it in a different community, shifts it abroad or who knows? How do you then take the ecological value, for example, into account?

Michael Albert

Why is the fact that—

Greg Wilpert

 Presumably to offer a lower price and to perhaps get more income?

Michael Albert

Why?

Greg Wilpert

Because everybody wants to have more stuff.

Michael Albert

But they’re not going to get more stuff. This is one of the peculiarities, I suppose you could say, of participatory planning or of participatory economics. There are these two things. There’s your productivity, and there’s your duration, intensity, and onerousness of socially valued labor. They’re not the same. So let’s say that you have a balance job complex, but a part of that is, I don’t know, doing brain surgery. I have a balanced job complex, and a part of it is, I don’t know, inside of a workplace, being involved in planning the allocation of stuff during the workday or making something that is empowering but in no way as socially valuable as brain surgery. So you’re going to get, in some systems, you’re going to get a higher income because your brain surgery is so valuable, and I’m going to get a lower income because the violins that I’m working on are less valuable. In participatory economics, that isn’t the case. I’m going to get income for the duration, intensity, and onerous. You’re going to get income for the duration, intensity, and onerous.

Greg Wilpert

Wait, isn’t that allocated by the workplace? In other words, depending on how much income that workplace generates, on the whole, isn’t it?

Michael Albert

That was the thing in the last little section that we did, and I left for last. There is no such thing as me getting twice as much for the similar duration, intensity, and onerousness, or at least that’s the claim. In other words, there’s no way to aggrandize self. There’s no way to enlarge one’s income beyond the norm that is stipulated.

Now, you’re right. If society misallocates to a workplace, if society were to allocate— I’m in one bicycle factory, and you’re in another bicycle factory. So your bicycle factory dumps its crap on the neighborhood, or maybe it takes it around the corner and dumps it, and mine doesn’t. The idea here is your factory is in a position to get a greater income allotment from the allocation system than mine is. The answer is no. First of all, this gets us to another step, but we probably shouldn’t have used dumping. In any case, in the guise of dumping, you get charged for the dumping. So, in other words, that’s part of your cost. In the same way, you use some input steel. So your workplace is charged for the steel that you use that you get from someplace else. Your workplace generates some pollution. Your workplace is charged for that also. It’s not like a product where you’re benefiting from the product. It’s a product of pollution. The product is a negative thing, and you’re charged for that. Indeed, the income goes to the people who are suffering the pollution. It’s a little bit difficult. The idea is the planning process arrives at— let’s look at it now as a whole. So the planning process arrives at a plan. That means it’s arrived at essentially an average income. It now has to apportion, say to the bicycle industry as compared to some other industries. Well, if everything is just level, then the bicycle industry gets the total number of people in the bicycle industry times the average income, and so does the violin industry. If it’s not level, let’s say the bicycle industry is more onerous than you’d get an added element to your income, to your industry income. Or let’s say that during the course of the year, the bicycle industry fails to fulfill its plan. So it’s not doing the socially valued amount of labor that was the average; it’s doing less. So then it gets less again. It’s not that you, Greg, did less; it’s the whole damn industry that did less. So now the industry, so the society is basically, in a sense, you could say the planned society is apportioning to industries income allotment. That has to all add up to the total for the whole society.

Michael Albert

Now, inside your industry, there’s an industry federation of councils. Inside your industry, again, there’s an apportionment. To what? To all the factories in the industry. Once again, now the industry has a certain amount that’s allotted to it. And let’s just, for the sake of discussion, say it’s average or whatever. It’s a total amount. Now, the industry is allotting to every factory inside the industry or every workplace inside the industry. Again, if some workplaces are under producing, are under utilizing the productive assets of the social commons, then they’re going to get less income on the grounds that they’re not fully doing socially valued labor. They’re either not working or they’re working poorly, one or the other. So they would get less.

Then the next step is— it’s a similar kind of step at the total level, there’s an apportionment to industries, and the total level has to have some notion. None of this is perfect, but it can’t be. The total level has some notion if some of the industries are more onerous or less onerous.

Now, at the industry level, there might be that too. Maybe there’s a bicycle factory in, I don’t know, Alabama where the temperature is really hot, and there’s a bicycle factory in Ohio where the temperature isn’t that hot, and maybe that’s a real issue. The one is more onerous than the other. Anyway, the industry has to apportion among workplaces, and then the workplace apportions among its workforce. At every step, it’s the same criteria: remuneration for duration, intensity, and onerousness of socially valued labor.

You don’t have a situation where as an individual— now let’s look at the individual level. You want to aggrandize yourself. So how do you do that? Well, you can claim to do stuff that you didn’t do. So you can cheat. Try and cheat somehow, or you can do a whole lot. Well, you can’t do a whole lot unless your workmates agree because it affects them. You can’t take on all the work in the workplace. You can’t do that. You have to get an agreement. You can’t cheat because your workplace is going to know. Maybe you can cheat a little bit, I don’t know, but the workplace is going to know if you’re just exaggerating. You’re saying, I did 60 hours, you all did 30 hours, and everybody can see you didn’t do 60 hours. Not only that, even if you did do 60 hours, you didn’t generate double the output of everybody else.

So there are a lot of indicators that preclude, and this presumes that just solidarity wouldn’t preclude it, which I think it would. These kinds of behaviors, it’s a little like it’s a whole different thing. What if you’re a tennis player and you’re as good as Roger Federer? So you look around, and you say to yourself, well, this is nice, but let’s get real. I’m special, and I want more income, so I’m going to set up a black market. I’m going to sell my tennis capacity on the side, and I’m going to try and aggrandize myself.

Well, what happens in a participatory economy? First of all, you have to have tennis courts, you have to have tennis balls, you have to have, et cetera, not so simple because all work is done in a workers council. You’re going to do it on the side, on the sly. The next thing that’s the problem is how do you get this income? Where is it coming from? Notice income was coming from the plan. It’s not coming from a bunch of people who are coming and paying you. So you say to a bunch of people, pay me, and you can play with me. There are a lot of people who want to play, and they want to play with Roger Federer because you’re so damn good. So they’re willing to give you stuff. So they give you chickens and whatever.

Greg Wilpert

But don’t they also have their own money that they get?

Michael Albert

Not particularly, not in the modern version. In other words, they have an income. Everybody has an income. So I have an income, let’s call it 100, and I can spend my 100 on stuff, and I’ve planned on what to spend on. Another feature is that that changes over the course of the year. So the system has to be able to accommodate that, but it does. So I have that amount of spending capacity, but it’s probably just on a computer. It’s not like a credit card. So I can’t pay you with a credit card, but it doesn’t really matter, even if I can transfer to you, which I don’t think I’d be able to, but let’s say I can transfer to you a piece of my bargaining, I mean, a piece of my income. So now you, Roger, have a big income. You don’t have Roger’s capitalist world income, but let’s say you have twice what you would have had, or three times what you would have had even. Now, what do you do?

Well, in our current society, being rich is no big deal. That is to say, you can do whatever you want with that income because when you drive around in your Ferrari or whatever it is that you’re doing, it’s no big deal. Lots of people do that. In a participatory economy, that’s not true. If you spend a really high income publicly, everybody knows you cheated. Everybody knows you did something wrong. I don’t even think you could get to that point. If you got to that point, it’s still hard. You have to enjoy it in your basement because it’s clearly a violation. So there are things like that. For instance, we didn’t put that in participatory economics. We just discovered that after we had this picture of what this thing was in our head, we discovered this peculiar and interesting attribute. It sort of makes it hard to cheat. It isn’t just that it’s oriented against that. It isn’t just that it sort of tries to create social relations and solidarity. Contrary to that, it even makes it hard to do. It’s true inside the workplace also. So you and your fellow workers, I mean, if you’re going to be an asshole, how do you get away with that? It’s not obvious. These are all minuscule— just as a sidebar— these are all small negatives compared to what’s normal and commonplace in existing allocation systems and economies. Even these small negatives are very hard to implement and have—

Greg Wilpert

I want to ask a whole bunch of follow-up questions, but we’ve gone on for pretty long now. So I want to conclude this part, and we’ll do another segment where we cover the follow-up questions that I have. So, first of all, I just want to remind people to take a look at the first part that was done with Paul Jay. This is part two. We’re going to conclude that now. I’m speaking to Michael Albert, author of the book No Bosses: A New Economy for a Better World. Thanks again, Michael, for having joined me today. I urge you to tune in, everybody, for the third part, which is going to follow right after this one.

Michael Albert

Thank you.

Greg Wilpert

Thank you to our audience for tuning into theAnalysis.news. If you like our videos and podcasts, please make sure to visit theAnalysis.news website and make a donation there so we can continue providing the service. Also, don’t forget to subscribe to our YouTube channel and or to the podcast.

Γιάνης Βαρουφάκης | Project Syndicate

Δεν είναι ποτέ εύκολο να ξυπνά κανείς με την είδηση ότι το επιχειρηματικό μοντέλο της χώρας του έχει καταρρεύσει. Ότι οι πολιτικοί που τον κυβερνούσαν είτε τον εξαπατούσαν είτε του έλεγαν ψέματα επί δεκαετίες, όταν τον διαβεβαίωναν ότι το βιοτικό επίπεδο που με κόπο κέρδισε ήταν ασφαλές. Ότι το άμεσο μέλλον του εξαρτάται πλέον από την καλοσύνη των ξένων που είναι αποφασισμένοι να τον συντρίψουν. Ότι τα θεσμικά όργανα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, τα οποία είχε εμπιστευτεί, είχαν επιδοθεί σε μια διαρκή άσκηση συγκάλυψης. Ότι οι Ευρωπαίοι εταίροι του, στους οποίους στρέφεται τώρα για βοήθεια, τον βλέπουν ως έναν κακοποιό του οποίου η τιμωρία έχει καθυστερήσει προ πολλού. Ότι οι οικονομικές ελίτ στη χώρα του, και όχι μόνο, αναζητούν επιμελώς νέους τρόπους για να εξασφαλίσουν ότι η χώρα του θα παραμείνει εγκλωβισμένη. Ότι οι κυβερνώντες πολιτικοί στις Βρυξέλλες είναι έτοιμοι να τον δεσμεύσουν σε μαζικές, επώδυνες αλλαγές, ώστε να διασφαλίσουν ότι τίποτα δεν θα αλλάξει.

Οι Έλληνες γνωρίζουμε αυτό το συναίσθημα. Το βιώσαμε στα κόκκαλά μας στις αρχές του 2010. Σήμερα, είναι οι Γερμανοί που, καθώς το γερμανικό επιχειρηματικό μοντέλο καταρρέει γύρω τους, πρέπει να αντιμετωπίσουν αυτό το τείχος συγκατάβασης, αντιπάθειας, ακόμη και χλευασμού. Όσο ειρωνικό κι αν είναι, οι Έλληνες είναι ο ευρωπαϊκός λαός που είναι σε καλύτερη θέση να καταλάβει ότι οι Γερμανοί αξίζουν κάτι καλύτερο. Ότι η σημερινή τους δυσχερής θέση είναι το αποτέλεσμα της συλλογικής, ευρωπαϊκής μας αποτυχίας. Ότι κανείς δεν κερδίζει από το αίσθημα ικανοποίησης ότι όλα αναποδογύρισαν εναντίον του λαού της Γερμανίας- λιγότερο απ’ όλους οι πολύπαθοι Έλληνες, οι νότιοι Ιταλοί, οι Ισπανοί, οι Πορτογάλοι – τα PIGS όπως μας αποκαλούσαν κάποτε.

Το γερμανικό επιχειρηματικό μοντέλο βασιζόταν στους συρρικνωμένους μισθούς, στο φθηνό ρωσικό φυσικό αέριο και στην αριστεία στη μηχανική μεσαίας τεχνολογίας – ιδίως στην κατασκευή αυτοκινήτων με κινητήρες εσωτερικής καύσης. Σε αυτή τη βάση, συνέχισε να παράγει τεράστια εμπορικά πλεονάσματα κατά τη διάρκεια τεσσάρων διαφορετικών μεταπολεμικών φάσεων: Πρώτον, κατά τη διάρκεια του συστήματος Bretton Woods υπό την ηγεσία των ΗΠΑ, το οποίο παρείχε στη Γερμανία σταθερές συναλλαγματικές ισοτιμίες και πρόσβαση στην αγορά της υπόλοιπης Ευρώπης, της Ασίας και της Αμερικής. Δεύτερον, μετά την κατάρρευση του Bretton Woods, η ενιαία αγορά της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης αποδείχθηκε ιδιαίτερα προσοδοφόρα για τις γερμανικές εξαγωγές. Τρίτον, με την εισαγωγή του ευρώ, η χρηματοδότηση των προμηθευτών ενίσχυσε τρομερά τη ροή τόσο των αγαθών όσο και των κεφαλαίων από τη Γερμανία προς την ευρωπαϊκή περιφέρεια. Τέλος, μόλις η κρίση του ευρώ μείωσε τη ζήτηση για γερμανικά προϊόντα από τις ευρωπαϊκές αγορές της Μεσογείου, η Κίνα που διψούσε για γερμανικά ενδιάμεσα και τελικά προϊόντα μεταποίησης (τα οποία έγιναν φτηνά λόγω του ευρώ που κρατούσε τη γερμανική συναλλαγματική ισοτιμία σε χαμηλά επίπεδα) κάλυψε το κενό.

Οι Γερμανοί, τώρα, σιγά – σιγά, συμβιβάζονται με την κατάρρευση των θεμελίων του επιχειρηματικού τους μοντέλου και αρχίζουν να βλέπουν πέρα από το πολύπλευρο Μεγάλο Ψέμα που τους πούλησαν οι ελίτ τους επί τρεις δεκαετίες: Τα δημοσιονομικά πλεονάσματα δεν ήταν σύνεση στην πράξη, αλλά μια μνημειώδης αποτυχία να επενδύσουν, κατά τα μακρά χρόνια των εξαιρετικά χαμηλών επιτοκίων, στην καθαρή ενέργεια, στις κρίσιμες υποδομές, καθώς και στις δύο κρίσιμες τεχνολογίες του μέλλοντος: τις μπαταρίες και την τεχνητή νοημοσύνη. Η εξάρτηση της Γερμανίας από το φυσικό αέριο του Πούτιν και τις κινεζικές καθαρές εισαγωγές δεν ήταν ποτέ βιώσιμη μακροπρόθεσμα και είναι χαρακτηριστικά, όχι σφάλματα που μπορούν να εξομαλυνθούν, του γερμανικού μοντέλου.

Και γίνεται πλέον αντιληπτό ξεκάθαρα, όσον αφορά το Μεγάλο Ψέμα, ότι το γερμανικό οικονομικό μοντέλο ήταν συμβατό με τη νομισματική ένωση της Ευρώπης. Η έλλειψη μιας δημοσιονομικής και μιας πολιτικής ένωσης, πάντα θα φόρτωνε τις χώρες της Μεσογείου, τις τράπεζες και τις επιχειρήσεις με μη διαχειρίσιμα χρέη, τα οποία, τελικά, θα ανάγκαζαν την Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα να επιλέξει μεταξύ του να αφήσει το ευρώ να πεθάνει και του να ξεκινήσει ένα μόνιμο σχέδιο απόκρυψης της χρεοκοπίας. Οι Γερμανοί το συνειδητοποιούν αυτό σήμερα, καθώς παρατηρούν μια ακινητοποιημένη ΕΚΤ, η οποία είναι καταδικασμένη, αν αυξήσει σημαντικά τα επιτόκια (προκαλώντας την κατάρρευση της Ιταλίας κ.ά.) και καταδικασμένη αν δεν το κάνει (ανεξέλεγκτος πληθωρισμός). Μπορούν να δουν ότι, ενώ δεν θα έπρεπε ποτέ να είναι δουλειά της ΕΚΤ να σώσει το ευρώ από τα ελαττωματικά θεμέλιά του, οι πολιτικοί τους τούς είχαν πει ψέματα πως το γερμανικό μοντέλο θα μπορούσε να επιβιώσει από την κρίση του 2008, εφόσον οι άλλες χώρες της Ευρωζώνης εφάρμοζαν αρκετή λιτότητα. Παίρνουν επίσης μυρωδιά ότι η φοβία των κυβερνήσεών τους για τα κίνητρα οδήγησε σε μόνιμο σοσιαλισμό για τους ολιγάρχες της Νότιας Ευρώπης, τους γαλλογερμανούς τραπεζίτες και τις διάφορες εταιρείες ζόμπι.

Κάποτε, όσοι από εμάς επικρίναμε την ιδέα ότι κάθε χώρα της Ευρωζώνης πρέπει να γίνει σαν τη Γερμανία αντιτείναμε ότι η Γερμανία λειτουργούσε επειδή άλλες χώρες δεν είχαν υιοθετήσει το γερμανικό μοντέλο. Σήμερα, με το τέλος του φθηνού φυσικού αερίου και τον Νέο Ψυχρό Πόλεμο της Αμερικής εναντίον της Κίνας, που αναγκάζει τους Κινέζους να επανεκτιμήσουν τις πηγές των ενδιάμεσων εισαγωγών τους, το γερμανικό μοντέλο πεθαίνει, ακόμη και αν υιοθετηθεί μόνο από τη Γερμανία. Σίγουρα, οι γερμανικές εξαγωγές θα ανακάμψουν, υποβοηθούμενες από τη χαμηλή αξία του ευρώ. Η Volkswagen θα πουλήσει πολύ περισσότερα ηλεκτρικά αυτοκίνητα, μόλις αποκατασταθούν οι αλυσίδες εφοδιασμού. Η BASF θα ανακάμψει, μόλις διασφαλιστεί ο ενεργειακός εφοδιασμός. Αυτό που δεν θα επιστρέψει είναι το γερμανικό μοντέλο, με ένα μεγάλο μέρος των εσόδων της Volkswagen να πηγαίνει στην Κίνα, από όπου προέρχονται οι τεχνολογίες μπαταριών, και καθώς όγκοι αξίας μετατοπίζονται από τη χημική βιομηχανία σε τομείς που σχετίζονται με την τεχνητή νοημοσύνη.

Κάποιοι Γερμανοί φίλοι εναποθέτουν τις ελπίδες τους στην πτώση του ευρώ για την αποκατάσταση της υγείας του γερμανικού μοντέλου. Αυτό δεν θα συμβεί. Οι χώρες με χαμηλές αποταμιεύσεις και διαρθρωτικό εμπορικό έλλειμμα, όπως η Ελλάδα ή η Γκάνα, επωφελούνται από την υποτίμηση. Οι χώρες με υψηλές αποταμιεύσεις και διαρθρωτικό εμπορικό πλεόνασμα δεν επωφελούνται – το μόνο που συμβαίνει είναι ότι οι φτωχότεροι εγχώριοι καταναλωτές επιδοτούν τους πλουσιότερους εξαγωγείς- ακριβώς το αντίθετο από αυτό που χρειάζεται η γερμανική κοινωνική οικονομία.

Το μήνυμά μου προς τους Γερμανούς φίλους είναι απλό: Ξεπεράστε τις φάσεις άρνησης και πένθους και προχωρήστε κατευθείαν στο σχεδιασμό του ολοκαίνουργιου επιχειρηματικού μοντέλου. Σε αντίθεση με την Ελλάδα, η Γερμανία διαθέτει ακόμη έναν βαθμό κυριαρχίας που της επιτρέπει να το κάνει αυτό χωρίς την άδεια των πιστωτών. Αλλά πρώτα, πρέπει να επιλύσετε ένα κρίσιμο πολιτικό δίλημμα: Θέλετε η Γερμανία να διατηρήσει την πολιτική και δημοσιονομική της κυριαρχία; Αν ναι, το νέο επιχειρηματικό σας μοντέλο δεν θα λειτουργήσει ποτέ μέσα στην Ευρωζώνη μας. Αν δεν θέλετε να επιστρέψετε στο γερμανικό μάρκο, χρειάζεστε ένα νέο επιχειρηματικό μοντέλο ενσωματωμένο σε μια πλήρως ολοκληρωμένη, δημοκρατική ευρωπαϊκή ομοσπονδία. Οτιδήποτε άλλο θα συνεχίσει το Μεγάλο Ψέμα, με το οποίο έρχεστε τώρα, με οδυνηρό τρόπο, αντιμέτωποι.  

mέta presents the latest book by Guy Standing, member of mέta’s Advisory Board: The Blue Commons: Rescuing the Economy of the Sea.

‘A landmark book… The Blue Commons is at once a brilliant synthesis, a searing analysis, and an inspiring call to action.’ – David Bollier

‘With remarkable erudition, passion and lyricism, Guy Standing commands the reader to wake up to the threat posed by rentier capitalism’s violent policies for extraction, exploitation and depletion of that which is both common to us all, but also vital to our survival: the sea and all within it.’ – Ann Pettifor

‘Shines a bright light on the economy of the oceans, directing us brilliantly towards where a sustainable future lies.’ – Danny Dorling

‘This is a powerful, visionary book – essential reading for all who yearn for a better world.’ – Jason Hickel

The sea provides more than half the oxygen we breathe, food for billions of people and livelihoods for hundreds of millions. But giant corporations are plundering the world’s oceans, aided by global finance and complicit states, following the neoliberal maxim of Blue Growth. The situation is dire: rampant exploitation and corruption now drive all aspects of the ocean economy, destroying communities, intensifying inequalities, and driving fish populations and other ocean life towards extinction.
The Blue Commons is an urgent call for change, from a campaigning economist responsible for some of the most innovative solutions to inequality of recent times. From large nations bullying smaller nations into giving up eco-friendly fishing policies to the profiteering by the Crown Estate in commandeering much of the British seabed, the scale of the global problem is synthesised here for the first time, as well as a toolkit for all of us to rise up and tackle it.
The oceans have been left out of calls for a Green New Deal but must be at the centre of the fight against climate change. How do we do it? By building a Blue Commons alternative: a transformative worldview and new set of proposals that prioritise the historic rights of local communities, the wellbeing of all people and, with it, the health of our oceans.

In this landmark book, Guy Standing not only documents how state-corporate collusion is destroying fragile ocean ecosystems, fisheries, and coastal communities. He explains how degrowth economics and fishery commons could restore the ‘Blue Commons-Wealth’ that belongs to all of us. The Blue Commons is at once a brilliant synthesis, a searing analysis, and an inspiring call to action

-David Bollier, author of The Commoner’s Catalog for Changemaking

Shines a bright light on the economy of the oceans, directing us brilliantly towards where a sustainable future lies.

-Danny Dorling

Guy Standing writes with remarkable erudition, but also with passion and lyricism about the Blue Commons. He commands the reader to wake up to the threat posed by rentier capitalism’s violent policies for extraction, exploitation and depletion of that which is both common to us all, but also vital to our survival: the sea and all within it. He offers radical and hopeful alternatives to the dominant economics for ‘making a killing’ from the commodification of nature – giving hope to the dedicated stewards of the seas – fishers and ‘blue commoners’ – but also to his readers.

-Ann Pettifor

As capital sets its sights on the seas, our planet’s final frontier, the struggle for the commons becomes all the more urgent. This is a powerful, visionary book – essential reading for all who yearn for a better world.

-Jason Hickel

A powerful indictment of all that has gone wrong with contemporary oceanic governance, and an inspiring account of how it can be put right. Guy Standing shows how local communities can turn the tide on neoliberal excess and put a vibrant and inclusive politics in its place.

-Chris Armstrong

Looking out of my window at the radiant blue of the Aegean Sea, I surrender to the dream of a near future where Guy Standing’s Blue Commons proposals have been implemented – an indispensable blue section of any genuine Green New Deal. It is a good dream, one that deserves a shot at infecting our sad reality.

-Yanis Varoufakis

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Στις 16 Ιουνίου, ο καθηγητής του Πανεπιστημίου του Σικάγο, John J. Mearsheimer, επισκέφθηκε τη Villa Schifanoia στη Φλωρεντία για να συζητήσει την τρέχουσα ρωσική εισβολή στην Ουκρανία, διερευνώντας παράλληλα τις πιθανές αιτίες και συνέπειες της κρίσης.

Η εκδήλωση, η οποία διοργανώθηκε από το Κέντρο Robert Schuman και το Τμήμα Ιστορίας, συγκέντρωσε σχεδόν 200 συμμετέχοντες αυτοπροσώπως και διαδικτυακά.

Ο πολιτικός επιστήμονας, γνωστός για τη ρεαλιστική του προσέγγιση, υποστήριξε ότι οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες είναι κυρίως υπεύθυνες για την πρόκληση της κρίσης στην Ουκρανία, ακόμη και αν ο Πούτιν ήταν αυτός που ξεκίνησε τον πόλεμο και ο υπεύθυνος για τη συμπεριφορά της Ρωσίας στο πεδίο της μάχης: «Το βασικό μου σημείο είναι ότι οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες προώθησαν πολιτικές προς την Ουκρανία που ο Πούτιν και οι συνάδελφοί του θεωρούν υπαρξιακή απειλή για τη χώρα τους […] Συγκεκριμένα μιλάω για την εμμονή της Αμερικής να εντάξει την Ουκρανία στο ΝΑΤΟ και να την καταστήσει δυτικό προπύργιο στα σύνορα της Ρωσίας».

Ο καθηγητής Mearsheimer επέμεινε ότι η Μόσχα δεν ενδιαφέρεται να καταστήσει την Ουκρανία τμήμα της Ρωσίας, αλλά να διασφαλίσει ότι δεν θα γίνει εφαλτήριο της δυτικής επιθετικότητας- και ότι η Ρωσία δεν μπορεί να αισθάνεται ασφαλής, να αναπτύσσεται και να υπάρχει ενώ αντιμετωπίζει μια μόνιμη απειλή από το έδαφος της σημερινής Ουκρανίας. Επέμεινε ότι παρά τη δυτική αφήγηση για το ΝΑΤΟ, η καθοριστική πτυχή για την κατανόηση των βαθύτερων αιτιών αυτής της σύγκρουσης είναι το πώς βλέπει η Μόσχα τις ενέργειες της συμμαχίας.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qciVozNtCDM

YouTube VIDEO:

Ο πόλεμος στην Ουκρανία είναι μια πολυδιάστατη καταστροφή, η οποία είναι πιθανό να γίνει πολύ χειρότερη στο ορατό μέλλον. Όταν ένας πόλεμος είναι επιτυχής, λίγη προσοχή δίνεται στα αίτιά του, αλλά όταν το αποτέλεσμα είναι καταστροφικό, η κατανόηση του πώς συνέβη καθίσταται υψίστης σημασίας. Ο κόσμος θέλει να μάθει: πώς βρεθήκαμε σε αυτή την τρομερή κατάσταση;

Έχω γίνει μάρτυρας αυτού του φαινομένου δύο φορές στη ζωή μου -πρώτα με τον πόλεμο του Βιετνάμ και δεύτερον με τον πόλεμο του Ιράκ. Και στις δύο περιπτώσεις, οι Αμερικανοί ήθελαν να μάθουν πώς μπόρεσε η χώρα τους να υπολογίσει τόσο άσχημα. Δεδομένου ότι οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και οι σύμμαχοί τους στο ΝΑΤΟ έπαιξαν καθοριστικό ρόλο στα γεγονότα που οδήγησαν στον πόλεμο στην Ουκρανία -και τώρα παίζουν κεντρικό ρόλο στη διεξαγωγή αυτού του πολέμου- είναι σκόπιμο να αξιολογήσουμε την ευθύνη της Δύσης για αυτή τη συμφορά.

Θα προβάλω δύο βασικά επιχειρήματα σήμερα.

Πρώτον, οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες είναι κυρίως υπεύθυνες για την πρόκληση της κρίσης στην Ουκρανία. Αυτό δεν σημαίνει ότι αρνούμαστε ότι ο Πούτιν ξεκίνησε τον πόλεμο και ότι είναι υπεύθυνος για τη διεξαγωγή του πολέμου από τη Ρωσία. Ούτε πρόκειται να αρνηθούμε ότι οι σύμμαχοι της Αμερικής φέρουν κάποια ευθύνη, αλλά ακολουθούν σε μεγάλο βαθμό το παράδειγμα της Ουάσινγκτον στην Ουκρανία. Ο κεντρικός μου ισχυρισμός είναι ότι οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες προώθησαν πολιτικές προς την Ουκρανία τις οποίες ο Πούτιν και άλλοι Ρώσοι ηγέτες βλέπουν ως υπαρξιακή απειλή, κάτι που έχουν επισημάνει επανειλημμένα εδώ και πολλά χρόνια. Συγκεκριμένα, μιλάω για την εμμονή της Αμερικής να φέρει την Ουκρανία στο ΝΑΤΟ και να την καταστήσει δυτικό προπύργιο στα σύνορα της Ρωσίας. Η κυβέρνηση Μπάιντεν ήταν απρόθυμη να εξαλείψει αυτή την απειλή μέσω της διπλωματίας και μάλιστα το 2021 δέσμευσε εκ νέου τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες να εντάξουν την Ουκρανία στο ΝΑΤΟ. Ο Πούτιν απάντησε με εισβολή στην Ουκρανία στις 24 Φεβρουαρίου του τρέχοντος έτους.

Δεύτερον, η κυβέρνηση Μπάιντεν αντέδρασε στο ξέσπασμα του πολέμου διπλασιάζοντας τις ενέργειές της κατά της Ρωσίας. Η Ουάσιγκτον και οι δυτικοί σύμμαχοί της έχουν δεσμευτεί να νικήσουν αποφασιστικά τη Ρωσία στην Ουκρανία και να εφαρμόσουν ολοκληρωμένες κυρώσεις για να αποδυναμώσουν σημαντικά τη ρωσική ισχύ. Οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες δεν ενδιαφέρονται σοβαρά για την εξεύρεση διπλωματικής λύσης στον πόλεμο, πράγμα που σημαίνει ότι ο πόλεμος είναι πιθανό να τραβήξει για μήνες, αν όχι χρόνια. Στην πορεία, η Ουκρανία, η οποία έχει ήδη υποφέρει βαρύτατα, θα υποστεί ακόμη μεγαλύτερη ζημιά. Στην ουσία, οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες βοηθούν την Ουκρανία να οδηγηθεί στο μονοπάτι των πρωτευόντων. Επιπλέον, υπάρχει ο κίνδυνος ο πόλεμος να κλιμακωθεί, καθώς το ΝΑΤΟ μπορεί να παρασυρθεί στις μάχες και να χρησιμοποιηθούν πυρηνικά όπλα. Ζούμε σε επικίνδυνους καιρούς.

Επιτρέψτε μου τώρα να εκθέσω το επιχείρημά μου λεπτομερέστερα, ξεκινώντας με μια περιγραφή της συμβατικής σοφίας σχετικά με τα αίτια της σύγκρουσης στην Ουκρανία.

Η συμβατική σοφία

Πιστεύεται ευρέως και σταθερά στη Δύση ότι ο Πούτιν είναι αποκλειστικά υπεύθυνος για την πρόκληση της κρίσης στην Ουκρανία και βεβαίως για τον συνεχιζόμενο πόλεμο. Λέγεται ότι έχει αυτοκρατορικές φιλοδοξίες, δηλαδή ότι είναι αποφασισμένος να κατακτήσει την Ουκρανία και άλλες χώρες – όλα αυτά με σκοπό τη δημιουργία μιας μεγάλης Ρωσίας που θα έχει κάποια ομοιότητα με την πρώην Σοβιετική Ένωση. Με άλλα λόγια, η Ουκρανία είναι ο πρώτος στόχος του Πούτιν, αλλά όχι ο τελευταίος. Όπως το έθεσε ένας μελετητής, “ενεργεί με βάση έναν σκοτεινό, μακροχρόνιο στόχο: να σβήσει την Ουκρανία από τον παγκόσμιο χάρτη”. Δεδομένων των υποτιθέμενων στόχων του Πούτιν, είναι απολύτως λογικό η Φινλανδία και η Σουηδία να ενταχθούν στο ΝΑΤΟ και η συμμαχία να αυξήσει τα επίπεδα των δυνάμεών της στην ανατολική Ευρώπη. Η αυτοκρατορική Ρωσία, εξάλλου, πρέπει να περιοριστεί.

Ενώ αυτή η αφήγηση επαναλαμβάνεται ξανά και ξανά στα κυρίαρχα μέσα ενημέρωσης και σχεδόν από κάθε δυτικό ηγέτη, δεν υπάρχουν στοιχεία που να την υποστηρίζουν. Στο βαθμό που οι φορείς της συμβατικής σοφίας παρέχουν αποδείξεις, αυτές έχουν ελάχιστη ή και καθόλου σχέση με τα κίνητρα του Πούτιν για την εισβολή στην Ουκρανία. Για παράδειγμα, κάποιοι τονίζουν ότι είπε ότι η Ουκρανία είναι ένα “τεχνητό κράτος” ή ότι δεν είναι “πραγματικό κράτος”. Τέτοια αδιαφανή σχόλια, ωστόσο, δεν λένε τίποτα για τους λόγους που τον οδήγησαν στον πόλεμο. Το ίδιο ισχύει και για τη δήλωση του Πούτιν ότι θεωρεί τους Ρώσους και τους Ουκρανούς ως “έναν λαό” με κοινή ιστορία. Άλλοι επισημαίνουν ότι αποκάλεσε την κατάρρευση της Σοβιετικής Ένωσης “τη μεγαλύτερη γεωπολιτική καταστροφή του αιώνα”. Φυσικά, ο Πούτιν είπε επίσης: “Όποιος δεν νοσταλγεί τη Σοβιετική Ένωση δεν έχει καρδιά. Όποιος την θέλει πίσω δεν έχει μυαλό”. Ακόμα, άλλοι επισημαίνουν μια ομιλία στην οποία δήλωσε ότι “η σύγχρονη Ουκρανία δημιουργήθηκε εξ ολοκλήρου από τη Ρωσία ή, για να είμαστε πιο ακριβείς, από την μπολσεβίκικη, κομμουνιστική Ρωσία”. Αλλά όπως συνέχισε να λέει στην ίδια ακριβώς ομιλία, αναφερόμενος στην ανεξαρτησία της Ουκρανίας σήμερα: “Φυσικά, δεν μπορούμε να αλλάξουμε τα γεγονότα του παρελθόντος, αλλά πρέπει τουλάχιστον να τα παραδεχτούμε ανοιχτά και ειλικρινά”.

Για να υποστηρίξει κανείς ότι ο Πούτιν ήταν αποφασισμένος να κατακτήσει ολόκληρη την Ουκρανία και να την ενσωματώσει στη Ρωσία, είναι απαραίτητο να προσκομίσει αποδείξεις ότι πρώτον, πίστευε ότι ήταν ένας επιθυμητός στόχος, ότι δεύτερον, πίστευε ότι ήταν ένας εφικτός στόχος και τρίτον, ότι σκόπευε να επιδιώξει αυτόν τον στόχο. Δεν υπάρχει καμία απόδειξη στα δημόσια αρχεία ότι ο Πούτιν σκεφτόταν, και πολύ περισσότερο ότι σκόπευε να βάλει τέλος στην Ουκρανία ως ανεξάρτητο κράτος και να την κάνει μέρος της μεγάλης Ρωσίας όταν έστειλε τα στρατεύματά του στην Ουκρανία στις 24 Φεβρουαρίου.

Στην πραγματικότητα, υπάρχουν σημαντικές αποδείξεις ότι ο Πούτιν αναγνώριζε την Ουκρανία ως ανεξάρτητη χώρα. Στο άρθρο του της 12ης Ιουλίου 2021 σχετικά με τις ρωσο-ουκρανικές σχέσεις, το οποίο οι υποστηρικτές της συμβατικής σοφίας συχνά επισημαίνουν ως απόδειξη των αυτοκρατορικών φιλοδοξιών του, λέει στον ουκρανικό λαό: “Θέλετε να δημιουργήσετε ένα δικό σας κράτος: είστε ευπρόσδεκτοι!”. Όσον αφορά το πώς η Ρωσία θα πρέπει να αντιμετωπίζει την Ουκρανία, γράφει: “Υπάρχει μόνο μία απάντηση: με σεβασμό”. “Και τι θα γίνει η Ουκρανία – είναι στο χέρι των πολιτών της να αποφασίσουν”. Είναι δύσκολο να συμβιβάσει κανείς αυτές τις δηλώσεις με τον ισχυρισμό ότι θέλει να ενσωματώσει την Ουκρανία σε μια μεγαλύτερη Ρωσία.

Στο ίδιο άρθρο της 12ης Ιουλίου 2021 και πάλι σε μια σημαντική ομιλία που έδωσε στις 21 Φεβρουαρίου του τρέχοντος έτους, ο Πούτιν τόνισε ότι η Ρωσία αποδέχεται “τη νέα γεωπολιτική πραγματικότητα που διαμορφώθηκε μετά τη διάλυση της ΕΣΣΔ”. Το ίδιο σημείο επανέλαβε για τρίτη φορά στις 24 Φεβρουαρίου, όταν ανακοίνωσε ότι η Ρωσία θα εισβάλει στην Ουκρανία. Συγκεκριμένα, δήλωσε ότι “δεν είναι το σχέδιό μας να καταλάβουμε ουκρανικό έδαφος” και ξεκαθάρισε ότι σέβεται την ουκρανική κυριαρχία, αλλά μόνο μέχρι ενός σημείου: “Η Ρωσία δεν μπορεί να αισθάνεται ασφαλής, να αναπτύσσεται και να υπάρχει ενώ αντιμετωπίζει μια μόνιμη απειλή από το έδαφος της σημερινής Ουκρανίας”. Στην ουσία, ο Πούτιν δεν ενδιαφερόταν να καταστήσει την Ουκρανία τμήμα της Ρωσίας- ενδιαφερόταν να διασφαλίσει ότι δεν θα γίνει “εφαλτήριο” για την επιθετικότητα της Δύσης κατά της Ρωσίας, θέμα για το οποίο θα αναφερθώ περισσότερο σύντομα.

Κάποιος θα μπορούσε να ισχυριστεί ότι ο Πούτιν έλεγε ψέματα για τα κίνητρά του, ότι προσπαθούσε να συγκαλύψει τις αυτοκρατορικές του φιλοδοξίες. Όπως αποδεικνύεται, έχω γράψει ένα βιβλίο σχετικά με το ψέμα στη διεθνή πολιτική -Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics- και για μένα είναι σαφές ότι ο Πούτιν δεν έλεγε ψέματα. Για αρχή, ένα από τα κύρια ευρήματά μου είναι ότι οι ηγέτες δεν λένε πολλά ψέματα μεταξύ τους- λένε πιο συχνά ψέματα στο ίδιο τους το κοινό. Όσον αφορά τον Πούτιν, ό,τι κι αν πιστεύει κανείς γι’ αυτόν, δεν έχει ιστορικό ψεμάτων σε άλλους ηγέτες. Αν και ορισμένοι ισχυρίζονται ότι λέει συχνά ψέματα και ότι δεν μπορεί να τον εμπιστευτεί κανείς, υπάρχουν ελάχιστες αποδείξεις ότι λέει ψέματα σε ξένα ακροατήρια. Επιπλέον, έχει εκθέσει δημοσίως τις σκέψεις του για την Ουκρανία σε πολλές περιπτώσεις τα τελευταία δύο χρόνια και έχει τονίσει σταθερά ότι το κύριο μέλημά του είναι οι σχέσεις της Ουκρανίας με τη Δύση, ιδίως με το ΝΑΤΟ. Ποτέ δεν έχει αφήσει να εννοηθεί ότι θέλει να κάνει την Ουκρανία μέρος της Ρωσίας. Αν όλη αυτή η συμπεριφορά αποτελεί μέρος μιας γιγαντιαίας εκστρατείας εξαπάτησης, δεν θα είχε προηγούμενο στην καταγεγραμμένη ιστορία.

Ίσως η καλύτερη ένδειξη ότι ο Πούτιν δεν είναι αποφασισμένος να κατακτήσει και να απορροφήσει την Ουκρανία είναι η στρατιωτική στρατηγική που εφάρμοσε η Μόσχα από την αρχή της εκστρατείας. Ο ρωσικός στρατός δεν προσπάθησε να κατακτήσει ολόκληρη την Ουκρανία. Κάτι τέτοιο θα απαιτούσε μια κλασική στρατηγική blitzkrieg που θα στόχευε στη γρήγορη κατάληψη ολόκληρης της Ουκρανίας με τεθωρακισμένες δυνάμεις που θα υποστηρίζονταν από τακτική αεροπορική δύναμη. Αυτή η στρατηγική δεν ήταν εφικτή, ωστόσο, επειδή υπήρχαν μόνο 190.000 στρατιώτες στον στρατό εισβολής της Ρωσίας, που είναι πολύ μικρή δύναμη για να κατακτήσει και να καταλάβει την Ουκρανία, η οποία όχι μόνο είναι η μεγαλύτερη χώρα μεταξύ του Ατλαντικού Ωκεανού και της Ρωσίας, αλλά έχει και πληθυσμό άνω των 40 εκατομμυρίων. Όπως ήταν αναμενόμενο, οι Ρώσοι ακολούθησαν μια στρατηγική περιορισμένων στόχων, η οποία επικεντρώθηκε είτε στην κατάληψη είτε στην απειλή του Κιέβου και στην κατάκτηση μιας μεγάλης εδαφικής έκτασης στην ανατολική και νότια Ουκρανία. Εν ολίγοις, η Ρωσία δεν είχε τη δυνατότητα να υποτάξει ολόκληρη την Ουκρανία, πολύ περισσότερο να κατακτήσει άλλες χώρες της ανατολικής Ευρώπης.

Όπως παρατήρησε ο Ramzy Mardini, μια άλλη αποκαλυπτική ένδειξη των περιορισμένων στόχων του Πούτιν είναι ότι δεν υπάρχουν αποδείξεις ότι η Ρωσία προετοίμαζε μια κυβέρνηση μαριονέτας για την Ουκρανία, καλλιεργούσε φιλορώσους ηγέτες στο Κίεβο ή ακολουθούσε οποιαδήποτε πολιτικά μέτρα που θα καθιστούσαν δυνατή την κατάληψη ολόκληρης της χώρας και τελικά την ενσωμάτωσή της στη Ρωσία.

Για να πάμε αυτό το επιχείρημα ένα βήμα παραπέρα, ο Πούτιν και άλλοι Ρώσοι ηγέτες σίγουρα καταλαβαίνουν από τον Ψυχρό Πόλεμο ότι η κατοχή χωρών στην εποχή του εθνικισμού είναι πάντοτε μια συνταγή για ατελείωτα προβλήματα. Η σοβιετική εμπειρία στο Αφγανιστάν είναι ένα κραυγαλέο παράδειγμα αυτού του φαινομένου, αλλά πιο σημαντική για το συγκεκριμένο ζήτημα είναι οι σχέσεις της Μόσχας με τους συμμάχους της στην ανατολική Ευρώπη. Η Σοβιετική Ένωση διατηρούσε μια τεράστια στρατιωτική παρουσία στην περιοχή αυτή και αναμείχθηκε στην πολιτική σχεδόν κάθε χώρας που βρισκόταν εκεί. Αυτοί οι σύμμαχοι, ωστόσο, αποτελούσαν συχνά αγκάθι στο πλευρό της Μόσχας. Η Σοβιετική Ένωση κατέστειλε μια μεγάλη εξέγερση στην Ανατολική Γερμανία το 1953 και στη συνέχεια εισέβαλε στην Ουγγαρία το 1956 και στην Τσεχοσλοβακία το 1968 για να τις κρατήσει σε τάξη. Υπήρξαν σοβαρά προβλήματα στην Πολωνία το 1956, το 1970 και ξανά το 1980-1981. Αν και οι πολωνικές αρχές αντιμετώπισαν αυτά τα γεγονότα, λειτούργησαν ως υπενθύμιση ότι η επέμβαση μπορεί να είναι απαραίτητη. Η Αλβανία, η Ρουμανία και η Γιουγκοσλαβία προκαλούσαν συστηματικά προβλήματα στη Μόσχα, αλλά οι σοβιετικοί ηγέτες έτειναν να ανέχονται την κακή τους συμπεριφορά, επειδή η θέση τους τις καθιστούσε λιγότερο σημαντικές για την αποτροπή του ΝΑΤΟ.

Τι γίνεται με τη σύγχρονη Ουκρανία; Είναι προφανές από το δοκίμιο του Πούτιν της 12ης Ιουλίου 2021, ότι κατάλαβε εκείνη τη στιγμή ότι ο ουκρανικός εθνικισμός είναι μια ισχυρή δύναμη και ότι ο εμφύλιος πόλεμος στο Ντονμπάς, ο οποίος συνεχίζεται από το 2014, είχε κάνει πολλά για να δηλητηριάσει τις σχέσεις μεταξύ Ρωσίας και Ουκρανίας. Σίγουρα γνώριζε ότι η δύναμη εισβολής της Ρωσίας δεν θα γινόταν δεκτή με ανοιχτές αγκάλες από τους Ουκρανούς και ότι θα ήταν ηράκλειο έργο για τη Ρωσία να υποτάξει την Ουκρανία, αν είχε τις απαραίτητες δυνάμεις για να κατακτήσει ολόκληρη τη χώρα, πράγμα που δεν είχε.

Τέλος, αξίζει να σημειωθεί ότι σχεδόν κανείς δεν διατύπωσε το επιχείρημα ότι ο Πούτιν είχε αυτοκρατορικές φιλοδοξίες από τη στιγμή που ανέλαβε τα ηνία της εξουσίας το 2000 μέχρι το πρώτο ξέσπασμα της ουκρανικής κρίσης στις 22 Φεβρουαρίου 2014. Στην πραγματικότητα, ο Ρώσος ηγέτης ήταν προσκεκλημένος στη σύνοδο κορυφής του ΝΑΤΟ τον Απρίλιο του 2008 στο Βουκουρέστι, όπου η συμμαχία ανακοίνωσε ότι η Ουκρανία και η Γεωργία θα γίνουν τελικά μέλη. Η αντίθεση του Πούτιν σε αυτή την ανακοίνωση δεν είχε σχεδόν καμία επίδραση στην Ουάσινγκτον, επειδή η Ρωσία κρίθηκε πολύ αδύναμη για να σταματήσει την περαιτέρω διεύρυνση του ΝΑΤΟ, όπως ακριβώς ήταν πολύ αδύναμη για να σταματήσει τα κύματα επέκτασης του 1999 και του 2004.

Συναφώς, είναι σημαντικό να σημειωθεί ότι η επέκταση του ΝΑΤΟ πριν από τον Φεβρουάριο του 2014 δεν αποσκοπούσε στον περιορισμό της Ρωσίας. Δεδομένης της θλιβερής κατάστασης της ρωσικής στρατιωτικής ισχύος, η Μόσχα δεν ήταν σε θέση να ακολουθήσει ρεβανσιστικές πολιτικές στην ανατολική Ευρώπη. Είναι ενδεικτικό ότι ο πρώην πρεσβευτής των ΗΠΑ στη Μόσχα Michael McFaul σημειώνει ότι η κατάληψη της Κριμαίας από τον Πούτιν δεν είχε σχεδιαστεί πριν ξεσπάσει η κρίση το 2014- ήταν μια παρορμητική κίνηση ως απάντηση στο πραξικόπημα που ανέτρεψε τον φιλορώσο ηγέτη της Ουκρανίας. Εν ολίγοις, η διεύρυνση του ΝΑΤΟ δεν είχε ως στόχο να περιορίσει μια ρωσική απειλή, αλλά αντίθετα ήταν μέρος μιας ευρύτερης πολιτικής για την εξάπλωση της φιλελεύθερης διεθνούς τάξης στην ανατολική Ευρώπη και για να κάνει ολόκληρη την ήπειρο να μοιάζει με τη δυτική Ευρώπη.

Μόνο όταν ξέσπασε η κρίση στην Ουκρανία τον Φεβρουάριο του 2014, οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και οι σύμμαχοί τους άρχισαν ξαφνικά να περιγράφουν τον Πούτιν ως επικίνδυνο ηγέτη με αυτοκρατορικές φιλοδοξίες και τη Ρωσία ως σοβαρή στρατιωτική απειλή που έπρεπε να περιοριστεί. Τι προκάλεσε αυτή την αλλαγή; Αυτή η νέα ρητορική σχεδιάστηκε για να εξυπηρετήσει έναν βασικό σκοπό: να μπορέσει η Δύση να κατηγορήσει τον Πούτιν για το ξέσπασμα των προβλημάτων στην Ουκρανία. Και τώρα που η κρίση έχει μετατραπεί σε πόλεμο πλήρους κλίμακας, είναι επιτακτική ανάγκη να διασφαλιστεί ότι μόνο αυτός θα κατηγορηθεί για αυτή την καταστροφική τροπή των γεγονότων. Αυτό το παιχνίδι επίρριψης ευθυνών εξηγεί γιατί ο Πούτιν παρουσιάζεται τώρα ευρέως ως ιμπεριαλιστής εδώ στη Δύση, παρόλο που δεν υπάρχουν σχεδόν καθόλου στοιχεία που να υποστηρίζουν αυτή την προοπτική.

Επιτρέψτε μου τώρα να στραφώ στην πραγματική αιτία της κρίσης στην Ουκρανία.

Η πραγματική αιτία του προβλήματος

Η ρίζα της κρίσης είναι η αμερικανικής ηγεσίας προσπάθεια να γίνει η Ουκρανία ένα δυτικό προπύργιο στα σύνορα της Ρωσίας. Αυτή η στρατηγική έχει τρεις άξονες: την ενσωμάτωση της Ουκρανίας στην ΕΕ, τη μετατροπή της Ουκρανίας σε μια φιλοδυτική φιλελεύθερη δημοκρατία και, το σημαντικότερο, την ενσωμάτωση της Ουκρανίας στο ΝΑΤΟ. Η στρατηγική τέθηκε σε κίνηση στην ετήσια σύνοδο κορυφής του ΝΑΤΟ στο Βουκουρέστι τον Απρίλιο του 2008, όταν η συμμαχία ανακοίνωσε ότι η Ουκρανία και η Γεωργία “θα γίνουν μέλη”. Οι Ρώσοι ηγέτες αντέδρασαν αμέσως με οργή, καθιστώντας σαφές ότι θεωρούσαν την απόφαση αυτή ως υπαρξιακή απειλή και ότι δεν είχαν καμία πρόθεση να αφήσουν καμία από τις δύο χώρες να ενταχθεί στο ΝΑΤΟ. Σύμφωνα με έναν σεβαστό Ρώσο δημοσιογράφο, ο Πούτιν “εξαγριώθηκε” και προειδοποίησε ότι “αν η Ουκρανία ενταχθεί στο ΝΑΤΟ, θα το κάνει χωρίς την Κριμαία και τις ανατολικές περιοχές. Απλώς θα καταρρεύσει”.

Ο Γουίλιαμ Μπερνς, ο οποίος είναι σήμερα επικεφαλής της CIA, αλλά ήταν πρεσβευτής των ΗΠΑ στη Μόσχα την εποχή της συνόδου κορυφής του Βουκουρεστίου, έγραψε ένα υπόμνημα προς την τότε υπουργό Εξωτερικών Κοντολίζα Ράις που περιγράφει επιγραμματικά τη ρωσική σκέψη για το θέμα αυτό. Με τα λόγια του: “Η είσοδος της Ουκρανίας στο ΝΑΤΟ είναι η πιο φωτεινή από όλες τις κόκκινες γραμμές για τη ρωσική ελίτ (όχι μόνο για τον Πούτιν). Σε περισσότερα από δυόμισι χρόνια συνομιλιών με βασικούς ρωσικούς παράγοντες, από τους κοπρίτες στις σκοτεινές εσοχές του Κρεμλίνου μέχρι τους πιο οξυδερκείς φιλελεύθερους επικριτές του Πούτιν, δεν έχω βρει ακόμη κανέναν που να βλέπει την Ουκρανία στο ΝΑΤΟ ως οτιδήποτε άλλο παρά μια άμεση πρόκληση για τα ρωσικά συμφέροντα”. Το ΝΑΤΟ, είπε, “θα φαινόταν … ότι πετάει το στρατηγικό γάντι. Η σημερινή Ρωσία θα απαντήσει. Οι ρωσο-ουκρανικές σχέσεις θα πέσουν σε βαθύ πάγωμα… Θα δημιουργήσει πρόσφορο έδαφος για ρωσική ανάμειξη στην Κριμαία και την ανατολική Ουκρανία”.

Ο Μπερνς, φυσικά, δεν ήταν ο μόνος πολιτικός που κατάλαβε ότι η ένταξη της Ουκρανίας στο ΝΑΤΟ ήταν γεμάτη κινδύνους. Πράγματι, στη Σύνοδο Κορυφής του Βουκουρεστίου, τόσο η Γερμανίδα καγκελάριος Άνγκελα Μέρκελ όσο και ο Γάλλος πρόεδρος Νικολά Σαρκοζί αντιτάχθηκαν στο να προχωρήσει η ένταξη της Ουκρανίας στο ΝΑΤΟ, επειδή καταλάβαιναν ότι αυτό θα θορυβούσε και θα εξαγρίωνε τη Ρωσία. Η Μέρκελ εξήγησε πρόσφατα την αντίθεσή της: “Ήμουν πολύ σίγουρη … ότι ο Πούτιν δεν πρόκειται να το αφήσει να συμβεί έτσι απλά. Από τη δική του οπτική γωνία, αυτό θα ήταν κήρυξη πολέμου”.

Η κυβέρνηση Μπους, ωστόσο, ελάχιστα νοιάστηκε για την “πιο φωτεινή από τις κόκκινες γραμμές” της Μόσχας και πίεσε τους Γάλλους και Γερμανούς ηγέτες να συμφωνήσουν στην έκδοση μιας δημόσιας ανακοίνωσης που θα δήλωνε ότι η Ουκρανία και η Γεωργία θα ενταχθούν τελικά στη συμμαχία.

Όπως ήταν αναμενόμενο, η υπό αμερικανική ηγεσία προσπάθεια ένταξης της Γεωργίας στο ΝΑΤΟ κατέληξε σε πόλεμο μεταξύ της Γεωργίας και της Ρωσίας τον Αύγουστο του 2008 – τέσσερις μήνες μετά τη σύνοδο κορυφής του Βουκουρεστίου. Παρ’ όλα αυτά, οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και οι σύμμαχοί τους συνέχισαν να προχωρούν με τα σχέδιά τους να καταστήσουν την Ουκρανία ένα δυτικό προπύργιο στα σύνορα της Ρωσίας. Οι προσπάθειες αυτές προκάλεσαν τελικά μια μεγάλη κρίση τον Φεβρουάριο του 2014, αφού μια εξέγερση που υποστηρίχθηκε από τις ΗΠΑ ανάγκασε τον φιλορώσο πρόεδρο της Ουκρανίας Βίκτορ Γιανουκόβιτς να εγκαταλείψει τη χώρα. Αντικαταστάθηκε από τον φιλοαμερικανό πρωθυπουργό Αρσένι Γιατσενιούκ. Σε απάντηση, η Ρωσία κατέλαβε την Κριμαία από την Ουκρανία και βοήθησε να τροφοδοτηθεί ένας εμφύλιος πόλεμος μεταξύ φιλορώσων αυτονομιστών και της ουκρανικής κυβέρνησης στην περιοχή Ντονμπάς της ανατολικής Ουκρανίας.

Συχνά ακούγεται το επιχείρημα ότι στα οκτώ χρόνια που μεσολάβησαν μεταξύ του ξεσπάσματος της κρίσης τον Φεβρουάριο του 2014 και της έναρξης του πολέμου τον Φεβρουάριο του 2022, οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και οι σύμμαχοί τους έδωσαν ελάχιστη προσοχή στο να εντάξουν την Ουκρανία στο ΝΑΤΟ. Στην πραγματικότητα, το θέμα είχε αποσυρθεί από το τραπέζι, και έτσι η διεύρυνση του ΝΑΤΟ δεν θα μπορούσε να είναι σημαντική αιτία της κλιμάκωσης της κρίσης το 2021 και του επακόλουθου ξεσπάσματος του πολέμου νωρίτερα φέτος. Αυτή η επιχειρηματολογία είναι λανθασμένη. Στην πραγματικότητα, η δυτική απάντηση στα γεγονότα του 2014 ήταν να διπλασιάσει την υπάρχουσα στρατηγική και να φέρει την Ουκρανία ακόμη πιο κοντά στο ΝΑΤΟ. Η συμμαχία άρχισε να εκπαιδεύει τον ουκρανικό στρατό το 2014, διαθέτοντας κατά μέσο όρο 10.000 εκπαιδευμένους στρατιώτες ετησίως για τα επόμενα οκτώ χρόνια. Τον Δεκέμβριο του 2017, η κυβέρνηση Τραμπ αποφάσισε να παράσχει στο Κίεβο “αμυντικά όπλα”. Σύντομα και άλλες χώρες του ΝΑΤΟ μπήκαν στη δράση, στέλνοντας ακόμη περισσότερα όπλα στην Ουκρανία.

Ο στρατός της Ουκρανίας άρχισε επίσης να συμμετέχει σε κοινές στρατιωτικές ασκήσεις με τις δυνάμεις του ΝΑΤΟ. Τον Ιούλιο του 2021, το Κίεβο και η Ουάσινγκτον συνδιοργάνωσαν την Επιχείρηση Sea Breeze, μια ναυτική άσκηση στη Μαύρη Θάλασσα στην οποία συμμετείχαν ναυτικά από 31 χώρες και είχε άμεσο στόχο τη Ρωσία. Δύο μήνες αργότερα, τον Σεπτέμβριο του 2021, ο ουκρανικός στρατός ηγήθηκε της άσκησης Rapid Trident 21, την οποία ο αμερικανικός στρατός περιέγραψε ως μια “ετήσια άσκηση που έχει σχεδιαστεί για να ενισχύσει τη διαλειτουργικότητα μεταξύ συμμαχικών και συνεργαζόμενων εθνών, για να αποδείξει ότι οι μονάδες είναι έτοιμες να ανταποκριθούν σε οποιαδήποτε κρίση”. Η προσπάθεια του ΝΑΤΟ να εξοπλίσει και να εκπαιδεύσει τον στρατό της Ουκρανίας εξηγεί σε μεγάλο βαθμό γιατί τα πήγε τόσο καλά απέναντι στις ρωσικές δυνάμεις στον συνεχιζόμενο πόλεμο. Όπως το έθεσε ένας τίτλος της Wall Street Journal, “Το μυστικό της στρατιωτικής επιτυχίας της Ουκρανίας: Χρόνια εκπαίδευσης του ΝΑΤΟ”.

Εκτός από τις συνεχείς προσπάθειες του ΝΑΤΟ να καταστήσει τον ουκρανικό στρατό μια πιο τρομερή πολεμική δύναμη, η πολιτική που περιβάλλει την ένταξη της Ουκρανίας στο ΝΑΤΟ και την ενσωμάτωσή της στη Δύση άλλαξε το 2021. Υπήρξε ανανεωμένος ενθουσιασμός για την επιδίωξη αυτών των στόχων τόσο στο Κίεβο όσο και στην Ουάσινγκτον. Ο πρόεδρος Ζελένσκι, ο οποίος δεν είχε δείξει ποτέ ιδιαίτερο ενθουσιασμό για την ένταξη της Ουκρανίας στο ΝΑΤΟ και ο οποίος εξελέγη τον Μάρτιο του 2019 με μια πλατφόρμα που καλούσε σε συνεργασία με τη Ρωσία για τη διευθέτηση της συνεχιζόμενης κρίσης, άλλαξε πορεία στις αρχές του 2021 και όχι μόνο αγκάλιασε την επέκταση του ΝΑΤΟ αλλά υιοθέτησε και μια σκληρή προσέγγιση έναντι της Μόσχας. Έκανε μια σειρά από κινήσεις -συμπεριλαμβανομένου του κλεισίματος φιλορωσικών τηλεοπτικών σταθμών και της απαγγελίας κατηγοριών σε στενό φίλο του Πούτιν για προδοσία- που ήταν βέβαιο ότι θα εξοργίσουν τη Μόσχα.

Ο πρόεδρος Μπάιντεν, ο οποίος μετακόμισε στον Λευκό Οίκο τον Ιανουάριο του 2021, είχε από καιρό δεσμευτεί να εντάξει την Ουκρανία στο ΝΑΤΟ και ήταν επίσης υπερ-σκληρός απέναντι στη Ρωσία. Όπως ήταν φυσικό, στις 14 Ιουνίου 2021, το ΝΑΤΟ εξέδωσε το ακόλουθο ανακοινωθέν στην ετήσια σύνοδο κορυφής του στις Βρυξέλλες:

Επαναλαμβάνουμε την απόφαση που ελήφθη στη Σύνοδο Κορυφής του Βουκουρεστίου το 2008 ότι η Ουκρανία θα γίνει μέλος της Συμμαχίας με το Σχέδιο Δράσης για την ένταξη (MAP) ως αναπόσπαστο μέρος της διαδικασίας. Παραμένουμε σταθεροί στην υποστήριξή μας για το δικαίωμα της Ουκρανίας να αποφασίζει η ίδια για το μέλλον της και την πορεία της εξωτερικής της πολιτικής χωρίς εξωτερικές παρεμβάσεις.

Την 1η Σεπτεμβρίου 2021, ο Ζελένσκι επισκέφθηκε τον Λευκό Οίκο, όπου ο Μπάιντεν κατέστησε σαφές ότι οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες ήταν “σταθερά προσηλωμένες” στις “ευρωατλαντικές φιλοδοξίες της Ουκρανίας”. Στη συνέχεια, στις 10 Νοεμβρίου 2021, ο υπουργός Εξωτερικών Άντονι Μπλίνκεν και ο Ουκρανός ομόλογός του, Ντμίτρο Κουλέμπα, υπέγραψαν ένα σημαντικό έγγραφο – τον “Χάρτη Στρατηγικής Εταιρικής Σχέσης ΗΠΑ-Ουκρανίας”. Στόχος και των δύο μερών, αναφέρεται στο έγγραφο, είναι να “υπογραμμιστεί … η δέσμευση για την εφαρμογή από την Ουκρανία των βαθιών και ολοκληρωμένων μεταρρυθμίσεων που είναι απαραίτητες για την πλήρη ενσωμάτωση στους ευρωπαϊκούς και ευρωατλαντικούς θεσμούς”. Το έγγραφο αυτό βασίζεται ρητά όχι μόνο “στις δεσμεύσεις που ανέλαβαν για την ενίσχυση της στρατηγικής εταιρικής σχέσης Ουκρανίας-ΗΠΑ οι Πρόεδροι Ζελένσκι και Μπάιντεν”, αλλά επιβεβαιώνει επίσης τη δέσμευση των ΗΠΑ στη “Διακήρυξη της Συνόδου Κορυφής του Βουκουρεστίου του 2008”.

Εν ολίγοις, δεν υπάρχει αμφιβολία ότι από τις αρχές του 2021 η Ουκρανία άρχισε να κινείται με ταχείς ρυθμούς προς την κατεύθυνση της ένταξης στο ΝΑΤΟ. Ακόμα κι έτσι, ορισμένοι υποστηρικτές αυτής της πολιτικής υποστηρίζουν ότι η Μόσχα δεν θα έπρεπε να ανησυχεί, επειδή “το ΝΑΤΟ είναι μια αμυντική συμμαχία και δεν αποτελεί απειλή για τη Ρωσία”. Αλλά ο Πούτιν και άλλοι Ρώσοι ηγέτες δεν σκέφτονται έτσι για το ΝΑΤΟ και αυτό που έχει σημασία είναι τι σκέφτονται. Δεν υπάρχει αμφιβολία ότι η ένταξη της Ουκρανίας στο ΝΑΤΟ παρέμεινε η “πιο φωτεινή από τις κόκκινες γραμμές” για τη Μόσχα.

Για να αντιμετωπίσει αυτή την αυξανόμενη απειλή, ο Πούτιν τοποθέτησε ολοένα και μεγαλύτερο αριθμό ρωσικών στρατευμάτων στα σύνορα της Ουκρανίας μεταξύ Φεβρουαρίου 2021 και Φεβρουαρίου 2022. Στόχος του ήταν να εξαναγκάσει τον Μπάιντεν και τον Ζελένσκι να αλλάξουν πορεία και να σταματήσουν τις προσπάθειές τους να εντάξουν την Ουκρανία στη Δύση. Στις 17 Δεκεμβρίου 2021, η Μόσχα έστειλε ξεχωριστές επιστολές στην κυβέρνηση Μπάιντεν και στο ΝΑΤΟ, ζητώντας γραπτή εγγύηση ότι 1) η Ουκρανία δεν θα ενταχθεί στο ΝΑΤΟ, 2) δεν θα σταθμεύουν επιθετικά όπλα κοντά στα σύνορα της Ρωσίας και 3) τα στρατεύματα και ο εξοπλισμός του ΝΑΤΟ που μετακινήθηκαν στην ανατολική Ευρώπη από το 1997 θα μετακινηθούν πίσω στη δυτική Ευρώπη.

Ο Πούτιν έκανε πολλές δημόσιες δηλώσεις κατά τη διάρκεια αυτής της περιόδου που δεν άφηναν καμία αμφιβολία ότι θεωρούσε την επέκταση του ΝΑΤΟ στην Ουκρανία ως υπαρξιακή απειλή. Μιλώντας στο Διοικητικό Συμβούλιο του Υπουργείου Άμυνας στις 21 Δεκεμβρίου 2021, δήλωσε: “αυτό που κάνουν, ή προσπαθούν ή σχεδιάζουν να κάνουν στην Ουκρανία, δεν συμβαίνει χιλιάδες χιλιόμετρα μακριά από τα εθνικά μας σύνορα. Είναι στο κατώφλι του σπιτιού μας. Πρέπει να καταλάβουν ότι απλά δεν έχουμε πουθενά αλλού να υποχωρήσουμε. Πιστεύουν πραγματικά ότι δεν βλέπουμε αυτές τις απειλές; Ή μήπως νομίζουν ότι απλά θα καθόμαστε άπραγοι και θα βλέπουμε τις απειλές προς τη Ρωσία να αναδύονται;”. Δύο μήνες αργότερα, σε συνέντευξη Τύπου στις 22 Φεβρουαρίου 2022, λίγες ημέρες πριν από την έναρξη του πολέμου, ο Πούτιν δήλωσε “Είμαστε κατηγορηματικά αντίθετοι στην ένταξη της Ουκρανίας στο ΝΑΤΟ, επειδή αυτό αποτελεί απειλή για εμάς, και έχουμε επιχειρήματα για να το υποστηρίξουμε αυτό. Έχω επανειλημμένα μιλήσει γι’ αυτό σε αυτή την αίθουσα”. Στη συνέχεια κατέστησε σαφές ότι αναγνωρίζει ότι η Ουκρανία γίνεται de facto μέλος του ΝΑΤΟ. Οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και οι σύμμαχοί τους, είπε, “συνεχίζουν να γεμίζουν τις σημερινές αρχές του Κιέβου με σύγχρονους τύπους όπλων”. Συνέχισε λέγοντας ότι αν αυτό δεν σταματήσει, η Μόσχα “θα μείνει με μια “αντι-Ρωσία” οπλισμένη μέχρι τα δόντια. Αυτό είναι εντελώς απαράδεκτο”.

Η λογική του Πούτιν θα πρέπει να είναι απολύτως λογική για τους Αμερικανούς, οι οποίοι έχουν από καιρό δεσμευτεί στο Δόγμα Μονρόε, το οποίο ορίζει ότι καμία μακρινή μεγάλη δύναμη δεν επιτρέπεται να τοποθετεί στρατιωτικές δυνάμεις της στο δυτικό ημισφαίριο.

Θα μπορούσα να σημειώσω ότι σε όλες τις δημόσιες δηλώσεις του Πούτιν κατά τη διάρκεια των μηνών που προηγήθηκαν του πολέμου, δεν υπάρχει η παραμικρή απόδειξη ότι σκεφτόταν να κατακτήσει την Ουκρανία και να την καταστήσει μέρος της Ρωσίας, πόσο μάλλον να επιτεθεί σε πρόσθετες χώρες της ανατολικής Ευρώπης. Άλλοι Ρώσοι ηγέτες -συμπεριλαμβανομένων του υπουργού Άμυνας, του υπουργού Εξωτερικών, του αναπληρωτή υπουργού Εξωτερικών και του Ρώσου πρέσβη στην Ουάσινγκτον- τόνισαν επίσης την κεντρική σημασία της επέκτασης του ΝΑΤΟ για την πρόκληση της κρίσης στην Ουκρανία. Ο υπουργός Εξωτερικών Σεργκέι Λαβρόφ το έθεσε επιγραμματικά σε συνέντευξη Τύπου στις 14 Ιανουαρίου 2022, όταν είπε ότι “το κλειδί για όλα είναι η εγγύηση ότι το ΝΑΤΟ δεν θα επεκταθεί προς ανατολάς”.

Παρ’ όλα αυτά, οι προσπάθειες του Λαβρόφ και του Πούτιν να πείσουν τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και τους συμμάχους τους να εγκαταλείψουν τις προσπάθειές τους να καταστήσουν την Ουκρανία δυτικό προπύργιο στα σύνορα της Ρωσίας απέτυχαν πλήρως. Ο υπουργός Εξωτερικών Άντονι Μπλίνκεν απάντησε στις απαιτήσεις της Ρωσίας στα μέσα Δεκεμβρίου λέγοντας απλώς: “Δεν υπάρχει καμία αλλαγή. Δεν θα υπάρξει καμία αλλαγή”. Στη συνέχεια, ο Πούτιν εξαπέλυσε εισβολή στην Ουκρανία για να εξαλείψει την απειλή που έβλεπε από το ΝΑΤΟ.

Πού βρισκόμαστε τώρα και πού πηγαίνουμε;

Ο πόλεμος στην Ουκρανία μαίνεται εδώ και σχεδόν τέσσερις μήνες Θα ήθελα τώρα να προσφέρω κάποιες παρατηρήσεις σχετικά με το τι έχει συμβεί μέχρι στιγμής και πού μπορεί να κατευθυνθεί ο πόλεμος. Θα ασχοληθώ με τρία συγκεκριμένα ζητήματα: 1) τις συνέπειες του πολέμου για την Ουκρανία, 2) τις προοπτικές κλιμάκωσης -συμπεριλαμβανομένης της πυρηνικής κλιμάκωσης- και 3) τις προοπτικές τερματισμού του πολέμου στο ορατό μέλλον.

Αυτός ο πόλεμος είναι μια απόλυτη καταστροφή για την Ουκρανία. Όπως σημείωσα νωρίτερα, ο Πούτιν κατέστησε σαφές το 2008 ότι η Ρωσία θα καταστρέψει την Ουκρανία για να την εμποδίσει να ενταχθεί στο ΝΑΤΟ. Τηρεί αυτή την υπόσχεση. Οι ρωσικές δυνάμεις έχουν κατακτήσει το 20% του ουκρανικού εδάφους και έχουν καταστρέψει ή υποστεί σοβαρές ζημιές σε πολλές ουκρανικές πόλεις και κωμοπόλεις. Περισσότεροι από 6,5 εκατομμύρια Ουκρανοί έχουν εγκαταλείψει τη χώρα, ενώ περισσότεροι από 8 εκατομμύρια έχουν εκτοπιστεί στο εσωτερικό της χώρας. Πολλές χιλιάδες Ουκρανοί -συμπεριλαμβανομένων αθώων πολιτών- είναι νεκροί ή βαριά τραυματισμένοι και η ουκρανική οικονομία βρίσκεται υπό κατάρρευση. Η Παγκόσμια Τράπεζα εκτιμά ότι η οικονομία της Ουκρανίας θα συρρικνωθεί κατά σχεδόν 50 τοις εκατό κατά τη διάρκεια του 2022. Οι εκτιμήσεις αναφέρουν ότι έχουν προκληθεί ζημιές στην Ουκρανία αξίας περίπου 100 δισεκατομμυρίων δολαρίων και ότι θα χρειαστούν σχεδόν ένα τρισεκατομμύριο δολάρια για την ανοικοδόμηση της χώρας. Εν τω μεταξύ, το Κίεβο χρειάζεται περίπου 5 δισεκατομμύρια δολάρια βοήθειας κάθε μήνα μόνο και μόνο για να συνεχίσει να λειτουργεί η κυβέρνηση.

Επιπλέον, φαίνεται να υπάρχει μικρή ελπίδα ότι η Ουκρανία θα μπορέσει να ανακτήσει τη χρήση των λιμανιών της στην Αζοφική και τη Μαύρη Θάλασσα σύντομα. Πριν από τον πόλεμο, περίπου το 70 τοις εκατό όλων των ουκρανικών εξαγωγών και εισαγωγών -και το 98 τοις εκατό των εξαγωγών σιτηρών- διακινούνταν μέσω αυτών των λιμένων. Αυτή είναι η βασική κατάσταση μετά από λιγότερο από 4 μήνες μαχών. Είναι εντελώς τρομακτικό να αναλογιστεί κανείς πώς θα μοιάζει η Ουκρανία αν αυτός ο πόλεμος παραταθεί για μερικά ακόμη χρόνια.

Ποιες είναι λοιπόν οι προοπτικές για τη διαπραγμάτευση μιας ειρηνευτικής συμφωνίας και τον τερματισμό του πολέμου τους επόμενους μήνες; Λυπάμαι που το λέω, αλλά δεν βλέπω καμία περίπτωση να τελειώσει αυτός ο πόλεμος σύντομα, άποψη που συμμερίζονται εξέχοντες πολιτικοί, όπως ο στρατηγός Mark Milley, πρόεδρος του JCS, και ο γενικός γραμματέας του ΝΑΤΟ Jens Stoltenberg. Ο κύριος λόγος για την απαισιοδοξία μου είναι ότι τόσο η Ρωσία όσο και οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες είναι βαθιά προσηλωμένες στη νίκη στον πόλεμο και είναι αδύνατο να διαμορφωθεί μια συμφωνία όπου θα κερδίζουν και οι δύο πλευρές. Για να γίνω πιο συγκεκριμένος, το κλειδί για μια διευθέτηση από τη σκοπιά της Ρωσίας είναι να καταστεί η Ουκρανία ένα ουδέτερο κράτος, τερματίζοντας την προοπτική ενσωμάτωσης του Κιέβου στη Δύση. Αλλά αυτό το αποτέλεσμα είναι απαράδεκτο για την κυβέρνηση Μπάιντεν και για μεγάλο μέρος του αμερικανικού κατεστημένου της εξωτερικής πολιτικής, επειδή θα αποτελούσε νίκη για τη Ρωσία.

Οι Ουκρανοί ηγέτες έχουν βέβαια πρακτορείο και θα μπορούσε κανείς να ελπίζει ότι θα πιέσουν για ουδετεροποίηση για να γλιτώσουν τη χώρα τους από περαιτέρω ζημιά. Πράγματι, ο Ζελένσκι ανέφερε εν συντομία αυτό το ενδεχόμενο τις πρώτες ημέρες του πολέμου, αλλά ποτέ δεν το επιδίωξε σοβαρά. Ωστόσο, υπάρχει μικρή πιθανότητα το Κίεβο να πιέσει για εξουδετέρωση, επειδή οι υπερεθνικιστές στην Ουκρανία, οι οποίοι διαθέτουν σημαντική πολιτική δύναμη, έχουν μηδενικό ενδιαφέρον να υποχωρήσουν σε οποιαδήποτε απαίτηση της Ρωσίας, ειδικά σε εκείνη που υπαγορεύει την πολιτική ευθυγράμμιση της Ουκρανίας με τον έξω κόσμο. Η κυβέρνηση Μπάιντεν και οι χώρες στην ανατολική πλευρά του ΝΑΤΟ -όπως η Πολωνία και οι χώρες της Βαλτικής- είναι πιθανό να υποστηρίξουν τους υπερεθνικιστές της Ουκρανίας σε αυτό το ζήτημα.

Για να περιπλέξει περαιτέρω τα πράγματα, πώς αντιμετωπίζει κανείς τις μεγάλες εκτάσεις του ουκρανικού εδάφους που έχει κατακτήσει η Ρωσία από την έναρξη του πολέμου, καθώς και την τύχη της Κριμαίας; Είναι δύσκολο να φανταστεί κανείς ότι η Μόσχα θα παραιτηθεί οικειοθελώς από οποιοδήποτε από τα ουκρανικά εδάφη που κατέχει σήμερα, πολύ περισσότερο από όλα, καθώς οι εδαφικοί στόχοι του Πούτιν σήμερα δεν είναι πιθανώς οι ίδιοι που είχε πριν από τον πόλεμο. Ταυτόχρονα, είναι εξίσου δύσκολο να φανταστεί κανείς Ουκρανός ηγέτης να αποδεχθεί μια συμφωνία που θα επιτρέπει στη Ρωσία να κρατήσει οποιοδήποτε ουκρανικό έδαφος, εκτός ενδεχομένως από την Κριμαία. Ελπίζω να κάνω λάθος, αλλά αυτός είναι ο λόγος για τον οποίο δεν βλέπω ορατό το τέλος αυτού του καταστροφικού πολέμου.

Επιτρέψτε μου τώρα να στραφώ στο θέμα της κλιμάκωσης. Είναι ευρέως αποδεκτό μεταξύ των μελετητών των διεθνών σχέσεων ότι υπάρχει μια ισχυρή τάση για την κλιμάκωση των παρατεταμένων πολέμων. Με την πάροδο του χρόνου, άλλες χώρες μπορούν να παρασυρθούν στη μάχη και το επίπεδο της βίας είναι πιθανό να αυξηθεί. Το ενδεχόμενο να συμβεί αυτό στον πόλεμο της Ουκρανίας είναι υπαρκτό. Υπάρχει ο κίνδυνος οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και οι σύμμαχοί τους στο ΝΑΤΟ να παρασυρθούν στις μάχες, κάτι που κατάφεραν να αποφύγουν μέχρι τώρα, παρόλο που ήδη διεξάγουν έναν πόλεμο δι’ αντιπροσώπων εναντίον της Ρωσίας. Υπάρχει επίσης η πιθανότητα να χρησιμοποιηθούν πυρηνικά όπλα στην Ουκρανία και αυτό μπορεί να οδηγήσει ακόμη και σε πυρηνική ανταλλαγή μεταξύ της Ρωσίας και των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών. Ο βαθύτερος λόγος για τον οποίο μπορεί να πραγματοποιηθούν αυτά τα αποτελέσματα είναι ότι το διακύβευμα είναι τόσο υψηλό και για τις δύο πλευρές, και συνεπώς καμία από τις δύο δεν έχει την πολυτέλεια να χάσει.

Όπως έχω τονίσει, ο Πούτιν και οι υπαρχηγοί του πιστεύουν ότι η προσχώρηση της Ουκρανίας στη Δύση αποτελεί υπαρξιακή απειλή για τη Ρωσία που πρέπει να εξαλειφθεί. Πρακτικά, αυτό σημαίνει ότι η Ρωσία πρέπει να κερδίσει τον πόλεμό της στην Ουκρανία. Η ήττα είναι απαράδεκτη. Η κυβέρνηση Μπάιντεν, από την άλλη πλευρά, έχει τονίσει ότι στόχος της δεν είναι μόνο να νικήσει αποφασιστικά τη Ρωσία στην Ουκρανία, αλλά και να χρησιμοποιήσει τις κυρώσεις για να προκαλέσει τεράστια ζημιά στη ρωσική οικονομία. Ο υπουργός Άμυνας Λόιντ Όστιν έχει τονίσει ότι στόχος της Δύσης είναι να αποδυναμώσει τη Ρωσία σε σημείο που να μην μπορεί να εισβάλει ξανά στην Ουκρανία. Στην πραγματικότητα, η κυβέρνηση Μπάιντεν έχει δεσμευτεί να βγάλει τη Ρωσία από τις τάξεις των μεγάλων δυνάμεων. Την ίδια στιγμή, ο ίδιος ο πρόεδρος Μπάιντεν έχει χαρακτηρίσει τον πόλεμο της Ρωσίας στην Ουκρανία “γενοκτονία” και έχει κατηγορήσει τον Πούτιν ως “εγκληματία πολέμου”, ο οποίος θα πρέπει να αντιμετωπίσει “δίκη για εγκλήματα πολέμου” μετά τον πόλεμο. Μια τέτοια ρητορική δύσκολα προσφέρεται για διαπραγματεύσεις για τον τερματισμό του πολέμου. Άλλωστε, πώς διαπραγματεύεσαι με ένα κράτος-γενοκτόνο;

Η αμερικανική πολιτική έχει δύο σημαντικές συνέπειες. Για αρχή, ενισχύει σημαντικά την υπαρξιακή απειλή που αντιμετωπίζει η Μόσχα σε αυτόν τον πόλεμο και καθιστά πιο σημαντικό από ποτέ να επικρατήσει στην Ουκρανία. Ταυτόχρονα, σημαίνει ότι οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες είναι βαθιά αφοσιωμένες στο να διασφαλίσουν ότι η Ρωσία θα χάσει. Η κυβέρνηση Μπάιντεν έχει πλέον επενδύσει τόσο πολύ στον πόλεμο της Ουκρανίας -τόσο υλικά όσο και ρητορικά- ώστε μια ρωσική νίκη θα αποτελούσε καταστροφική ήττα για την Ουάσινγκτον.

Προφανώς, και οι δύο πλευρές δεν μπορούν να κερδίσουν. Επιπλέον, υπάρχει σοβαρή πιθανότητα η μία πλευρά να αρχίσει να χάνει άσχημα. Αν η αμερικανική πολιτική πετύχει και οι Ρώσοι χάσουν από τους Ουκρανούς στο πεδίο της μάχης, ο Πούτιν μπορεί να στραφεί στα πυρηνικά όπλα για να σώσει την κατάσταση. Η διευθύντρια της Εθνικής Υπηρεσίας Πληροφοριών των ΗΠΑ, Avril Haines, δήλωσε στην Επιτροπή Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων της Γερουσίας τον Μάιο ότι αυτή ήταν μία από τις δύο καταστάσεις που θα μπορούσαν να οδηγήσουν τον Πούτιν να χρησιμοποιήσει πυρηνικά όπλα στην Ουκρανία. Για όσους από εσάς πιστεύετε ότι αυτό είναι απίθανο, θυμηθείτε ότι το ΝΑΤΟ σχεδίαζε να χρησιμοποιήσει πυρηνικά όπλα σε παρόμοιες περιπτώσεις κατά τη διάρκεια του Ψυχρού Πολέμου. Εάν η Ρωσία χρησιμοποιούσε πυρηνικά όπλα στην Ουκρανία, είναι αδύνατο να πούμε πώς θα αντιδρούσε η κυβέρνηση Μπάιντεν, αλλά σίγουρα θα βρισκόταν υπό μεγάλη πίεση για αντίποινα, αυξάνοντας έτσι την πιθανότητα ενός πυρηνικού πολέμου μεταξύ μεγάλων δυνάμεων. Εδώ υπάρχει ένα διεστραμμένο παράδοξο: όσο πιο επιτυχημένες είναι οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και οι σύμμαχοί τους στην επίτευξη των στόχων τους, τόσο πιο πιθανό είναι ο πόλεμος να εξελιχθεί σε πυρηνικό.

Ας αντιστρέψουμε τα δεδομένα και ας αναρωτηθούμε τι θα συμβεί αν οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και οι σύμμαχοί τους στο ΝΑΤΟ φαίνεται να οδεύουν προς την ήττα, πράγμα που ουσιαστικά σημαίνει ότι οι Ρώσοι δρομολογούν τον ουκρανικό στρατό και η κυβέρνηση στο Κίεβο κινείται προς τη διαπραγμάτευση μιας ειρηνευτικής συμφωνίας που αποσκοπεί στη διάσωση όσο το δυνατόν μεγαλύτερου μέρους της χώρας. Σε αυτή την περίπτωση, θα υπάρξει μεγάλη πίεση στις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και τους συμμάχους τους να εμπλακούν ακόμη πιο βαθιά στις μάχες. Δεν είναι πιθανό, αλλά σίγουρα πιθανό ότι αμερικανικά ή ίσως και πολωνικά στρατεύματα θα τραβηχτούν στις μάχες, πράγμα που σημαίνει ότι το ΝΑΤΟ θα βρεθεί κυριολεκτικά σε πόλεμο με τη Ρωσία. Αυτό είναι το άλλο σενάριο, σύμφωνα με την Avril Haines, όπου οι Ρώσοι θα μπορούσαν να στραφούν στα πυρηνικά όπλα. Είναι δύσκολο να πούμε με ακρίβεια πώς θα εξελιχθούν τα γεγονότα αν αυτό το σενάριο πραγματοποιηθεί, αλλά δεν υπάρχει αμφιβολία ότι θα υπάρξει σοβαρό ενδεχόμενο κλιμάκωσης, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της πυρηνικής κλιμάκωσης. Και μόνο η πιθανότητα αυτής της έκβασης θα πρέπει να σας προκαλεί ανατριχίλα.

Είναι πιθανό να υπάρξουν και άλλες καταστροφικές συνέπειες από αυτόν τον πόλεμο, τις οποίες δεν μπορώ να συζητήσω λεπτομερώς λόγω των χρονικών περιορισμών. Για παράδειγμα, υπάρχει λόγος να πιστεύουμε ότι ο πόλεμος θα οδηγήσει σε μια παγκόσμια επισιτιστική κρίση στην οποία θα πεθάνουν πολλά εκατομμύρια άνθρωποι. Ο πρόεδρος της Παγκόσμιας Τράπεζας, David Malpass, υποστηρίζει ότι αν συνεχιστεί ο πόλεμος στην Ουκρανία, θα αντιμετωπίσουμε μια παγκόσμια επισιτιστική κρίση που θα είναι μια “ανθρώπινη καταστροφή”.

Επιπλέον, οι σχέσεις μεταξύ της Ρωσίας και της Δύσης έχουν δηλητηριαστεί τόσο πολύ που θα χρειαστούν πολλά χρόνια για να αποκατασταθούν. Εν τω μεταξύ, αυτή η βαθιά εχθρότητα θα τροφοδοτήσει την αστάθεια σε όλο τον κόσμο, αλλά κυρίως στην Ευρώπη. Κάποιοι θα πουν ότι υπάρχει και μια ασημένια πλευρά: οι σχέσεις μεταξύ των χωρών της Δύσης έχουν βελτιωθεί αισθητά εξαιτίας του πολέμου στην Ουκρανία. Αυτό είναι αλήθεια προς το παρόν, αλλά υπάρχουν βαθιές ρωγμές κάτω από την επιφάνεια, και είναι βέβαιο ότι θα επαναβεβαιωθούν με την πάροδο του χρόνου. Για παράδειγμα, οι σχέσεις μεταξύ των χωρών της ανατολικής και της δυτικής Ευρώπης είναι πιθανό να επιδεινωθούν καθώς ο πόλεμος παρατείνεται, επειδή τα συμφέροντα και οι προοπτικές τους σχετικά με τη σύγκρουση δεν είναι οι ίδιες.

Τέλος, η σύρραξη έχει ήδη προκαλέσει σημαντικές ζημιές στην παγκόσμια οικονομία και η κατάσταση αυτή είναι πιθανό να επιδεινωθεί με την πάροδο του χρόνου. Ο Jamie Diamond, ο διευθύνων σύμβουλος της JPMorgan Chase λέει ότι πρέπει να προετοιμαστούμε για έναν οικονομικό “τυφώνα”. Αν έχει δίκιο, αυτοί οι οικονομικοί κλυδωνισμοί θα επηρεάσουν την πολιτική κάθε δυτικής χώρας, θα υπονομεύσουν τη φιλελεύθερη δημοκρατία και θα ενισχύσουν τους αντιπάλους της τόσο στα αριστερά όσο και στα δεξιά. Οι οικονομικές συνέπειες του πολέμου στην Ουκρανία θα επεκταθούν σε όλες τις χώρες του πλανήτη, όχι μόνο στη Δύση. Όπως το έθεσαν τα Ηνωμένα Έθνη σε μια έκθεση που κυκλοφόρησε μόλις την περασμένη εβδομάδα: “Οι επιπτώσεις της σύγκρουσης επεκτείνουν τον ανθρώπινο πόνο πολύ πέρα από τα σύνορά της. Ο πόλεμος, σε όλες του τις διαστάσεις, έχει επιδεινώσει μια παγκόσμια κρίση κόστους ζωής που δεν έχει παρατηρηθεί εδώ και τουλάχιστον μια γενιά, θέτοντας σε κίνδυνο ζωές, βιοποριστικά μέσα και τις προσδοκίες μας για έναν καλύτερο κόσμο μέχρι το 2030”.

Συμπέρασμα

Με απλά λόγια, η συνεχιζόμενη σύγκρουση στην Ουκρανία είναι μια κολοσσιαία καταστροφή, η οποία, όπως σημείωσα στην αρχή της ομιλίας μου, θα οδηγήσει τους ανθρώπους σε όλο τον κόσμο στην αναζήτηση των αιτιών της. Όσοι πιστεύουν στα γεγονότα και τη λογική θα ανακαλύψουν γρήγορα ότι οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και οι σύμμαχοί τους είναι κυρίως υπεύθυνοι για αυτό το ναυάγιο. Η απόφαση του Απριλίου του 2008 να ενταχθούν η Ουκρανία και η Γεωργία στο ΝΑΤΟ ήταν γραφτό να οδηγήσει σε σύγκρουση με τη Ρωσία. Η κυβέρνηση Μπους ήταν ο κύριος αρχιτέκτονας αυτής της μοιραίας επιλογής, αλλά οι κυβερνήσεις Ομπάμα, Τραμπ και Μπάιντεν διπλασίασαν αυτή την πολιτική σε κάθε στροφή και οι σύμμαχοι της Αμερικής ακολούθησαν υπάκουα το παράδειγμα της Ουάσινγκτον. Παρόλο που οι Ρώσοι ηγέτες κατέστησαν απολύτως σαφές ότι η ένταξη της Ουκρανίας στο ΝΑΤΟ θα περνούσε “την πιο φωτεινή από τις κόκκινες γραμμές”, οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες αρνήθηκαν να ικανοποιήσουν τις βαθύτερες ανησυχίες της Ρωσίας για την ασφάλεια και, αντίθετα, κινήθηκαν αδυσώπητα για να καταστήσουν την Ουκρανία ένα δυτικό προπύργιο στα σύνορα της Ρωσίας.

Η τραγική αλήθεια είναι ότι αν η Δύση δεν είχε επιδιώξει την επέκταση του ΝΑΤΟ στην Ουκρανία, είναι απίθανο να υπήρχε πόλεμος στην Ουκρανία σήμερα και η Κριμαία θα ήταν ακόμη μέρος της Ουκρανίας. Στην ουσία, η Ουάσινγκτον έπαιξε τον κεντρικό ρόλο στο να οδηγηθεί η Ουκρανία στον δρόμο προς την καταστροφή. Η ιστορία θα κρίνει αυστηρά τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και τους συμμάχους τους για την αξιοσημείωτα ανόητη πολιτική τους στην Ουκρανία. Σας ευχαριστώ.

Ο John J. Mearsheimer κατέχει την έδρα πολιτικής επιστήμης R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service στο Πανεπιστήμιο του Σικάγο. Στα βιβλία του συμπεριλαμβάνονται τα The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities καιThe Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

Αφοσιώνεσαι για δεκαετίες σε μία τέχνη – και είναι μια τέχνη που συνοδεύει την πορεία της ανθρωπότητας εδώ και χιλιετίες. Και όμως: κάθε τόσο μοιάζει σαν να πρέπει να αποφασιστούν και να οριστούν τα πράγματα από την αρχή. Το αναστοχαστικό ερώτημα επανέρχεται αναπόφευκτο: Γιατί ζωγραφίζουμε; Γιατί ζωγραφίζω;

Παραμερίζω προς στιγμήν τα όσα έχει να μας πει η διαρκώς εμπλουτιζόμενη θεωρία και επιλέγω να μιλήσω βιωματικά. Ζωγραφίζω όχι απλώς από προσωπική ανάγκη, αλλά ακριβώς γιατί αυτή η επιλογή με συνδέει με μια βαθύτερη ιστορικότητα, που φέρει αυτή η τέχνη. Κατασκευάζω εικόνες μέσω των οποίων συνδιαλέγομαι με την Ιστορία. Εξού και επιλέγω πορτρέτα αρχετυπικά που δεν αναφέρονται στην ψυχολογία ή την προσωπικότητα του εικονιζόμενου, αλλά στη συλλογική συνείδηση, στην κοινωνική διάσταση της εικόνας.

Αυτή η συλλογική συνείδηση υπακούει ασφαλώς σε μία χρονικότητα, που όμως είναι μη γραμμική. Με αυτή την έννοια, αισθάνομαι πιο κοντά στο χοροθέατρο, παρά στο παραδοσιακό θέατρο, με την έννοια του μη γραμμικού χρόνου. Τα έργα μου λειτουργούν έτσι σαν θεατρική παράσταση. Νιώθω σαν σκηνοθέτης. Παλαιότερα, δούλευα με έτοιμες εικόνες (found images), τις οποίες και ζωγράφιζα. Τώρα, ξεκινάω με την ιδέα, μετά δουλεύω το σκηνικό και τα ρούχα. Βρίσκω τα μοντέλα, τα φωτογραφίζω, επεξεργάζομαι τις εικόνες στον υπολογιστή και μετά επιλέγω ποιες θα ζωγραφίσω.

Αλλά η καταγωγή του θεάτρου είναι η τελετή. Και αυτό δεν απαλείφεται ακόμη και στους εκκοσμικευμένους καιρούς μας. Δημιουργώ τελετουργικές αποθρησκευτικοποιημενες εικόνες. Αυτές οι τελετουργικές δραστηριότητες απελευθερώνουν τη ζωή από το τυπικό της περιεχόμενο, προσφέροντας μια ποικιλία εμπειριών και αισθήσεων και μια πολύτιμη εγγύτητα προς τα πράγματα και τους ανθρώπους. Τα έργα μου λοιπόν αποβλέπουν σε μια κοσμική λατρεία που φανερώνει τον σύγχρονο κόσμο μας. Η καλλιτεχνική μου παραγωγή αρχίζει με δημιουργήματα που εξυπηρετούν τη λατρεία – με εμένα τον ίδιο σε ρόλο λειτουργού.

Κάτι τέτοιο υποχρεωτικά οδηγεί σε μια διαφορετική σχέση με την πολυσημία και την αισθητικότητα. Προσπαθώ να εφεύρω εικόνες που να είναι πολυσήμαντες και ανοιχτές σε ερμηνείες. Οτιδήποτε άλλο στερείται ενδιαφέροντος. Η πολυσημία είναι καταστατικό γνώρισμα του νοήματος, γιατί στην πραγματικότητα, αυτό παράγεται από το παιχνίδι του ρητού και του άρρητου. Η ζωγραφική έχει πρωτίστως να κάνει με αυτά που δεν δείχνει, με αυτό που λείπει και δεν είναι εκεί. Η δράση συμβαίνει κυρίως έξω από τον καμβά – γιατί εκτυλίσσεται ακριβώς σε χρόνο μη γραμμικό.

Το αισθητηριακό κριτήριο, πάλι, είναι σημαντικό για την ανάγνωση του παρόντος μας. Είναι αυτό που συνδέει τον εσωτερικό με τον εξωτερικό μας κόσμο. Και σε ό,τι με αφορά, οι αισθητηριακές προσλαμβάνουσες αφορούν μια συγκεκριμένη πόλη, με τη βουή και κυρίως την απροσδιοριστία της. Για αυτό και επιμένω να υπάρχει το πνεύμα της Αθήνας στην τέχνη μου. Όλα αυτά επηρεάζουν άμεσα και τον τρόπο δουλειάς του ζωγράφου. Δουλεύω στο studio μου σαν να είναι μια τελετουργική διαδικασία. Με συγκεντρώνει να αλλάζω και να βάζω τα ρούχα της δουλειάς, σαν να ενδύομαι διακριτό ρόλο. Δεν μπορώ να ζω και να ζωγραφίζω στον ίδιο χώρο πια. Όλα μου τα έργα θέλω να γίνονται γρήγορα, σαν μια αυθόρμητη χειρονομία – όσο και αν η προεργασία απαιτεί χρόνο, μεγάλη έρευνα και πολλές δοκιμές.

Και η πρόσληψη του αποτελέσματος; Πιστεύω ότι η ζωγραφική πρέπει να ερεθίζει και να ενοχλεί. Να επανατοποθετεί τις συντεταγμένες της εικόνας που έχουμε για τον κόσμο. Για αυτό και προσπαθώ να δημιουργήσω οδυνηρά όμορφες εικόνες, που να είναι τεχνικά άρτιες και πάντοτε να εγκολπώνονται το παράλογο της ύπαρξης και την πολυπλοκότητα των ανθρωπίνων σχέσεων. Προφανώς κανείς δεν επανεφευρίσκει τον τροχό. Όμως η σχέση ενός σημερινού καλλιτέχνη με την πριν από αυτόν ζωγραφική παραγωγή έχει γίνει πια ιδιαίτερα πολύπλοκη – και διόλου αθώα.

Η ίδια η ιστορικότητα στην οποία βρισκόμαστε καταβυθισμένοι, σημαίνει όχι μόνο ότι αλλάζει η ιστορική, πολιτική και φιλοσοφική ανάγνωση των έργων, αλλά ότι κατά μία έννοια αλλάζει η λειτουργία της όρασης με κυριολεκτικό τρόπο. Αλλιώς αντιλαμβανόμαστε τις εικόνες σήμερα, απ’ ό,τι πριν τριάντα ή πενήντα χρόνια πριν. Βλέπουμε τον κόσμο διαφορετικά, εξαιτίας και των μέσων που χρησιμοποιούμε.

Υπάρχουν ωστόσο εικόνες (και αυτές αποτελούν τα πιο σημαντικά έργα στην ιστορία της τέχνης) που παραμένουν πολύ σύγχρονες. Γιατί ούτε και στην ιστορία της τέχνης είναι ο χρόνος γραμμικός. Προσωπικά, έχω επηρεαστεί από έργα της αρχαίας Ελλάδας, της Αναγέννησης αλλά και από τους εν ζωή συναδέλφους μου. Όλα αυτά τα έργα είναι παρόντα και ενεργά στην δουλειά μου. Με τον κόσμο της πληροφορίας, πάλι, που μας περιζώνει από παντού, επιλέγω μια πιο αποστασιοποιημένη σχέση. Διαλέγω στις συνθέσεις μου να μην δίνω πολλές πληροφορίες για το περιεχόμενο, ώστε ο θεατής να έχει την ελευθερία να τη συμπληρώσει. Είναι διαφορετική η προσέγγισή μου από την παραδοσιακή κατασκευή αλλά και ανάγνωση μιας εικόνας. Υπάρχει ισχυρή αναφορά στη φωτογραφία και το φιλμ, αλλά πάντα επιλέγω η πληροφορία να είναι εκτός του πίνακα. Είναι μια τακτική που παραπέμπει περισσότερο ίσως στη χρήση του Instagram, με την ελλειπτική πληροφορία, παρά στην ευθύγραμμη και φορτωμένη με πληροφορία αφήγηση της τηλεόρασης.

Η προσωπική μου απάντηση, συνεπώς, στο γιατί αξίζει ακόμη να κάνουμε ζωγραφική έχει να κάνει με τη φιλοδοξία για μία νέα θέαση των πραγμάτων και μία νέα ελεύθερη από προκατασκευές, σύνδεση των ανθρώπων Αλλά υπάρχει και μια απλούστερη εξήγηση: Ζωγραφίζω γιατί έχω εθιστεί. Τυχαίνει να κάνω ένα έργο και να μου αρέσει – και αυτό με τρέφει. Αλλά μέχρι να κάνω το επόμενο, περνάει καιρός και εν τω μεταξύ έχω πετάξει πολλές προσπάθειες. Έτσι κυνηγώ αυτόν τον εθισμό μου. Κυνηγώ αυτήν την έκπληξη, τη χαρά που μου προκαλεί κάποιο έργο που κάνω και αναφωνώ “Τι έγινε τώρα;”.

Αλλά ο δράστης δεν είμαι στην πραγματικότητα εγώ: Το ίδιο το θέμα μου, αυτό που έχει ζωγραφιστεί, αγωνιά να υπάρξει.

link here: https://elculture.gr/to-anapofefkto-erotima/?fbclid=IwAR0Q5iucB8srev7dY9gdFrk6fYoFYRfWGxwfj9PUvpV_hRjwRYq6nLwjXAg

Project Syndicate | Nouriel Roubini

Υπάρχουν αρκετοί λόγοι να ανησυχούμε ότι μεγάλες οικονομίες όπως οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες οδεύουν προς ύφεση, συνοδευόμενη από αλυσιδωτές χρηματοπιστωτικές αναταραχές. Ορισμένα από τα χειρότερα στοιχεία τόσο της δεκαετίας του 1970 όσο και του κραχ του 2008 είναι τώρα στο παιχνίδι, με τις αγορές μετοχών να είναι πιθανό να κινηθούν βαθύτερα σε πτωτικό έδαφος.

Οι παγκόσμιες χρηματοπιστωτικές και οικονομικές προοπτικές για το επόμενο έτος έχουν επιδεινωθεί ραγδαία τους τελευταίους μήνες, με τους υπεύθυνους χάραξης πολιτικής, τους επενδυτές και τα νοικοκυριά να αναρωτιούνται τώρα πόσο πρέπει να αναθεωρήσουν τις προσδοκίες τους και για πόσο χρονικό διάστημα. Αυτό εξαρτάται από τις απαντήσεις σε έξι ερωτήσεις.

Πρώτον, η αύξηση του πληθωρισμού στις περισσότερες προηγμένες οικονομίες θα είναι προσωρινή ή πιο επίμονη; Αυτή η συζήτηση μαίνεται εδώ και ένα χρόνο, αλλά τώρα έχει σε μεγάλο βαθμό διευθετηθεί: η “Ομάδα Εμμένουσα” κέρδισε και η “Ομάδα Μεταβατική” -που προηγουμένως περιελάμβανε τις περισσότερες κεντρικές τράπεζες και δημοσιονομικές αρχές- πρέπει να παραδεχτεί ότι έκανε λάθος.

Το δεύτερο ερώτημα είναι αν η αύξηση του πληθωρισμού οφείλεται περισσότερο στην υπερβολική συνολική ζήτηση (χαλαρή νομισματική, πιστωτική και δημοσιονομική πολιτική) ή σε στασιμοπληθωριστικά αρνητικά σοκ της συνολικής προσφοράς (συμπεριλαμβανομένων των αρχικών αποκλεισμών του COVID-19, των στενώσεων στην αλυσίδα εφοδιασμού, της μειωμένης προσφοράς εργασίας στις ΗΠΑ, των επιπτώσεων του πολέμου της Ρωσίας στην Ουκρανία στις τιμές των εμπορευμάτων και της πολιτικής “μηδενικού COVID” της Κίνας). Ενώ τόσο οι παράγοντες της ζήτησης όσο και της προσφοράς συμμετείχαν στο μείγμα, αναγνωρίζεται πλέον ευρέως ότι οι παράγοντες της προσφοράς έπαιξαν έναν όλο και πιο καθοριστικό ρόλο. Αυτό έχει σημασία, διότι ο πληθωρισμός που καθορίζεται από την προσφορά είναι στασιμοπληθωριστικός και συνεπώς αυξάνει τον κίνδυνο σκληρής προσγείωσης (αυξημένη ανεργία και ενδεχομένως ύφεση) όταν η νομισματική πολιτική σφίγγει.

Αυτό οδηγεί άμεσα στο τρίτο ερώτημα: Η σύσφιξη της νομισματικής πολιτικής από την Ομοσπονδιακή Τράπεζα των ΗΠΑ και άλλες μεγάλες κεντρικές τράπεζες θα επιφέρει σκληρή ή ήπια προσγείωση; Μέχρι πρόσφατα, οι περισσότερες κεντρικές τράπεζες και το μεγαλύτερο μέρος της Wall Street κατείχαν την “ομάδα μαλακής προσγείωσης”. Αλλά η συναίνεση έχει αλλάξει γρήγορα, με ακόμη και τον πρόεδρο της Fed Jerome Powell να αναγνωρίζει ότι η ύφεση είναι πιθανή και ότι μια ήπια προσγείωση θα είναι “πολύ δύσκολη”.

Επιπλέον, ένα μοντέλο που χρησιμοποιείται από την Ομοσπονδιακή Τράπεζα της Νέας Υόρκης δείχνει υψηλή πιθανότητα σκληρής προσγείωσης, και η Τράπεζα της Αγγλίας έχει εκφράσει παρόμοιες απόψεις. Αρκετά εξέχοντα ιδρύματα της Wall Street έχουν πλέον αποφασίσει ότι η ύφεση είναι το βασικό τους σενάριο (το πιο πιθανό αποτέλεσμα εάν όλες οι άλλες μεταβλητές παραμείνουν σταθερές). Τόσο στις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες όσο και στην Ευρώπη, οι μελλοντικοί δείκτες οικονομικής δραστηριότητας και εμπιστοσύνης των επιχειρήσεων και των καταναλωτών κατευθύνονται απότομα προς τα κάτω.

Το τέταρτο ερώτημα είναι κατά πόσον μια σκληρή προσγείωση θα αποδυναμώσει την αποφασιστικότητα των κεντρικών τραπεζών για την αντιμετώπιση του πληθωρισμού. Εάν σταματήσουν τη σύσφιξη της πολιτικής τους μόλις καταστεί πιθανή μια σκληρή προσγείωση, μπορούμε να περιμένουμε μια επίμονη αύξηση του πληθωρισμού και είτε οικονομική υπερθέρμανση (πληθωρισμός πάνω από τον στόχο και ανάπτυξη πάνω από τη δυνητική ανάπτυξη) είτε στασιμοπληθωρισμό (πληθωρισμός πάνω από τον στόχο και ύφεση), ανάλογα με το αν κυριαρχούν οι διαταραχές της ζήτησης ή της προσφοράς.

Οι περισσότεροι αναλυτές της αγοράς φαίνεται να πιστεύουν ότι οι κεντρικές τράπεζες θα παραμείνουν “γερακίστικες”, αλλά εγώ δεν είμαι τόσο σίγουρος. Έχω υποστηρίξει ότι τελικά θα δειλιάσουν και θα αποδεχθούν υψηλότερο πληθωρισμό – ακολουθούμενο από στασιμοπληθωρισμό – όταν μια σκληρή προσγείωση καταστεί επικείμενη, επειδή θα ανησυχούν για τις ζημιές μιας ύφεσης και μιας παγίδας χρέους, λόγω της υπερβολικής συσσώρευσης ιδιωτικών και δημόσιων υποχρεώσεων μετά από χρόνια χαμηλών επιτοκίων.

Τώρα που η σκληρή προσγείωση γίνεται βασική γραμμή για περισσότερους αναλυτές, αναδύεται ένα νέο (πέμπτο) ερώτημα: Θα είναι ήπια και βραχύβια η επερχόμενη ύφεση ή θα είναι πιο σοβαρή και θα χαρακτηρίζεται από βαθιά χρηματοπιστωτική δυσπραγία; Οι περισσότεροι από αυτούς που έχουν προσχωρήσει αργά και απρόθυμα στη βασική γραμμή σκληρής προσγείωσης εξακολουθούν να υποστηρίζουν ότι η όποια ύφεση θα είναι ρηχή και σύντομη. Υποστηρίζουν ότι οι σημερινές χρηματοπιστωτικές ανισορροπίες δεν είναι τόσο σοβαρές όσο εκείνες που υπήρχαν στην πορεία προς την παγκόσμια χρηματοπιστωτική κρίση του 2008 και ότι ο κίνδυνος ύφεσης με σοβαρή κρίση χρέους και χρηματοπιστωτική κρίση είναι επομένως χαμηλός. Όμως αυτή η άποψη είναι επικίνδυνα αφελής.

Υπάρχουν αρκετοί λόγοι να πιστεύουμε ότι η επόμενη ύφεση θα σημαδευτεί από μια σοβαρή στασιμοπληθωριστική κρίση χρέους. Ως ποσοστό του παγκόσμιου ΑΕΠ, τα επίπεδα του ιδιωτικού και δημόσιου χρέους είναι σήμερα πολύ υψηλότερα από ό,τι στο παρελθόν, έχοντας αυξηθεί από 200% το 1999 σε 350% σήμερα (με ιδιαίτερα απότομη αύξηση από την έναρξη της πανδημίας). Υπό αυτές τις συνθήκες, η ταχεία εξομάλυνση της νομισματικής πολιτικής και η αύξηση των επιτοκίων θα οδηγήσουν τα νοικοκυριά, τις εταιρείες, τα χρηματοπιστωτικά ιδρύματα και τις κυβερνήσεις με υψηλή μόχλευση ζόμπι σε πτώχευση και αθέτηση πληρωμών.

Η επόμενη κρίση δεν θα είναι σαν τις προηγούμενες. Στη δεκαετία του 1970, είχαμε στασιμοπληθωρισμό αλλά όχι μαζικές κρίσεις χρέους, επειδή τα επίπεδα χρέους ήταν χαμηλά. Μετά το 2008, είχαμε μια κρίση χρέους ακολουθούμενη από χαμηλό πληθωρισμό ή αποπληθωρισμό, επειδή η πιστωτική κρίση είχε δημιουργήσει ένα αρνητικό σοκ ζήτησης. Σήμερα, αντιμετωπίζουμε σοκ προσφοράς σε ένα πλαίσιο πολύ υψηλότερων επιπέδων χρέους, γεγονός που υποδηλώνει ότι οδεύουμε προς έναν συνδυασμό στασιμοπληθωρισμού τύπου 1970 και κρίσεων χρέους τύπου 2008 – δηλαδή μια κρίση χρέους με στασιμοπληθωρισμό.

Όταν αντιμετωπίζει στασιμοπληθωριστικά σοκ, μια κεντρική τράπεζα πρέπει να αυστηροποιήσει τη στάση πολιτικής της ακόμη και όταν η οικονομία οδεύει προς την ύφεση. Η σημερινή κατάσταση διαφέρει επομένως θεμελιωδώς από την παγκόσμια χρηματοπιστωτική κρίση ή τους πρώτους μήνες της πανδημίας, όταν οι κεντρικές τράπεζες μπορούσαν να χαλαρώσουν επιθετικά τη νομισματική πολιτική ως απάντηση στην πτώση της συνολικής ζήτησης και την αποπληθωριστική πίεση. Ο χώρος για δημοσιονομική επέκταση θα είναι επίσης πιο περιορισμένος αυτή τη φορά. Το μεγαλύτερο μέρος των δημοσιονομικών πυρομαχικών έχει χρησιμοποιηθεί και τα δημόσια χρέη καθίστανται μη βιώσιμα.

Επιπλέον, επειδή ο σημερινός υψηλότερος πληθωρισμός είναι ένα παγκόσμιο φαινόμενο, οι περισσότερες κεντρικές τράπεζες σφίγγουν ταυτόχρονα, αυξάνοντας έτσι την πιθανότητα μιας συγχρονισμένης παγκόσμιας ύφεσης. Αυτή η σύσφιξη έχει ήδη αποτελέσματα: οι φούσκες ξεφουσκώνουν παντού – συμπεριλαμβανομένων των δημόσιων και ιδιωτικών μετοχών, των ακινήτων, της στέγασης, των μετοχών μιμιδίων, της κρυπτογράφησης, των SPAC (εταιρείες εξαγοράς ειδικού σκοπού), των ομολόγων και των πιστωτικών μέσων. Ο πραγματικός και χρηματοοικονομικός πλούτος μειώνεται, και τα χρέη και οι δείκτες εξυπηρέτησης χρέους αυξάνονται.

Αυτό μας φέρνει στο τελικό ερώτημα: Θα ανακάμψουν οι αγορές μετοχών από την τρέχουσα πτωτική αγορά (μείωση τουλάχιστον 20% από την τελευταία κορύφωση) ή θα βυθιστούν ακόμη χαμηλότερα; Το πιθανότερο είναι ότι θα πέσουν χαμηλότερα. Εξάλλου, σε τυπικές απλές υφέσεις, οι αμερικανικές και παγκόσμιες μετοχές τείνουν να υποχωρούν κατά 35% περίπου. Αλλά, επειδή η επόμενη ύφεση θα είναι και στασιμοπληθωριστική και θα συνοδεύεται από χρηματοπιστωτική κρίση, η κατάρρευση των μετοχικών αγορών θα μπορούσε να είναι πιο κοντά στο 50%.

Ανεξάρτητα από το αν η ύφεση είναι ήπια ή σοβαρή, η ιστορία δείχνει ότι η αγορά μετοχών έχει πολύ περισσότερο περιθώριο πτώσης πριν φτάσει στο κατώτατο σημείο. Στο σημερινό πλαίσιο, οποιαδήποτε ανάκαμψη -όπως αυτή των δύο τελευταίων εβδομάδων- θα πρέπει να θεωρηθεί ως αναπήδηση νεκρής γάτας και όχι ως η συνήθης ευκαιρία για αγορά της βουτιάς. Αν και η τρέχουσα παγκόσμια κατάσταση μας φέρνει αντιμέτωπους με πολλά ερωτήματα, δεν υπάρχει πραγματικός γρίφος προς επίλυση. Τα πράγματα θα γίνουν πολύ χειρότερα πριν βελτιωθούν.

Ο Nouriel Roubini, ομότιμος καθηγητής Οικονομικών στο Stern School of Business του Πανεπιστημίου της Νέας Υόρκης, είναι επικεφαλής οικονομολόγος της Atlas Capital Team, διευθύνων σύμβουλος της Roubini Macro Associates, συνιδρυτής του TheBoomBust.com και συγγραφέας του επερχόμενου βιβλίου MegaThreats: Ten Dangerous Trends That Imperil Our Future, and How to Survive Them (Little, Brown and Company, Οκτώβριος 2022). Είναι πρώην ανώτερος οικονομολόγος για διεθνείς υποθέσεις στο Συμβούλιο Οικονομικών Συμβούλων του Λευκού Οίκου κατά τη διάρκεια της κυβέρνησης Κλίντον και έχει εργαστεί για το Διεθνές Νομισματικό Ταμείο, την Ομοσπονδιακή Τράπεζα των ΗΠΑ και την Παγκόσμια Τράπεζα. Η ιστοσελίδα του είναι NourielRoubini.com, και είναι ο οικοδεσπότης του NourielToday.com.

mέta & After the Oligarchy

Editor’s note: Discussion includes using choice of production technique in central planning, opportunity cost, labour cost, calculating environmental costs (such as GHG emissions), agent-based modelling, consumer modelling, simulation results, computational complexity, research to be done.

[After The Oligarchy] Hello fellow democrats, futurists, and problem solvers, this is After The Oligarchy. Today I’m speaking with Dr. Philipp Dapprich.

Philipp Dapprich is a political economist and philosopher working at the Free University Berlin. His PhD was entitled Rationality and Distribution in the Socialist Economy (2020), , and he is also co-author of a forthcoming (2022) book entitled Economic Planning in an Age of Environmental Crisis. Today we’ll be discussing his work on refining the model of economic planning first proposed by Cockshott and Cottrell in Towards a New Socialism (1993).

Today’s conversation is in association with mέta: the Centre for Postcapitalist Civilisation if you’re not familiar with Towards a New Socialism you can buy the book or find a free PDF online you can also find interviews with Paul Cockshott on this channel and I’ll put links in the description to Philipp Dapprich’s doctoral thesis as well as a relevant paper.

Philipp Dapprich, thank you very much for joining me.

[Philipp Dapprich] Thank you for having me again.

[ATO] The first thing I’m going to say is I really recommend the viewers watch the previous interview, because they’re not standalone interviews. We covered a lot of important stuff last time about opportunity costs, the motivations for your work, and really if viewers want to understand what we’re talking about now they should watch that. So, I’m just going to say that once.

Today there are two main things that we want to talk about. The first is we want to get into the details of the simulations that you ran to investigate your new techniques of opportunity cost valuations in the Towards a New Socialism model.

The other thing is we want to talk about a fundamental question, a fundamental problem, in economic planning and central planning about choice of production technologies. Can you introduce the problem and how you approached it?

[PD] One approach to planning has long been to use so-called input-output tables. And input-output tables – they are commonly published even by western capitalist countries – show you which industries use inputs from which other industries, and which output, how much output, they produce with this.

And the problem with that is that these tables are generally very aggregated. So, you have entire industries, you might have something like Forestry and Agriculture, all bunched together into one column of the table. And it doesn’t differentiate between various different kinds of products within those industries. It won’t differentiate between different kinds of agricultural products, lumber, and so on. That’s the first problem: they’re way too aggregated. And what you’d have to do is to have a much more disaggregated table which differentiates between different kinds of products.

[ATO] When you’re talking about input-output tables – for viewers – you’re saying that these are very aggregated tables. And they’re saying, for example, the agricultural sector is outputting let’s say corn and milk. And then you’re also looking at the inputs required for that, for example, grain, iron, electricity.

[PD] Exactly. The input-output table will tell you not just how much the Forestry and Agriculture sector is producing, but also which inputs from which other industries it is using. Is it using a lot of input from the energy industry, or from the mining industry? How much labour is it using? That’s an important input as well.

Source: UN, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/370160?ln=en

But, as I said, it doesn’t differentiate between different kinds of products being produced in those industries. It’s all aggregated into one column. And if you want to plan specifically, not just what the size of a certain sector should be, but precisely which kinds of products should be produced – and that’s the level of detail of planning that we really need – those input-output tables are not going to be very useful.

So, the first thing you have to do is get a much more disaggregated table which differentiates within the same industry between different kinds of product. For example, you differentiate between wheat, potatoes, and tomatoes, and so on, rather than having them all bunched together as one sector. That’s the first problem, that they don’t differentiate between different kinds of products.

The second problem is they don’t differentiate between different ways of producing that product. The input-output table looks at the past year, or whatever year this table was made for, and looks at how much was used in this industry to produce whatever that industry produces. So even if we were to differentiate that, and we look at potato farming or we look at electricity generation (maybe that’s a better example here) it will not differentiate between electricity that’s produced by coal power plants versus nuclear power plants, versus solar and wind power plants. But if you want to plan precisely which methods should be used, you need to be able to differentiate this. Instead, an input-output table just tells you at the current mix of electricity production this is how many tons of coal were used to produce electricity, this is how many wind turbines were installed, and so on, this is how much labour was being used in in the electricity industry.

So, you don’t just want to differentiate between different kinds of products. Here we’re talking about the same product, electricity, but there are different methods of producing it. And one of the fundamental questions if you want to determine an efficient allocation of resources is which of these methods should we be using? We have to be able to tell them apart.

And the way that I do that is I kind of move away from these traditional input-output tables, and instead have tables which don’t have an entire sector or even single product as one column, but instead have a production technique. And producing electricity with coal power would be a different production technique hfrom producing it with wind power or nuclear power, and so on. And each column would then list with this particular kind of production technique how much labour is needed, how much coal would be needed, how many wind engines would be needed, to produce a certain output of electricity. And this can then serve as a basis for determining a production plan which precisely specifies which techniques should be used to what extent to produce the optimal overall output.

[ATO] Thank you for that overview. And let me ask: in a traditional input-output table, like you’re saying, it’s effectively a snapshot of the production techniques which are currently in use. However, if we wanted to devise plan for the economy that was the most efficient, we would of course not only want to find the best distribution of resources given fixed production techniques, but we’d also want to pick what the best production technique for each good and service would be.

So, you’re saying that part of how you approach this is that rather than using a traditional input-output table, you’re now introducing or including separate production techniques into some kind of table or matrix. Like you said, you could have multiple entries for electricity: Electricity 1, Electricity 2, Electricity 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

Could you talk more about how a planning algorithm can actually choose between these different techniques? Choose between one method of electricity generation over another.

[PD] What I call a plan, in the end, is basically a specification of which production techniques should be used at which intensity. Intensity here means if you use it at an intensity of one, then you’ll have exactly the input stated in the table and the outputs stated in the table. If you use it as an at an intensity of two, that means you’re using it twice as much. Which means you have twice as many inputs, twice as many outputs.

Input table and output table used in Dapprich (2021).

So, a plan in the end is supposed to specify which of these techniques should be used at what intensity. And the idea is that you calculate the plan which uses the mix of techniques which maximizes the overall production output, and that can be calculated using linear programming. So, you can determine the optimal plan, i.e. the mix of production techniques which maximizes overall production.

[ATO] In order for this to function then, presumably, let’s say in the real world, there would have to be some kind of register or list of available production techniques. How could we imagine that operating?

[PD] If you want to imagine some kind of central planning agency being in charge of this planning process in some sense, or administrating it, they would need to have this table which lists all the available production techniques, or at least the ones which plausibly could be used in an optimal plan. They need to have all the entries so they need to know which resources are being used, and which output is being produced by that plan.

The way that I imagine that this table would be created is you could have various production units communicating what production techniques they have available. Or you could also have research centres which continue to come up with new methods and which would then, perhaps in an experimental fashion, determine the resource usage of those production techniques, how much can be produced with those resources using that technique, and then communicate that to a central computer system where this would then be entered into the table.

[ATO] I’m thinking about computation here. And, of course, probably the great attraction of using these Leontief style input-output tables is that they make computation of a comprehensive plan so much easier. Now, if you introduce multiple production techniques, multiple production vectors for each product, that’s obviously going to make it more computationally complex. So, what are your thoughts about this? Is it still feasible and if so, how would you quantify that?

[PD] I think actually the biggest increase in computational complexity comes from differentiating between different kinds of products within the same industry. A typical input-output table will have maybe 100, at maximum maybe 500, different industries but there might be hundreds of millions of different kinds of products. That will massively increase the size of the table and that’s the computational complexity of the problem that has to be solved.

The different kinds of production techniques – if we maybe imagine that there might be two or three, on average, different ways of producing a product, that will of course increase it further. But that’s probably not the most relevant factor here. The differentiation between different kinds of products within the same industry will probably – at least that’s my guess – be the big effect.

The answer is yes absolutely that increases the computational complexity and increases the length of time that a computer will need to solve these kinds of problems

[ATO] Yes certainly, disaggregating the products has an enormous effect and that’s very relevant. I’m asking particularly about different production techniques because I think Cockshott and Cottrell have very convincingly argued that without multiple production techniques a comprehensive plan can be feasibly calculated for on the order of 100 million or a billion distinct products.

What you’re saying is that if we have, say, a handful of leading candidates for production techniques because it’s not necessary to list every single production technique available, including all of the ones which are really inefficient. There is probably a handful of ones which are more or less equally successful, maybe one is better in one aspect, another is better another aspect. You’re saying that, let’s say, if these additional production techniques are on the order of 10 or less, then you’re just looking at multiplying the calculations by a factor of 10.

[PD] Exactly. I think potentially imaginable production techniques can be already excluded from an engineering standpoint, because we already know that they used a lot of certain resources. We could in theory produce electricity by having hamsters on treadmills or something like that, but we know that’s not going to be an economically viable and feasible way of producing electricity compared to nuclear power or wind power or something like that. So, I think a lot a lot can be excluded already.

I actually think there’s a way also to formally calculate that without already having to do the optimization. Which is: if based on past plans, for example, you were able to calculate the opportunity costs of not just various products but also of inputs for these products – we talked about opportunity costs in the last part – if you were to calculate that opportunity cost, you could also use that as a cost indicator to give you a vague idea of the costs of different inputs. And then if you notice this production technique uses a lot of this really valuable scarce resource, that has a very high opportunity cost, that we really need somewhere, else then you can maybe already preclude that from the list to begin with. And that’s not going to be something that would be used in an optimal plan anyway.

[ATO] You’re saying that the opportunity cost valuations could be used to screen for efficient production techniques.

[PD] Exactly.

[ATO] Okay and actually on that point, firstly I’m just trying to picture the introduction of these multiple production techniques for each product. Is that essentially functioning like rather than, say, having electricity as an entry it’s almost like you have now multiple products. We know that they are electricity, but in mathematical terms it’s like there are different products.

[PD] Well, you need a way to specify to the algorithm, to the computer, that these are the same product. Because this will be relevant when calculating which techniques should be used, and how much do we need of a certain product, and so on. So, the algorithm needs to know which product is being produced.

The way I do this is by having actually two different kinds of tables. The first table specifies only the inputs of various production techniques. And then the second table specifies to you which product is being produced with this technique.

One advantage of this is also that you can actually have multiple products of the same production technique. In some production processes you might have maybe the main product but you also have some by-product that is being used. For example, something that has been in the news lately because of high energy prices, fertilizer manufacturers lowered their production but because a by-product of the fertilizer production process is CO2, that is then used for fizzy drinks and other kinds of things, that also reduced the availability of CO2. So, by having these two different tables – one specifies the inputs, the other the outputs – you can then also have in the output table non-zero entries for multiple products. You could have production techniques which produce more than one output.

[ATO] Yes, that’s a good point because that is certainly relevant information for actually quite a lot of products. And if we want to have a more circular economy that’s important information, we don’t want to just throw away products. We want to use by-products as efficiently as possible.

Staying on the topic of computational complexity just for a little bit longer: the opportunity cost valuations, what are the ramifications there on computation?

[PD] The way that I calculated them in my thesis was basically I did one optimization – we talked last time about this free bread method, for example, which might be used to produce one free unit of bread and then you see how that increases the overall output – so you do one calculation without any of these methods and then you do an extra calculation for each product. Basically, to see how much you increase the optimized production output when you have one unit of it for free.

And that, of course, means that you have to do a lot of extra calculations. But there is actually a computationally much easier way of doing this with linear programming. In linear programming, you actually get certain factors which are used in the optimization process which seem to be equivalent to my way of calculating it, and you get these basically computationally for free. So, there isn’t any significant increase in the computational complexity if you also want to calculate these opportunity costs.

[ATO] What you’re saying is that you can actually change from labour time calculations to opportunity cost calculations, which on the face of it would seem to require a lot more computation, but actually at the end of it these two methods – labour cost and opportunity cost – end up with roughly the same order of computational complexity.

[PD] Yes. At least that’s the case if you use linear programming.

The problem is that linear programming still seems to be a bit too complex for the number of different products and production techniques that that we have to consider. But there are better ways of doing that. Cockshott and Cottrell proposed the harmony algorithm – I think Cockshott was actually the one that that developed this – which is more computationally efficient than linear programming in these kinds of planning problems.

What I don’t know is whether there’s also a way of using the harmony algorithm to get these opportunity cost factors. I think that’s something that still needs to be looked into. Whether in the end you can also get these for free using an optimization method which is sufficiently computationally efficient to calculate a plan for millions, hundreds of millions, of different products and production techniques within a time frame that’s acceptable.

[ATO] You’re saying that the opportunity cost valuations actually do add in significantly more computation, so this is a topic for future research.

[PD] Well, they don’t add anything if you use linear programming. But the question is whether linear programming is actually fast enough to solve these kinds of problems. And Paul Cockshott suggests that actually with linear programming it would still require too much time, too much computer time, to solve these kinds of problems. And you actually need a more efficient algorithm and he proposes the harmony algorithm, which does solve it in time.

So, the question is whether what’s true for linear programming – that you can basically get these evaluations for free – is also true for the harmony algorithm. And that’s something that I simply don’t know.

[ATO] This is something to be to be worked out, it’s an open question.

[PD] Yes.

[ATO] All right. Would you be interested in talking about the opportunity cost of land in particular?

[PD] Yes, I mean it’s not that different from other factors really. But we could briefly talk about that.

[ATO] It’s basically the same process?

[PD] Yes, the idea would be that you consider if we had one unit of land extra how much does that increase production.

[ATO] Okay, let’s park that for now because that requires us to go back through all of the material from last interview again.

[PD] Yeah.

[ATO] Last time we discussed in depth the method that you’ve introduced to calculate the opportunity cost of different resources, different goods and services, in a democratic central plan. But also you did some simulations to investigate this, and we didn’t really talk about that much. Would you like to talk about that now?

[PD] Yes, sure, do you want me to just briefly outline it?

[ATO] Yes, please.

[PD] The basic idea of the simulation, or the motivation behind it, is I wanted to see how the composition of products that is being produced will differ in the traditional labour value model and my model using opportunity cost. And, specifically, I was interested in seeing how emission rights – if you constrain the allowable emissions for the economy overall, you put a cap on emissions – affect which kinds of products are being produced.

And I thought the best way of testing that would be a computer simulation. The computer simulation, on the one hand, uses precisely – or at least a simplified version of – the kinds of planning algorithms that you would apply in in the real world.

And then, on the other hand, you need to also consider the behaviour of consumers. Of course, in a computer simulation you don’t have real consumers, and in the real world you would, these would be real people going to the supermarket deciding what to use their vouchers, or tokens, or money, or whatever you want to call it, on. But for the purpose of the computer simulation, I devised a very simple agent-based model which simulates the behaviour of individual consumers. And then you can observe with consumers behaving in in this way how would the planning algorithm react to that? How would it change the composition of products that are being produced?

[ATO] Can we just take a brief detour here which I think people might find interesting. Some people will know what agent-based modelling is but others won’t. And I just think it would be interesting if you just explained briefly what that was. Because it’s a different kind of modelling than has traditionally been done for decades and decades, and it’s something that’s become a lot more popular now particularly in economics.

[PD] With agent-based modelling you’re basically modelling individual agents. You’re saying okay well we have maybe a thousand different agents and we’re going to model for each one of them how are they going to behave in a certain situation. How they’re going to act, interact with each other, with the environment, and so on. Which choices, which decisions, are they going to make?

And, of course, then you have some things about how people will react to various circumstances. And there might also be an element of chance. My model does include an element of chance as well, but with probabilities of various decisions depending on certain circumstances and also certain factors you can pre-specify as someone running this simulation.

(Source: Wikipedia) Netlogo is a popular and free agent-based modelling software. The image above shows an agent-based predator-prey model of an ecosystem with grass, sheep, and wolves. In agent-based modelling, rather than programming the macroscopic behaviour into the system (e.g. with an equation for the system), one programmes rules for each element of the system (e.g. for a patch of grass, a sheep,or a wolf) and then watches the agents interact based on their specified behaviour rules. Netlogo website: http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo-ccl.shtml

[ATO] So people can picture this who aren’t familiar with it. You could imagine, for example, if you’re one of these evil ‘security’ corporations trying to prepare the oligarchy to deal with the various uprisings which are due to happen in the in the coming century. You can imagine a crowd control simulation where you have individual people. And you can imagine looking at them, and then there are simple rules which govern their behaviour. Like if they’re enclosed by a certain number of other agents, they might act like this, and so forth.

And so, you program in these very basic rules for what they’re going to do, and then you just watch what happens when you throw all of these marbles together basically, and they interact with each other. And sometimes very surprising things can happen.

Well, anyway that’s agent-based modelling, but you were talking about using that to model consumers in the simulation. So, please continue.

[PD] In my simulation, the basic idea or what I wanted from the consumers is I wanted their decisions to be price dependent.

Basically, what that means is that if the price of a good increases suddenly they should be less likely to buy this kind of product, and maybe choose some alternative instead. Because I wanted to keep it very simple, it is price dependent so you get exactly this result under very specific circumstances. But as long as these are met, then you get significant price reaction of consumers so that they’re less likely to buy a product if the price of that product increases.

But some still will buy it. Some people will still buy a product even if it’s ridiculously expensive. And the real world equivalent would be someone who values this product so much that they’re willing to pay even a very high price for it. And you get some people like that, and you get that in the simulation as well.

The way that I’ve done this is basically each consumer has an infinite shopping list, and the shopping list is ordered. It is procedurally generated; you generate as much as you need basically until the consumer stops shopping. You start off with the first item on the list and that’s the top priority for that consumer. And if the consumer can afford that item, then she or he will purchase that item, and then goes moves on to the second item. And this then continues until the consumer isn’t able to afford an item

I think three times in a row is what I picked here as the stop condition. So, if there are three items on the list in a row that the consumer can no longer afford, because she or he has already spent all of her credits on the items further up on the list, then she’ll conclude that she has run out of money. She can’t afford anything else. He’s going to go home now.

The reason that under certain circumstances this yields a price dependent behaviour -consumption behaviour – is that if the price of a product is more expensive, it is more likely that she will not have enough credits left to be able to purchase that, and she will have to skip the item and see if there’s something else further down on the list that she can still afford.

So, that’s how you get this price dependent reaction with people being less likely to purchase items as their price increases

[ATO] The aim there is you’re trying to create a model of consumer behaviour where consumers are responsive to prices. Because the essential point of this is to model consumer feedback so that they’re responsive to prices. And then you’re saying, also, that this is done in a statistical way. Essentially, there’s a statistical distribution of preferences – that’s what it amounts to. Even if something is very expensive, e.g. there’s a very expensive guitar, somebody will want to buy that. Most people won’t.

[PD] Exactly. Some people will still purchase this.

And also what you get with this agent-based model which you wouldn’t get with – or which would be more difficult to get with – standard neoclassical models, is that the choice of products doesn’t just depend on the price of an individual product. So, how many, say, potatoes we bought doesn’t just depend on the price of potatoes but it also depends on the price of other products. Because if potatoes have a fair price but something else is a real bargain, then people might choose to use their limited funds not to buy potatoes and buy something else instead. That is actually something else that I wanted to capture in this model, and which I’ve accomplished, that the amount of a product being bought doesn’t just depend on its own price but also on the price of everything else that could be bought instead.

So, these are the two important factors that I cared about and which are realized in the model.

But, of course, overall it’s not a particularly realistic model of how people behave. It’s not supposed to be. If you were to apply this model in the real world, you wouldn’t need this consumer model in the first place. You’d have real people doing this. So, realism is not necessarily what I was interested in. These two factors are what I care about: price dependent behaviour of consumers, and that the amount of the product being bought doesn’t just depend on its own price but also on the price of alternative products.

[ATO] You’ve got that consumer model, but of course your overarching goal isn’t to model consumer behaviour. That is in the service of a larger goal which is an optimal plan. So, let’s talk about the other aspects of the simulation.

[PD] The way these two parts then fit together – you have, on the one hand, this optimal planning algorithm, the consumer feedback mechanism which we talked about last time, and the consumer behaviour model. The consumer model tells you what the consumer feedback going to be.

So, at a given supply … The optimal plan tells you how much is being produced of various products, that tells you how much is available for consumers. That’s the supply that can then be compared to the demand at a certain price level. You market the consumer products at certain prices to consumers, and you see what is going to be the demand for various products based on the consumer model.

Then you have supply and demand, and you can compare these. And you might observe that actually at the current prices the demand for a product is really high higher than the supply. And then based on one of these two feedback mechanisms – which we talked about last time – you’d adjust the price to try to balance supply and demand.

So, in this case, you would increase the price, and because the consumer model is reactive to these prices that means demand will go down. If the opposite is the case, so actually at current prices the demand for product is much lower than what’s been made available through production, than the supply, then you actually lower the price to encourage more consumers to pick these kinds of products, so that they don’t go to waste.

That’s the first step, this comparison of supply and demand. And this is really where the consumer model interacts with the planning algorithm and the feedback methods that we talked about last time.

Dapprich (2021). Summary diagram of model. (1) The plan target is used to calculate an optimal plan, determing supply of each good. (2) Consumers respond to goods sold at prices, and adjust their demand. (3) Compare supply and demand and adjust prices. (4) Compare opportunity cost with price and adjust plan target. (5) Repeat.

This is then done 30 times. You can imagine that that this is one month consisting of 30 days, and every day we adjust the prices somewhat to try to create this match of supply and demand. What I found in the very simple simulations that I ran is that usually after around 20 days you’d have a pretty good match of supply and demand. It took 30 [days] because I also thought that fits well with one month, so we can maybe better imagine that. After this 30 day period, usually you’ll have the market clearing prices which match supply and demand.

Now you know what the market clearing prices for a product are. You can also calculate the opportunity cost, in the way that we discussed in the last interview.

And now you have to make them comparable. The way that you do it is you now have the market clearing prices after this 30-day period, and you can also calculate the opportunity costs in the way that we discussed the last time for various products. You now have to make these two comparable because they might be on completely different scales. You want to (what’s called) ‘normalize’ them, bring them on the same level.

And the way that I do that is I modify the opportunity costs such that the relative costs of various products remain the same. So, originally, one item costs twice as much as another item. Those relations will be maintained. But the overall cost of all the different products that have been produced will be the same now, after normalization, as the overall price at the market clearing prices of all the products that are available. You maintain the proportions of different costs while having them on the same scale as market clearing prices, so that market clearing prices and opportunity costs of products can now be compared.

[ATO] Just to make that concrete for viewers: so, you’ve calculated that the opportunity cost of bread is – I’m just going to pick random numbers – a thousand euro, or a thousand, let’s say. And for potatoes the opportunity cost is 500 euro. If you look in the shop, then price of bread is one euro and the price of potatoes is 50 euro. So, first of all you’re saying that the proportions are the same, the relative prices, are the same. But you can’t compare an opportunity cost of bread which is a thousand euro with the price of bread which is one euro. That’ll end up with nonsense.

[PD] Well, the proportions won’t necessarily be the same with opportunity costs and prices. The opportunity cost of producing one unit of bread might be twice as much as producing one unit of potatoes. But the price of it actually might be three times more. So, that can still be the case.

But what you want to avoid is that they are on completely different scales. You assumed opportunity cost is already measured in euro, or something like that. Now the opportunity cost is not being measured in the same unit as the credits, or the vouchers, or the or the money, that you’re using to purchase items at all. They’re not measured in the same unit.

So, you have to make them comparable in some sense. And, as I said, the way doing it is not to change the proportions of the cost. That would stay two to one, even if the price is three to one. You maintain these proportions. But the overall value of all the products has to perhaps be reduced. Let’s say, on average, the cost of producing an individual product is a thousand but the price of it on average is one. Then you have to reduce the cost by a factor of 1,000, reduce that for all products to make them comparable. That’s the basic idea.

[ATO] While prices would be recorded in some units – we could imagine it might be something like euro – the opportunity cost valuations, that measurement is in terms of fulfilment of the plan. It’s a fulfilment of the target vector, so it’s not it doesn’t have the same unit as a price.

[PD] Yes, the unit is whatever the unit of the objective function is, which could be tons of grain for example. Because you see a slight increase in the value of the optimized objective function, and that’s what you’re measuring here: the opportunity cost.

But you then want to make that comparable to prices. So, you might have to scale the opportunity costs down a bit, or scale them up, while maintaining their proportions. You might increase them by a factor of a thousand, or decrease them by a factor of a thousand, something like that, such that in the end the overall cost of all items available is the same as the overall price of all items available.

[ATO] So, what’s the next step?

[PD] The next step is now, after this 30 day period, you have the market clearing prices for items. You can also calculate the opportunity cost for the items. You scale the opportunity costs to be comparable to the prices, and then you compare them.

So, for each product you would look: well, the price for that item is maybe 10. But the cost of producing it is only 9. And then, because the price is higher than the cost, it means there’s a lot of demand even at a high price for this product, which means we should be producing more of this. People are willing to pay the cost of producing this item. And actually there are even people are willing to pay more than that. So, we’ll produce more of it in the future.

And so you adjust the plan target entry for that product. The plan target, to repeat from last time, specifies the proportions in which various products are being produced. If our example is bread, and you have a price for bread that’s higher than the opportunity cost, and then you increase the entry for bread such that in the next planned period, we’ll have a higher proportion of bread being produced in the output mix.

If the opposite is the case, let’s say for potatoes, the market clearing price is actually lower than the opportunity cost of producing potatoes, then you decrease the entry for potatoes in the plan target vector (which specifies the proportions at which things have been produced). And what you then get is basically in the next planned period – a few days, the next month – you’d be producing relatively more grain compared to potatoes. Because you’ve now increased the proportion for grain and decreased the proportion for potatoes. So, you have the higher emphasis on bread versus potatoes.

[ATO] You’re talking about using the comparison between the opportunity cost of a product – let’s say, bread – with the price that it’s selling for. Those are being compared, and then the plan target is being adjusted based on that comparison. If the price is higher than the opportunity cost, this is taken as a signal that it would make sense for more of this to be produced. Because people are willing to pay more than the calculated cost of producing it, which is the opportunity cost.

And similarly in the reverse case. If the opportunity cost is higher than the price, people aren’t actually willing to pay a price which is equal to the opportunity cost. Then that’s an indication that too much of it is being produced.

And so, the plan target, which is basically a recipe for the entire economy – we talked about that last time, the example was falafel. If you want to make falafel, then you have one tin of chickpeas, one portion of garlic and two of parsley. But this is for the whole economy.

[PD] Let me just correct you there. The plan target is not what you might call a recipe. It doesn’t tell you what you need to produce falafel. Rather, it tells you how much falafel should you produce relative to haloumi, and kebab, and other things. Because if you produce too much falafel, there actually might not be that many people who want to eat falafel. Maybe more people want to eat haloumi instead. So the plan target tells you the proportions in which various products should be produced.

A different table, the input table, would tell you what you need to produce it. that that would be the recipe, or the plan target tells you how much of various things to produce in proportion to other things.

[ATO] That’s completely true. And when I was saying that, I was thinking, well, this is actually a very confusing analogy, because the natural analogy of falafel will be an actual would be an actual product in the economy, whereas I’m talking about in the economy, What I was trying to get across when we went through this last time, was that if you’re producing one unit of potatoes, then there will also be produced two units of iron, five units of bicycles, three units of electricity. And, like you said, they’re fixed proportions. So that’s where I was going with the recipe – that it scales up in fixed proportions.

The point being that comparing the opportunity cost to the price – this feeds back then and changes that plan target. So, the proportions will change. If people don’t want bread, then the amount of bread in this plan target will decrease.

Okay, so now know what?

[PD] Yes, exactly. So, now you change the plan target. You change the proportions at which various consumer products are being produced. Basically the idea is to adjust them to what people actually want and need. And then you have a new plan target. And based on that, you can then calculate a new production plan for the next period.

So you had some initial plan target that you started off with. You’re now changing that plan target, somewhat adjusting that in response to the behaviour of consumers. And now you start in the next period and you do the same thing basically again. So, you’ll have a slightly different composition of products now. You’ll again market them to consumers, every day you adjust the price until you approach market clearing prices. And then at the end of the period, again the same for the third period, you would adjust the target and recalculate the plan.

So each plan period you get a slightly different composition, and it keeps being adjusted to match what consumers actually are willing to spend that vouchers or credits on.

[ATO] The way you’ve done this is that the consumer model runs for 30 iterations, which we could think of as 30 days, or a month, consumers going into shops and buying things and liking the prices, or not liking the prices, and changing their demand. But if we just think about the real world, would you envisage this model applying in real life in a similar way? That the plan target might be updated once a month? Or is this just the way the simulation functions?

[PD] This is just the way I did it in the simulation. How are you going to do it in the real world depends, for example, on how long it takes to calculate an optimal plan. So, if it only takes a couple of minutes, then maybe you can update it every day. If it takes a couple of days, then maybe once a week, or once a month is more realistic.

But I needed to choose some number here. And also the other factor was I wanted for the simulation at least sufficient time for prices to adjust to market clearing prices before I calculate a new plan. That’s why it shows this 30 day period.

In the real world, of course, you could adjust it depending on how fast prices approach market clearing prices, how long it takes to calculate a new production plan. So, you could do this a lot faster if that is feasible from computational standpoint.

[ATO] We’ve been mostly talking about the model. But what about the simulation and the results of the simulation? What happened there?

[PD] What I was particularly interested in is what happens when you introduce a constraint on emissions. I tested this in a very simplified setting, because this way, it’s basically easier – it was easier for me, and also for someone else looking at this – to understand what is actually going on here.

I took an economy, which only has two different consumer products. And the idea is that one of these products takes a lot of emissions – takes a lot of energy, which takes emissions – to produce. And the other product is the more green, environmentally-friendly product, it has a lower carbon footprint.

And I wanted to see if we now introduce a constraint on emissions, how does that affect the proportions at which these products will be produced? Will we produce more of the product that has actually high carbon emissions? Or will we produce less of that, but more of the environmentally friendly product? And I think this would be what makes sense and what should happen in an ideal model; that as you limit emissions, that increases the cost of producing a product that takes a lot of emissions, because these are now a scarce resource that we have to economise on. And that means we should probably be producing less of that. And maybe it’s better to produce something else instead, which doesn’t use up all of these emission rights.

So, I then tested this. I compared the labour value model of [Paul] Cockshott and [Allin] Cottrell with my opportunity cost model, and looked at how these two differ.

First, what I did was [look at] what happens if you don’t have an emission constraint at all. Basically, the economy is allowed to produce as many greenhouse gas emissions as is necessary to produce as much as possible. You don’t care about emissions at all. And I chose the basic parameters of the simulation such that under these circumstances, the proportions of A and B being produced are one-to-one.

So, what happens is you produce one of the environmentally destructive products, so maybe this is meat, which has higher greenhouse gas emissions. Then maybe the vegetarian option, which has lower carbon emissions. You produce one unit of meat for every unit of the veggie option. And that’s when you don’t have an emission constraint. That’s exactly the same in the labour value model and in my opportunity cost model. When you don’t take emissions into account, both models basically have the same result under the circumstances.

Dapprich (2021). Black arrow is both cost models with no emissions constraint. With emission constraint, red is labour cost model, green is opportunity cost model. Red is a scaled version of the black vector. Green is scaled and shifted in direction.

But if you now introduce an emission constraint and say we can’t overall emit more CO2, or more greenhouse gases, than a certain cap, then what happens in the labour value model – at least in some cases that I looked into – is that you simply produce less overall. So you don’t change the proportions. You don’t say we’re going to produce less meat because it’s environmentally destructive, but we’re going to keep producing as much of the veggie option or even more of the veggie option. No, instead, what you do is you keep the proportions one-to-one. You just produce less overall, because that’s all you can produce without violating the emissions constraint. But there’s no change in the proportions, because there’s no change in the in the calculated cost of producing these items.

Emissions aren’t factored into labour values. So meat doesn’t get a higher cost of production, just because you now want to limit the amount of emissions and it takes a lot of emissions to produce. So that’s not factored into the cost. And accordingly, it doesn’t factor into the mix of products being produced.

But what happens in my opportunity cost value model is that meat actually – when you introduce an emission constraint – gets a much higher opportunity cost. Because all those emission rights being used to produce meat could be used to produce a lot of other things. And that increases the cost of meat, and this then results in there being a lot less meat being produced. Because it has a higher cost and not as many people are willing to pay that high of a price, such that the cost and the prices are somehow balanced. So, you see actually not just a reduction in the overall production to meet the emission constraint. You see a drastic reduction in meat production, but a relative increase of the production of the veggie option, the environmentally friendly option.

[ATO] Yes, it’s very interesting. And I’m going to include pictures from the paper. Visually, this is represented as – you can think about this plan target as being a vector.

[PD] The plan target gives you gives you the direction of a vector. So, you have a product space. Because you just have two products, it’s two dimensional. That’s why I chose two products, it’s easier to them to understand. And the target tells you in which direction is that arrow going to be. Because it tells you the proportions at which products are being produced. And then the length of the vector tells you how much we are producing at these proportions.

And without emissions, basically, you get a one-to-one proportion. So the vector is at a 45 degree angle. And the length is as long as possible with available resources, not taking into account the emissions. You can produce as many emissions as you want, or as necessary to produce as much as is possible.

And so the in the labour value model, when you then introduce an emission constraint, what happens is the direction of the arrow remains the same, you simply decrease the length of the arrow. So, you will maintain the same proportions but produce less of all. While, in my model, you actually change the direction of the vector towards the environmentally friendly product. So you actually see a shift in the kinds of things being produced and not just the quantity of what has been produced.

[ATO] Yes, exactly. So what other results did you get?

[PD] This was the main thing that I was interested in. I also ran some tests to see what the computational complexity was. I used linear programming and my results were consistent with other tests of that Paul Cockshott did on the complexity of linear programming for these kinds of planning problems.

But the main thing that I was interested in was precisely this. How other factors than labour, in particular emission rates, affect the costs of producing items compared to labour values, and how that then affects the composition of products being produced. And the results were for the most part, consistent with my expectation; and I think demonstrate that opportunity costs are a more adequate measure of cost and that it really matters which one we choose, because it will lead to different a different mix of products being produced.

[ATO] Yes, the simulation is very interesting. Of course, it’s basically a proof of concept, because there’s a toy economy. But I think, yes, it does show that – like you were describing – there is a qualitative difference between the labour value model and the opportunity cost value model. In one you have the same plan target, the same product mix for the economy, and you’re just scaling that up and down. The opportunity cost model is more dynamic, in the sense that the mix can actually change.

Okay, so we’ve talked about the model, we’ve talked about the simulations. What work remains to be done, do you think?

[PD] There are a lot of simplifications in my simulation. And what could be done is to have a more refined version of it, which takes us to kind of other things which I haven’t taken into account.

For example, one major limitation of my simulation is that it doesn’t really consider economic growth and change in the capital stock. You don’t have a scenario where, for example, what you can produce in the second year depends on the machinery that you produced in the first year. So that’s currently not taking into account in my simulation.

There is literature on this. Paul Cockshott has written about multiyear plans where you get precisely this, what you produce in the second year depends on the machinery that’s available which can be also produced in the prior year, and built up, and so on. But there is, as far as I know, no model yet which tries to combine this these multiyear plans with consumer feedback. So you have the short term planning, where you don’t really see a change in the composition of capital goods, which is in response to consumer goods. That’s what I did. You have these multiyear plans where you do see a change in the composition of capital goods, and you can build up capital stock, and so on. But that wasn’t made responsive to consumer demand.

So, I think what should be done next is to have a model which does both, where you have constant changing capital stuff but the production specifically of consumer products, is also made responsive to consumer demand; and the proportions at which various products are being produced continually get adjusted, depending on consumer demand.

[ATO] And is that something that you think you’ll find yourself working on?

[PD] So at the moment, I’m not working on that yet. Maybe that’s something I’ll get the time to get to at some point.

At the moment, I’m working on some questions which are more related to philosophy. So I’m working on Marx’s concept of alienation and looking how that applies to a socialist society. Marx criticised capitalism because he thought that labour was alienated under capitalism. And then the question I asked myself is ‘well, isn’t labour still alienated under socialism? What’s different under socialism that suddenly people are not alienated, but are free in some sense?’. So that’s what I’m currently working on.

And the other thing I’m working on is I’m in active exchange with economists from the Austrian School of Economics, who have long criticised the feasibility of socialist planning. And we are discussing whether these cyber-socialist models – or sometimes they call them techno-socialist models – are an adequate response to this socialist calculation problem, which they think is a fundamental problem of socialism. So I’m engaged in active exchanges with them. There’s a special issue, it’s going to come out, I think, sometime later this year, or maybe next year, which will be an exchange along those lines.

And then I’m also working on a paper with political scientist Dan Greenwood where we really try to see where this debate is currently at. Which problems of socialism is the cybersocialist models, such as the ones we discussed, able to overcome and which problems maybe still remain?

[ATO] For the people watching, you’re saying that there’s work remaining to be done on integrating an opportunity cost model of central planning with consumer feedback with a multi-year investment planning model. And so if there’s somebody watching who thinks that they’re up to the task, that’s something to consider

We’ll leave it there. Thank you very much for joining me, again, Philip Dapprich, talking about introducing opportunity cost valuations and multiple production techniques into central planning. Because these are, these are two of the most fundamental issues, most fundamental criticisms, that can be made of central planning as a model. And so it’s very interesting to see the work that you’ve been doing. It’s very interesting and important on a general note.

In terms of this channel, I focus largely on post-capitalist futures. I think there are essentially three main categories, I think, of both capitalist features. The first is some variety of market socialism. The other is central planning. And then there’s economic planning, it’s in another way. So Participatory Economics is the best example. And what I’m interested in is in each of these models has been developed to its greatest extent. I think we all benefit from that. I’m not interested in just picking a horse, and following that. I certainly have opinions on what I think is good about each of these. I think that the work you’re doing is very important is what I’m trying to say.

[PD] Yes, thank you very much. And I agree that it’s important to consider different models. And obviously, I have I have a horse in this race. But I’m also always interested in engaging with alternative approaches. And I think there’s, for example, a serious debate to be had about what role of markets can or should play under socialism. Obviously, under certain circumstances, they can yield efficient outcomes. I think what I’m trying to show is that, I mean, we do use something like markets for consumer products, something vaguely resembling markets anyways. What I’m trying to show is that maybe you don’t need markets to determine an optimal plan. Maybe you can actually do it in another way as well. But even if that’s right, that doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s the best way. So, I think we need to look into other models as well and need to have these discussions. And yes, it’s good that people are working on other proposals.

[ATO] Okay. But it’s been great to talk about your proposal. And so thank you very much for joining me.

[PD] Yes, thank you so much. It was very pleasant discussion.

[ATO] Thank you for watching.

If you got anything from this video, then please press the Like button, consider Subscribing, and, if you really enjoyed it, then repeat every word at the top of your lungs like they did in Occupy Wall Street.

There’s a lot more to come. We’ll keep exploring better futures for humanity until we get there.

And as always, I want to read your thoughts in the Comments section below. This channel has a wonderful audience, and there are usually some very interesting comments under the video, so let’s continue that.

That’s all for now. Our democratic future lies After The Oligarchy.

References

Dapprich, Jan Philipp (2021). Optimal Planning with Consumer Feedback: A Simulation of a Socialist Economy.

Dapprich, Jan Philipp (2020). Rationality and Distribution in the Socialist Economy. PhD thesis.

Η Αυγερινή Γάτση από το πρόγραμμα του «Μπουλουκιού», και ο Σωτήρης Μητραλέξης από το mέta | Κέντρο Μετακαπιταλιστικού Πολιτισμού, που διοργανώνει το «Μπουλούκι», μιλούν στις 15/6 στον τηλεοπτικό σταθμό «Θεσσαλία Τηλεόραση» για τη λαρισινή στάση του Μπουλουκιού μας.

Επόμενοι σταθμοί:

*Δευτέρα, 04 Ιουλίου: ΧΑΝΙΑ || «Σαν Σαλβατόρε» || Ώρα έναρξης: 21.00

*Τρίτη, 05 Ιουλίου: ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΟ || Πύλη Βηθλεέμ || ‘Ωρα έναρξης: 21.00

*Πέμπτη, 14 Ιουλίου: ΑΘΗΝΑ || Δημοτικό Θέατρο Ρεματιάς Χαλανδρίου || ‘Ωρα Έναρξης: 21.00

Περισσότερες πληροφορίες για το «Μπουλούκι», εδώ:

Κέντρο Τεχνών Δήμου Αθηναίων Τετάρτη 29 Ιουνίου | 18:30

Μία ανοικτή συζήτηση γύρω από τα ζητήματα που εγείρει η έκθεση «BurningIssues – Merimbula» της Δανάης Στράτου, την οποία παρουσιάζει ο Δήμος Αθηναίων στο Κέντρο Τεχνών του Δήμου Αθηναίων, θα πραγματοποιηθεί την Τετάρτη 29 Ιουνίου στις 18:30,παρουσία της εικαστικού και του επιμελητή της έκθεσης Χριστόφορου Μαρίνου.

Στην εκδήλωση θα συμμετάσχουν οι ομιλητές:
Χριστιάνα Γαλανοπούλου, Ιστορικός τέχνης, καλλιτεχνική διευθύντρια του Φεστιβάλ MIR
Βασιλική Γραμματικογιάννη, Δημοσιογράφος περιβαλλοντικών θεμάτων στην ΕφΣυν και στην Athens Voice με τη στήλη Ecovoice

Αλεξάνδρα Κοροξενίδη, Κριτικός τέχνης, αρχισυντάκτρια της The Art Newspaper Greece
Χριστόφορος Μαρίνος, Ιστορικός τέχνης, επιμελητής εκθέσεων και δράσεων του ΟΠΑΝΔΑ
Κωνσταντίνος Πουλής, Δημοσιογράφος, εκδότης του The Press Project
Εύα Στεφανή, Καθηγήτρια Κινηματογράφου, Τμήμα Επικοινωνίας και ΜΜΕ ΕΚΠΑ
Δανάη Στράτου, Εικαστικός
Μάκης Φάρος, Multimedia καλλιτέχνης

Η έκθεση «Burning Issues – Merimbula» διοργανώνεται έως τις 10 Ιουλίου 2022 από τον Οργανισμό Πολιτισμού, Αθλητισμού και Νεολαίας του Δήμου Αθηναίων (ΟΠΑΝΔΑ) και αποτελείται από δύο εγκαταστάσεις, οι οποίες μεταμορφώνουν ριζικά το Κέντρο Τεχνών.
Τα δύο βασικά στοιχεία που χρησιμοποιούνται αντιπαραθετικά́ στην έκθεση είναι η αναπαράσταση ενός υγιούς δάσους, στη μία εγκατάσταση, και η βιντεοσκοπημένη εικόνα ενός φύλλου χαρτιού που φλέγεται ασταμάτητα με πολύ αργό ρυθμό, στην άλλη.
Η Δανάη Στράτου κατασκευάζει ένα εμβυθιστικό περιβάλλον, όπου η φωτιά, οι συμβολισμοί και οι καταστροφικές της συνέπειες παίζουν πρωταγωνιστικό ρόλο: οι επισκέπτες εισδύουν σε έναν χώρο πνευματικής αφύπνισης, σε έναν χώρο κάθαρσης και εξαγνισμού, με απώτερο σκοπό την καλλιέργεια της περιβαλλοντικής τους συνείδησης. Η έκθεση της Στράτου, η οποία είναι διεθνώς γνωστή για τις σύνθετες και μεγάλης κλίμακας εγκαταστάσεις της, ανταποκρίνεται πλήρως και με ιδιαίτερη ευαισθησία στα φλέγοντα ζητήματα της εποχής μας, όπως είναι η ανάγκη διαμόρφωσης μιας κοινωνικής-οικολογικής συνείδησης και η ενίσχυση του καθεστώτος περιβαλλοντικής ευθύνης.

Επιμέλεια έκθεσης: Χριστόφορος Μαρίνος, Ιστορικός τέχνης, επιμελητής εκθέσεων και δράσεων του ΟΠΑΝΔΑ

Διάρκεια έκθεσης: έως 10 Ιουλίου 2022
Ώρες λειτουργίας: Τρίτη – Παρασκευή 11:00 – 19:00 Σάββατο – Κυριακή 10:00 – 15:00, Δευτέρα κλειστά

Η είσοδος για το κοινό είναι ελεύθερη.

Κέντρο Τεχνών Δήμου Αθηναίων: Βασ. Σοφίας, Πάρκο Ελευθερίας

Πληροφορίες: 210 7232604, στάση Μετρό: Μέγαρο Μουσικής

Alexandria Shaner

We are social creatures – we like to be heard. Yet, an enduring tragedy of modern society remains that there are things more often left unsaid, in the rare occasion there is actually something to say. A heavy silence or a hurried, awkward transition takes the place of words when we can’t bring ourselves to find and voice them. As a step towards finding the words and overcoming the heaviness which hangs about so many of us these days, I would like to invite you into a conversation about the toll of dissent, and about building a better world. We could begin by examining the unsaid…

The following was originally composed as a selection of conversations with a friend in Russia, since the start of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. It was never published for fear that I would be unable to fully protect my friend’s anonymity. This friend is a fellow activist and dissident, who shares my notion that as advocates for change, it isn’t sufficient to just talk about what we don’t like about the world. We should also be able to seriously address the question: “So, you don’t like (insert least favorite ism here) capitalism, authoritarianism, imperialism, sexism, racism, classism, etc – then, what DO you want?”. Carving this path, my Russian friend and I occasionally correspond over a shared interest in developing theory, vision, & strategy for a Participatory Society.

As the war broke out in February, my friend began sending me reactions, in a stream of thought style. I tried to reply to the best of my ability, as an activist who, like most of us, wavers between feeling as if I can do nothing to alter the horrors of the world, to feeling as if I can, because we must. Activism aside, as a regular person receiving outbursts of pain and frustration from a friend, I do not waiver. I know what is needed is not necessarily all the solutions, or even answers, but active listening, a perspective from outside one’s own mind, solidarity, care, someone to stand as witness. Perhaps the difference we can all make as activists actually starts here, with the very personal. The act of listening transmutes an empty shout in the dark into something shared and named, dragging it out into the light, the first step in overcoming.

My idea for this essay was to present something different from academic conjecture, or even strategic analysis. I sought to put a highly personal, human face on experience and solidarity, via my friend’s shared reflections. They were to be presented as raw as possible, having been written informally for private communication, by a person for whom English is not a mother tongue. I had hoped this format would highlight the unfiltered, collective struggles and desires of regular people, as opposed to the desires and actions of imperial and for-profit warring powers, or even of the popular opinions of various thought factions. I had also hoped it would reflect friendship, that most powerful force of human-ness.

But, like I said, this piece was never published. Though I had first gotten permission from my friend to share their words (carefully and anonymously), once it was organized, edited, and ready for publication, I knew in my gut that it didn’t feel right. Without editing and redacting down to scraps, I could not share our conversations without leaving a trail to my friend. As the weeks passed and brutal crackdowns on Russians who dared to speak out, protest, share art, and in any way express dissent increased, I was glad of my choice. Though it is worthy to give visibility and voice to on-the-ground experiences – it would have put someone else in danger unnecessarily. It would have defeated the purpose of an essay conceived to show a path to solidarity and empathy between regular people, in the face of brutal conditions. The unsaid has many barriers.

While this war and other wars rage on, in the US, we have been reckoning with the violence of yet another school shooting, yet another racially motivated mass shooting, the attacks on women’s rights, prisoner’s rights, voting rights, and on our educational freedoms. Covid, climate, fascism, food shortages, and a litany of other wrongs makes up our day to day reality, landing on some directly, and on others as a kind of noxious, insidious white noise. Since my aforementioned international exchange, I’ve continued to encounter higher than normal levels of burnout and even existential stress lately among comrades, friends, and family, closer to home. I’ll admit that I was personally stung hard, and shocked at my own emotional vulnerability, by the news of Roe being summoned up to the executioner’s block. We are all vulnerable somehow, even when we think we have made ourselves strong.

This issue of the toll of dissent, of how to keep depression, fear, and hopelessness at bay, of how to take care of each other, how to pursue fulfillment and balance as activists and people of good intent, must not remain unsaid, it must be addressed. For my friend in Russia, for my friend’s sister in Detroit, for the man I saw rubbing his forehead at the grocery store checkout line, for the struggles of those who have come before, for my new baby cousin, for you, and for me, we must not pretend we are fine. And we must not be defeated.

This essay originally aimed to: provide a constructive activist outlook for people who share anti-war and internationalist sentiments, to open the conversation about the physical, mental and emotional toll that dissidence can take, and to offer community via the sharing of experiences. Pursuing strategy often means changing tactics to suit context, so I have shifted the form of this essay in the hope of preserving the message. I will first try to mitigate your loss at not being given a chance to read the words of my anonymous friend, by offering another Russian dissident perspective reacting to war and finding reason to rebel: an English translation of Alexandra Kollontai’s 1915, Who Needs the War. Her words are timeless and her sentiments, not unlike my friend’s. I would also encourage you to just listen to someone else’s reactions, and in doing so, contribute to giving voice to experience and support to a friend.

I had hoped the story created by sharing one personal conversation would resonate with many people of varied backgrounds, and perhaps become applicable to diverse crises beyond Russia and Ukraine. Instead, I’ll offer my own reflections, inspired by and distilled through many conversations, with many people from many places, over many years. This is my way to say something in a moment when there is something to say, to offer a fist in the air, and a hand across the divides.

What can I do when activism is making me depressed/anxious/hopeless?

Firstly, if something feels wrong, it just might be wrong. Stop and think, do not be afraid to question, to listen, to pause, and reflect. This general wisdom applies to activism too. If your activities feel harmful to your wellbeing, it is okay to stop, reflect, reconsider, and shift. A diversity of thought and practice is good for movements, and natural for people. Find your own path that you can sustain. You won’t always feel like a bucket of sunshine, of course, but don’t mistake adding your own suffering for alleviating others’ suffering. Take the long view.

I’ve hit pause, ready to reassess, now what?

Look to some kind of visionary thinking as a compliment to activism addressing immediate, urgent problems. Not just because I personally advocate for Participatory Society as a worthy and viable, post-capitalist alternative, and not even just because including vision is the best, most strategic way to practice activism and make continued gains, but also because vision is the yin to the yang of activism, in a personal sense.

There is outrage and there is vision. We can hold both at once to try to stay sane, and even balanced, once we have been politically awakened. Going back to ignorance is not really an option. Once you know, you know – you will not unsee just because it’s ugly. Though we may all fantasize about walking away when it gets too much, there will always be this consciousness somewhere lurking, and festering. Stopping is not really a viable longterm solution. Taking breaks, refreshing, balancing, yes – but just cutting out your awareness of the world and ignoring that you have a preference for how it could be better, no. In fact, it is often crucial for our mental health, in the darkest moments, to engage with our activism as a defiance against the paralysis of shock. The question becomes how to manage, how to be a balanced and fulfilled human, once we become activists.

Find balance? Sounds nice… heard it before… but how?

We need to express outrage and react to the problems of right now, especially when we feel personally shaken, as I felt about the current crisis around women’s rights in the US, as my friend felt about their country’s military aggression, etc. Experiencing and acknowledging a heartfelt and sane reaction to insane conditions is a healthy way to deal with it, rather than to pretend it’s not true.

It is vital to call out injustice, to never look the other way. For movements, it is important that outrage is heard, especially from first hand accounts. However, there is also no lack of outrage concerning many, if not most, of the problems in the world. Beyond self expression, it is not something that usually needs us to continue to sacrifice ourselves, get depressed over, and become burned out.

Practice non attachment to that which no longer serves you or your cause. Give yourself permission to let go, and then act on letting go of outrage. Not ignoring it, not denying it, but expressing it, acknowledging it, and then letting it go. Don’t let outrage drain and consume you. You are allowed to also have fun, be lighthearted, and look at the world around you for its beauty and potential, as well as for its troubles. You will not let your cause down by doing so, and you might even spark joy in others.

Very simply, it’s healthy to express outrage, but not to consume it, at least not serially. We often mistake consuming outrage and even suffering for activism – it isn’t. And if it is hurting your wellbeing, take a break.

Global climate change strike – No Planet B

With less outrage, what will fire my activism?

Explore and engage with worthy vision. There is a scene that struck me, even as a child, in the cartoon film version of Alice in Wonderland. Alice is lost and listlessly bumbling around Wonderland when she meets the Cheshire Cat at a fork in the road. She asks him politely, which way she ought to go from here? He informs Alice that the answer to her question depends greatly on where she is heading – to which she replies that she doesn’t much care where. The cat dissolves into a wicked swirling grin as he taunts, “Then it doesn’t matter which way you go!”.

Activists sorely need to conceive and share a worthy social vision to overcome cynicism, to share strategic orientation, to guide practice and experimentation, and to retain commitment against serious opposition. We need to engage in discussion about where we want to go, why we want to get there, and how we might carve a path. Vision is for running towards something, when it is insufficient to just run away.

Once we break the habit of consuming outrage as if it is our duty, we will create space for vision. We should consistently consume vision. Outrage might get attention, but vision begets hope and is constructive. Outrage will drain you, vision will sustain you. These are general things people might say all the time, but it’s not until you are in the midst of acute, immediate crisis, that they become more true than trite.

When you have that outraged, exhausted, or even empty feeling, try to translate a disgust for the present condition into a vision for a better possibility. Connect current suffering to systems, which are human-made and changeable, not inevitable. This is the important part. This is the empowering voice you should develop and continually use. This is the magic formula and the lifeline.

How, exactly, might I start?

This part is personal, though that doesn’t mean you must discover it alone.

Sharing and talking with others is a very good thing. Developing community around wellbeing is a way to help yourself while helping others, and it can even create venues and mechanisms that remain and develop beyond your own need. Talk it out, share, listen, come together. Having fun is not frivolous, it can be mutual aid.

Little, practical changes can be pivotal. Tune in to your own daily circumstances and habits, reflect on how they are making you feel, and perhaps try adjusting something.

Don’t over consume images that eat away at you – doom scrolling, scrolling in general. Reconsider letting your feeds define your information intake.

Have good words in your ears, good music too. This can be politically themed, or totally unrelated. The environmental and sensory experiences in which we are saturated affect us, greatly.

For the activist with a heavy heart, I sometimes recommend Rebecca Solnit’s Hope in the Dark, or A Paradise Built in Hell. She pursues truth with beauty, and the result was once uplifting, for me. Arundhati Roy is another writer who can use words in a way that I am able to find beauty, even joy and hope, within the most troubling realities. I had a few good laughs and was energized by reading some of the speeches in Lonnie Ray Atkinson’s recent satire, Don’t Think of a Republican. There are words out there for every taste – just have good words in your ears, consistently. They may even come from a friend.

Turn off the news for a bit. You don’t need to become an ostrich, just claim control of your intake, and occasionally step back to assess whether and how your news consumption is serving a purpose.

Music has even more diverse possibilities, so I hesitate to recommend any one tune at all – just that it is important. A song can affect your mood immediately, so curate your soundtrack to help give you what you need. Simple and powerful.

Laugh.

Don’t (completely) ignore your own needs: it could be a need for sleep, exercise, regular hours, ritual, daylight, good food, camaraderie, art, nature, whatever. We all over do it – but just as no one can learn for you or do push ups for you, no can sleep for you or smile for you.

Taking care of each other, and of our future, also means taking care of ourselves. I don’t necessarily mean naps and bubble baths, unless that is really important to you. I mean that it is a very human and healthy state of being to be conscious of the world around you, and to imagine how it might be better. This state of being is to be encouraged and celebrated. It is not a curse, and should not mean that we also must wallow in endless suffering, oppressing ourselves further even than the systems we fight to change. Remembering and embracing life’s authentic pleasures is not selling out, it is not a commodity for purchase, it is in fact a power that we can and must take back as we fight for a better world.

Does it even matter what I do, or how I feel?

Yes. It matters immensely. In fact, your question has been on my mind lately in the form of an unassuming image that, like a catchy tune, I can’t seem to shake. Let me explain…

I’m a sailor, a traveller. I recently visited a place I hadn’t been to in many years, so I climbed up to to the highest place to look around. Atop this view point rests an old church and community cistern. There, I saw a little printed out and hastily laminated sign stuck to the outside of the meeting hall. The scene is beautiful, but far from grand, set in a very small community of about 250 people who call the tiny Caribbean island of Mayreau their home. Mayreau is the smallest inhabited island in the Grenadines, and was once considered the poorest island in the Caribbean. Though these days it has become an increasingly popular tourist spot for people to visit by boat (the island has no airstrip), it is still very quiet, and very poor (if measured using traditional, first world economic metrics). The point being that the people of this community know what it means to confront hardship, scarcity, and to collectively manage resources: food, water, tools, care, education, etc. They have weathered hurricanes, drought, changing conditions of fisheries, influxes and disappearances of outside investment and development schemes, and now Covid. Mayreau is not some kind of utopian community, but, they are intimately aware that when things get tough, survival demands us to come together to keep going.

Back to the undecorated little sign that inspired this story – it said, simply: “I protect you, you protect me, we’re in this together”. I assume it was a reference to Covid and observing social distancing, masking, and other sanitary measures, because it was posted next to the meeting hall’s government issued plaque of a stick figure coughing with a big red X over it. If you live on a tiny island with no hospital, containing outbreaks of a virus like Covid19 takes on an even more urgent, and social consideration. That is the obvious lesson.

But why does this unassuming little sign continue to linger in my mind? What other unfinished business needs to be worked out? I protect you, you protect me, we’re in this together. I care for you, you care for me, we’re in this together. Perhaps there is a simple mantra here that we can adopt, beyond the obvious, beyond Covid, and beyond the searing heat, the increasingly dry ground, and the dwindling catches of a precarious island community. Perhaps, like a good mantra, it sums up in twelve words what I have used three thousand to try to convey: we are all sometimes in need, we are all sometimes able to give, and we are all in this together. The need could be physical, mental, or emotional, or maybe even just for someone to hear us, to witness and acknowledge our struggle. This mantra does not imply that we must all always agree or get along to become community. It allows for diversity and dissent. It is instead, a source of regenerative power – giving by receiving, and vice versa. The benefit is both in the doing, and the receiving.

To me, this mantra suggests that activism itself is not actually the cause of our fatigue, but a cure. It is my senses of perception, my eyes, ears, smell, taste, and touch who observe the world. It is my mind and my empathy who discover wrongs. It is a sense of hopelessness that is my enemy. It is a trajectory of isolation that convinces me that I am lost. It is your action, in the face of similar conditions, that inspires me. It is my action, guided by a vision for better, that rescues me. Through your activism, you bring back hope. Through my activism, I rescue myself. We participate in building community in which we rescue each other, plant the seeds of the future, and begin to live our vision, over and over again. Activism is at once personal and social, and in this way it is a regenerative process. I care for you, you care for me, we’re in this together.

Let’s keep talking.

The toll of dissent takes many forms. Longterm wellbeing is one crucially important aspect for activists, and for everyone really. I am grateful to all of you who have bravely shared your pain and frustration with me, it not only gives me a chance to be a friend, but it also gives me courage in reckoning with my own ups and downs. I hope anyone who reads this will share their own reactions, tips, and ideas, as this was always meant to be a conversation. Let’s not leave things unsaid.

I’ll leave off with a recognition that while this is an attempt to address a serious concern as a strategic activist and as a human being, I do not presume to offer a perfect solution, just to share. I get blue too, and sometimes also grumpy enough to clear a room. But I’m proud of your struggle, and everyone’s struggles, for a better world. In the midst of darkness, your struggle brings me joy and solace – and I hope you may accept the same pride, joy, and solace from mine.

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